SADRIST PARLIAMENTARIAN ON HOW TO DISSOLVE JAYSH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001619

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PNAT PTER KDEM KISL IZ
SUBJECT: SADRIST PARLIAMENTARIAN ON HOW TO DISSOLVE JAYSH
AL-MAHDI

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: In a May 9 meeting with PolCouns,
Sadrist Council of Representatives member and Moqtada as-
Sadr advisor Baha al-Araji said he expected more intense
negotiations before a cabinet is agreed upon. Al-Araji
said that Tawafuq has changed its mind on which
ministries it wants. Al-Araji predicted that, while no
agreements had been reached on any ministries yet, some
current ministers, such as the Sadrist Transportation
Minister Salam al-Maliki, will not serve in the next
government. Al-Araji also said that a jobs creation
program would be the best solution to the militias'
problem, as long as it is not advertised as a program to
dissolve militias. He also pushed for a meeting between
a U.S. Congressional delegation and Sadrist Council of
Representative members, arguing that Moqtada al-Sadr
would approve of such a meeting and it would build
bridges between Coalition Forces and the Sadrists. End
Summary

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Government Formation Disputes
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2. (C) Sadrist Council of Representatives (CoR) member
Baha al-Araji told PolCouns in a May 9 meeting, that
Moqtada al-Sadr gave him much authority to negotiate
government formation on behalf of the Sadrist bloc,
including selecting ministers. The Sadrists agreed with
the broader Shia Islamist Coalition stance that the
Ministries of Interior, Finance, and Electricity must be
headed by non-party technocrats chosen by the Shia
Coalition. According to al-Araji, one thing is for
certain: Sadrist Salam al-Maliki will no longer serve as
Minister of Transport, but will instead serve in the
Council of Representatives.
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To End Jaysh Al-Mahdi
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3. (C) PolCouns told al-Araji that the Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) was clearly involved in extra-judicial killings and
posed a serious threat to Iraqi national unity. It and
other militias would have to be an issue for the next
government. Araji did not deny JAM excesses, although he
did deny that Sadr had much operational control over the
armed men fighting in his name. Araji stated that any
plan aimed at dissolving Shia militias should not be
advertised as such because it will sound provocative.
Talk of requiring the Jaysh al-Mahdi to disband will
merely stir Moqtada as-Sadr to defend it publicly, he
cautioned. Instead, he argued for a jobs program and
avoiding any mention of militias. Araji said the JAM
fighters rarely are deeply committed to the Jaysh; he
boasted, "Give me 25,000 jobs and I will end Jaysh al-
Mahdi." JAM members are simply young men with no money.
According to al-Araji, JAM members would rather work
steady, safe jobs and earn 10-15 USD per day rather than
earning 200 USD for planting an improvised explosive
device (IED) in the path of a Coalition Forces (CF)
convoy. (Comment: In talk that reminds of old Arab
socialist ideas in places like Egypt, he spoke of
launching big farming projects in the desert to employ
these Shia youth. End Comment.)

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Moqtada al-Sadr Disapproves of Sharia Courts
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4. (C) PolCouns also cautioned that the extra-judicial
"Sharia" courts operated by the Jaysh al-Mahdi represent
a threat to the security of ordinary citizens. Al-Araji
argued that Moqtada al-Sadr disapproves of these courts
but gangs of JAM members acting independently run them,
and Moqtada al-Sadr cannot stop them. "Jaysh al-Mahdi is
not as well-organized as you think," he argued to
PolCouns. Al-Araji cautioned against using force against
these gangs because, "putting too much pressure on JAM
will split the group, and neither you (i.e., CF) nor
Moqtada will be able to control them."

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Hospitality - Moqtada al-Sadr Style
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5. (C) Baha al-Araji told PolCouns that, despite Moqtada
al-Sadr's order to his advisors not to meet with
Americans, he thinks it would be possible to arrange for

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a U.S. Congressional delegation to meet with Sadrist CoR
members. Congressmen are not closely tied to President
Bush's administration, al-Araji argued, and so it should
be possible to convince other Sadrist CoR members to meet
them. Moqtada al-Sadr would agree because such a meeting
would make him look like a real statesman, al-Araji
opined. Al-Araji even said that, perhaps eventually,
U.S. Congressmen could meet with Moqtada al-Sadr himself.

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Comment
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6. (C) Araji was adamant that our meeting be kept secret,
as he worried Moqtada might react badly to hearing about
it. (We had to meet at another politician's home at
night.) We have seen al-Araji in many meetings with
Prime Minister-designate al-Maliki as they put together
the new cabinet. What is less clear to us is whether or
not Sadr has really delegated wide authority to al-Araji
on naming Sadrist ministers. We have seen Sadr abruptly
dismiss or shelve advisors before; it is not our
impression that his advisors have such a long leash.
Araji's comments about a jobs program being essential to
disbanding militias is not new from him, and it is a
point we hear many contacts, Shia and Sunni, reiterate.
What was more interesting was his point that American and
other Coalition officials talking publicly about
disbanding the militias will sound like a challenge to
Moqtada that will actually impede efforts to disband
groups like the Jaysh al-Mahdi.
KHALILZAD