Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD1559
2006-05-10 19:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

CABINET FORMATION UPDATE: PROGRESS BUT STILL A

Tags:  PGOV PNAT KDEM IZ 
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VZCZCXRO0282
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #1559/01 1301912
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101912Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4379
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001559 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: CABINET FORMATION UPDATE: PROGRESS BUT STILL A
DISTANCE TO GO

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001559

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: CABINET FORMATION UPDATE: PROGRESS BUT STILL A
DISTANCE TO GO

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: At the close of May 10, we see
progress in the cabinet formation negotiations, with some
ministries, such as the Foreign Ministry, Electricity and
Oil, nearly finalized while debates about several
ministries crystallized. Prime Minister-designate al-
Maliki and Shia Coalition Independent Hussayn Shahristani
both said that Interior and Defense ministry candidates
are still up for discussion. There was no agreement over
who would hold the Planning, Trade, Housing and Justice
ministries. In particular, there appears to be a real
fight shaping up about the Planning Ministry between the
Iraqiya List and the Tawafuq Front. There apparently was
agreement on May 10 to allocate the Health Ministry to
the Tawafuq Front, although whether the Sadrists will
readily relinquish it is less clear. Hewar's Saleh
Mutlak still insisted on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
rejecting appointments to head the Ministry of Culture or
the Ministry of Human Rights. Allawi appeared ready to
engage more seriously in negotiations with the Kurds and
the Shia Coalition about the cabinet. After Tawafuq's
talks on May 10 with Prime Minister designate Nuri Kamel
al-Maliki, a top Tawafuq official claimed that the Shia
Coalition was not negotiating in good faith and
threatened to air its grievances publicly. Much of this
chatter and swirling is standard fare in Iraqi politics -
a rough sport at the best of times. Our sense is that
there is a great deal of fluidity and that there is
progress being made. That said, the final deal is still
some time off, and the Sadrists could play a real spoiler
role. End Summary.

--------------
Kurdish Views: Progress and Blockages
--------------


2. (C) Kurdish Alliance negotiator Barham Salih told
Charge on the evening of May 10 that he was "90 percent"
likely to be nominated a deputy prime minister with
responsibility for economic issues. (Comment: Senior
Shia Islamist Coalition negotiator Hussayn Shahristani
told Charge earlier May 10 that Salih would be the DPM

for economic issues, although he expressed concern about
whether Salih and Prime Minister al-Maliki would have a
workable relationship. End Comment.) Salih said he had
just finished talking to Kurdistan Region President Masud
Barzani who had agreed that the Kurdish Alliance would
accept the deal offered by the Shia Islamists that
included

-- the Foreign Minister slot with Hoshyar Zebari again;
-- the Water Ministry with Abdel Latif Mohammed;
-- the Industry Ministry with Fawzi Hariri;

Salih said that the Kurdish Alliance was also pressing to
secure the Housing Ministry for a KDP woman named Bayan
and also a lesser ministry, such as environment or
cultural affairs. During the conversation with Charge,
Barzani called Salih back and asked Salih to push for an
extra Minister of State slot so that the Kurds could give
it to a Yazidi. Salih noted that the Shia Coalition was
trying to get the Kurds to trade Housing for Justice
(Shahristani confirmed this to in our conversation with
him). Salih said that while the Kurds had many good
judges, they had no political figures who needed to be
rewarded and who would be appropriate for Justice. Thus,
they were going to hold firm to their demand for the
Housing Ministry.


3. (C) Another Kurdish negotiator, Fuad Masum, told
PolCouns on May 10 that the key obstacle to government
formation was internal division within the various blocs.
Masum noted that Iraqiya was not acting as a unified
coalition: both individuals within Iraqiya (such as Adnan
Pachachi and Wa'el Abd al-Latif) and parties (such as the
Communist Party) were negotiating separately with the
Shia Coalition in the hopes of getting ministry
appointments. Masum said that Masum confirmed that
Barham Salih and Hoshyar Zebari (Deputy Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister, respectively) would definitely be
nominated, and the KDP would name a woman for one of
their ministerial slots. Masum said PUK Politburo member
Mohammad Tawfiq might also be awarded a ministry.


4. (C) According to Masum, the Shia Alliance would
continue to put forward Bayan Jabr al-Solagh for Interior
as long as the Sunni Arabs insisted on nominating Khalaf
al-Ulayan for Defense. As for some of the other

BAGHDAD 00001559 002 OF 004


candidates, Masum judged that Husayn al-Shahristani would
be a smart and capable Minister of Oil, but too prone to
see things through a sectarian lens. Masum said he did
not know Fadhila Party Trade Minister candidate Ali al-
Dabbagh well. Noting that al-Dabbagh was a new Fadhila
member, Masum questioned the character of a party that
would elevate al-Dabbagh to head of the Political Bureau
within a few weeks of membership.

--------------
PM Maliki trying to complete the puzzle
--------------


5. (C) Prime Minister-designate Nuri al-Maliki told the
Charge May 10 that competition between the Tawafuq Front
and Iraqiyya List was holding up progress in completing
his cabinet. Maliki said both of those lists were
competing over the planning minister position but the
Iraqiya List's Mehdi Hafez as the more capable candidate.
Maliki appealed to the Charge for help in bringing
Tawafuq and Iraqiyya to agreement on the issue. The
Charge also highlighted the importance of finding good
ministers for the Health and Transport Ministries where
the incumbents have made cooperating with us very
difficult.


6. (C) Maliki said he remained committed to keeping
finance, interior, defense and electricity out of the
political quota system. He said he still did not have a
solid candidate to be the Interior Minister, however.
Maliki said he was determined to put a civilian in that
post and planned to take his time to make sure he gets it
right. He also indicated he had made no decision on the
defense ministry and did not indicate when he would do
so. The Charge urged Maliki to keep the focus on
professionalism in all posts and to plan early for an
inaugural address that strikes a note of unity and
reconciliation. Maliki said he planned to work on those
themes. Maliki said he already had indications that some
armed groups were ready to seek a negotiated settlement
with the government. He added that he had attempted to
send a positive message on that front in his press
remarks the previous day.

--------------
Shia Coalition Negotiator Outlines Final Deal
--------------


7. (C) Shia Islamist Coalition negotiator Hussayn
Shahristani subsequently told Charge May 10 that the
pieces of the cabinet were falling into place, although
some important questions remain:

-- The Interior Minister is still unidentified. Muwafaq
Rubai'e, Qassem Daoud and Tawfiq al-Yasiri all are
unacceptable to the Shia Coalition which has the right to
name the minister. He said it could be a retired
security force officer, but he did not know who.

-- Similarly, the Defense Minister had to be named still
by the Sunni Arabs. He thought National Guard General
Muhammad Abd al-Qadir al-Mufraji might be acceptable.
(Salih also mentioned his name as a possibility although
he expressed strong preference for a civilian defense
minister.)

-- Maliki would not want any assistant ("muawun") prime
ministers - the two deputies would suffice.

-- Hoshyar Zebari would remain as Foreign Minister, but
a new Minister of State for Foreign Affairs would be
established for the Shia Islamist Coalition.
(Shahristani said that Coalition group SCIRI was pushing
for Akram al-Hakim, the old National Assembly Foreign
Relations Committee chair, for this post, but Shahristani
was not personally enthusiastic.)

-- At a May 10 meeting, the Shia Islamist Coalition
accepted that the Sunni Arab Tawafuq had a stronger
candidate for the Health Ministry and so would relinquish
it; now, he said, the Coalition leadership would have to
convince the Sadrists who had wanted it.

-- Shahristani said the Kurdish Alliance was pushing to
secure the Housing Ministry, but the Shia Islamist
Coalition so far was reserving it for the Sadrists who,
Shahristani said, would retain current minister Jafar in
his job.

-- He said the Shia Islamist Coalition was trying to

BAGHDAD 00001559 003 OF 004


convince the Kurds to accept the Justice Ministry, on top
of the Foreign Ministry and the Water Ministry, and two
"lesser" ministries such as Environment, Human Rights,
and Science.

-- Shahristani confirmed he is the Shia Coalition's
candidate for the Oil Ministry and that the Fadhila Party
would get no major ministry after its "corrupt
performance" at the Oil Ministry during the Jafari
government.

--------------
Tawafuq Ministerial Deal in Flux
--------------


8. (C) Tawafuq official Ala'a Maki told Poloff on May
10 that PM-designate Maliki was "playing with us." At
this point, Tawafuq wants the Ministries of Planning,
Education and Health, Maki said. He claimed that Maliki
had told Tawafuq leaders that he was making no
commitments and for Tawafuq to go and negotiate with Sadr
for the Health Ministry - a silly proposal in his view.
Maki said that meanwhile the initial offer to Tawafuq of
Finance was withdrawn, then Trade was offered and then
Planning was substituted for Trade only to be again
withdrawn. (Shahristani told us May 10 that the Tawafuq
Front should accept the Trade Ministry and that Tawafuq
negotiator Tariq al-Hashimi had agreed to do so.
However, Salih told us May 10 evening that President
Talabani had signed a letter signaling Kurdish support
for Tawafuq candidate for the Planning Ministry, Ali
Baban. Baban called us himself late May 10 complaining
that he did not want the Trade Ministry that the Shia had
again proposed. Clearly unhappy, he warned the Embassy
not to undercut his bid.)


9. (C) Asked what Tawafuq would do, Maki on May 10 said
they would meet and decide on the next steps. Maki said
one possibility would be a Tawafuq press conference to
voice displeasure. Poloff cautioned that it was best to
continue to negotiate and not escalate the differences to
the public forum.

--------------
Allawi getting involved
--------------


10. (C) Senior Iraqiya member Safia Suhail told PolOff
on May 10 that she had finally convinced Ayad Allawi to
personally enter government negotiations. She said
Allawi had arranged to meet President Jalal Talabani the
evening of May 10 to talk cabinet slots. Suhail said
that Allawi also agreed to meet with Prime Minister
designate Nuri Kamel al-Maliki this week. Suhail
reported that Iraqi Communist Party leader Hamid Mousa
officially represents Iraqiya at Parliament. Suhail
added that on May 11 Iraqiya general membership will meet
with Allawi.

--------------
Mutlak Still Eyes MFA
--------------


11. (C) Hewar's Saleh Mutlak told Poloff on May 10 that
he had not gone into the CoR chamber to participate in
the day's debates. Instead, true to form, he planted
himself in front of the press area and began giving a
series of interviews. He told Poloff that he has not
given up on his quest to become the Foreign Minister and
asked for Embassy support. He rejected the two
ministries that he claimed to have been offered (Culture
and Human Rights),demanded four ministries and insists
that he will go into opposition if his demands are not
met. Poloff reminded Mutlak that the Embassy is not
selecting ministerial candidates and he would have to
negotiate with the major political blocs for positions.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) Today's contacts describe a situation that is
still fluid but slowly crystallizing. The sensitive
Foreign Ministry, the Oil Ministry and the Electricity
Ministry jobs all appear done. The Kurdish Alliance
appears close to finalizing its overall package; finding
a lowly Minister of State slot for a Yazidi cannot be a
deal breaker. Not surprisingly, satisfying the Sunni
Arab Tawafuq and Hewar leaders, and the fickle Allawi
team, will be harder. In particular, we see a possibly

BAGHDAD 00001559 004 OF 004


sharp but short contest for the Planning Ministry over
the next couple of days. It will be interesting to see
if Allawi backs up his occasional political ally, Mehdi
Hafez, for the Planning Ministry job. Behind all of
this, however, there is the issue of satisfying the
Sadrists who are still smarting over the rejection of
their PM candidate, Ibrahim Jafari. The Kurds and the
Sadrists are wrestling over the Housing Ministry; the
Tawafuq and the Sadrists may wrestle over the Health
Ministry. Moreover, we and some of our contacts are
uncomfortable with the Sadrists' control over the
Transport Ministry where their minister causes big
problems with airports and the Sadrists exploit control
over the money and jobs tied to Basrah and Khor Zubayr
ports to their political advantage. Shahristani himself
pondered this problem and wondered how to fix it. We
could still see the Sadrists throw grains of sand into
negotiating gears over the next few days to slow the
process down.


SATTERFIELD