Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD1286
2006-04-20 10:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

CAUTIOUS BEGINNINGS TO FOOD SUBSIDY REFORM

Tags:  EAGR ECON ETRD KCOR KDEM KPRV PGOV IZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001286 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2016
TAGS: EAGR ECON ETRD KCOR KDEM KPRV PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: CAUTIOUS BEGINNINGS TO FOOD SUBSIDY REFORM

REF: A. BAGHDAD 375

B. BAGHDAD 241


C. 2005 BAGHDAD 5079

D. 2005 BAGHDAD 4559

E. 2005 BAGHDAD 4108

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David Satterfield, reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001286

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2016
TAGS: EAGR ECON ETRD KCOR KDEM KPRV PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: CAUTIOUS BEGINNINGS TO FOOD SUBSIDY REFORM

REF: A. BAGHDAD 375

B. BAGHDAD 241


C. 2005 BAGHDAD 5079

D. 2005 BAGHDAD 4559

E. 2005 BAGHDAD 4108

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David Satterfield, reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Evidence on the ground indicates that the
GOI intends to reform -- and eventually eliminate -- its
Public Distribution System (PDS),a $3 billion subsidy
program that fails in its mission of ensuring food security
for all Iraqis. The Embassy PDS Reform Team (chaired by
Embassy Econ) supports this decision as economically
necessary and will provide advice and assistance to the GOI
as appropriate. The PDS, managed by the Ministry of Trade
(MoT),is reportedly foul with corruption and drains
government revenues that could be used for essential public
services. It hinders agricultural and private-sector
economic development by setting up the MoT as the dominant
buyer of high-grade wheat and rice in Iraq and as a no-cost
provider of other food and living items. The GOI has said
that it intends to cut "nonessential" items from the PDS and
monetize it, establishing government reserves of key PDS
items to guard against price inflation and market shortages
and to act as a contingency stock in case of food
emergencies. The GOI recently carried out a monetization
experiment and touted its success as proof that it can
monetize the PDS effectively. The GOI has also implemented
policies -- albeit to a limited extent -- to encourage
private-sector development in food production, processing,
distribution, and marketing. The GOI has stated its
intention to phase out the PDS over the next four years,
freeing up a significant portion of its budget, and its 2006
PDS budget cut is evidence of GOI seriousness. Throughout
the PDS reform process, we will encourage the GOI to educate
the Iraqi public on the necessity and benefits of PDS reform
and link it to the recently launched Social Safety Net, which

is intended to protect the poorest Iraqis. End summary.

--------------
A Socialist Hindrance to Development
--------------


2. (C) The Public Distribution System (PDS) is a massive
subsidy program in which all Iraqis are entitled to receive a
monthly basket of foodstuffs and household items. The 2006
PDS budget is $3 billion, or 9% of Iraq's total government
budget. Another U.S. agency has estimated that the Iraqi
Ministry of Trade (MoT),which manages the PDS, spends
approximately $30 per monthly PDS basket, while the actual
market value per basket is around $9. Embassy market surveys
confirm this. According to Kareem Abdul Fajer (please
protect throughout),Director General (DG) of Foodstuffs (the
MoT state-owned enterprise responsible for procuring most
items in the PDS basket),transportation costs are $0.54 per
monthly basket. This leaves approximately $20 per monthly
basket that is lost to inefficiencies and corruption.


3. (C) The 2006 PDS budget of $3 billion is a 25% cut from

2005. In 2005 the MoT managed to spend only about $2
billion, or 50% of the budget, on actual procurement.
According to the British Department for International
Development (DFID) and the Iraqi Ministry of Finance (MoF),
the main hindrance to spending the entire 2005 budget was
contracting mismanagement within the MoT. (Note: The MoT
has stated that the problem was unavailability of funds from
the MoF. End note.) According to USAID/Food for Peace, in
the past the MoT has announced "executed contracts" that led
many of us to believe the food procurement was a completed
transaction. However, we later learned that delays in the
issuance of Letters of Credit, irregular financing
arrangements with foreign banks, and amendment requests by
suppliers often led to delays or cancellations of the
"executed contracts."


4. (C) Bi-weekly World Food Program (WFP) reports indicate
an average PDS delivery shortfall of nearly 77% over the last
six months of 2005. (Note: Using the $30 basket cost, the
amount of food procured by the MoT after spending $2 billion
roughly correlates to the 77% shortfall observed by the WFP.
End note.) U.S. military field reports confirm that most
Iraqis do not receive their entire allotted ration basket
each month. This is particularly damaging in the poorest
areas of Iraq -- located mainly in the far western regions of
Anbar and Ninewa provinces and pockets of southeast Iraq -
where, according to the 2003 UN WFP Baseline Food Security
Analysis (the most recent available),about a third of the
population is highly dependent on the PDS for survival.


5. (C) The PDS is reportedly corrupt at every stage of its

BAGHDAD 00001286 002 OF 004


operation, from procurement contracting to final distribution
of items to the Iraqi public. Deputy Prime Minister

al-Jabburi (strictly protect) has told us that Trade Minister
Mawlud skims money from sugar contracts. DG Kareem and MoT
Chief of Staff Azad Hussein Rasheed have stated that
PDS-laden trucks regularly disappear enroute to food
distribution points, and that MoT officials sometimes sell
PDS food articles to enrich themselves. A previous Iraq
Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) Trade Senior
Consultant strongly suspected that foreign wheat shipments
were being resold to fund terrorist operations and indicated
that the MoT Inspector General office was likely involved in
corrupt activities. Recent Iraqi press reports credit the
MoT with being the most corrupt ministry in the GOI. Local
Embassy hires confirm the widespread impression that
government officials at all levels of the MoT enrich
themselves through the PDS.


6. (C) The PDS hinders agricultural and private-sector
development by sapping entrepreneurial initiative and
encouraging dependence on the government. Deputy Prime
Minister Chalabi has told us that he instructed the MoT to
offer higher prices to Iraqi producers for wheat and rice
(ref B). (Note: We do not have evidence beyond verbal
assurances from MoT officials that they actually pay higher
prices to Iraqi producers. End note.) However, using
Ministry of Agriculture production estimates and MoT
procurement records, we estimate that less than half of Iraqi
wheat production is considered fit for PDS procurement, and
the farmers are currently only capable of producing about 12%
of annual PDS wheat needs. In addition, as ration recipients
and corrupt MoT officials reportedly sell PDS items into the
marketplace, they deflate and distort true market prices,
making it difficult for Iraqi farmers to recover production
costs on wheat and rice that they do not sell to the MoT. In
effect, the MoT has set itself up as the dominant buyer of
high-grade wheat and rice in Iraq, providing no incentive to
private-sector buyers to enter the market and decreasing the
need for GOI investment in distribution infrastructure that
would benefit small farmers and private distributors.

--------------
Cutting "Nonessential" Items
--------------


7. (C) According to DG Kareem, the most important items of
the PDS are flour, rice, sugar, and cooking oil, mainly
because Iraqis most need these items for daily living and
because Iraqi farmers are currently incapable of producing
sufficient quantities. "Nonessential" PDS items, according
to Kareem, make up 25% of PDS expenditures and include adult
milk, infant milk, baby food, beans, salt, tea, soap, and
detergent. According to Kareem and local sources, Iraqis
generally view these "nonessential" items as inferior in
quality and prefer to buy higher-quality replacements in
local retail markets. These same sources indicate that the
Iraqi recipients often sell the "nonessential" items for
income, though the income they receive is significantly lower
than what the GOI paid to provide the item initially. Kareem
has told us that the MoT plans to discontinue providing
"nonessential" PDS items in 2006. (Note: Though press
reports state that the MoT has done this, MoT sources
indicate it has not happened.)

--------------
Providing Freedom of Choice
--------------


8. (C) Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Chalabi recently told us
that the GOI plans to monetize the PDS, giving Iraqis the
opportunity to procure what they believe they need and
spurring private-sector development in areas that the market
(and not the government) dictates. Minister of Planning
Barhim Salih has echoed this position to Embassy officials,
and MoT Chief of Staff Azad has told us the MoT is conducting
studies in Dahuk and Muthana provinces to determine whether
or not Iraqis would embrace monetization. In any case, we
believe that PDS monetization would be a long and difficult
process.


9. (SBU) According to recent Baghdad market prices, the
annual cost to the GOI to provide every Iraqi with the
monetary equivalent of a PDS basket would be approximately
$2.7 billion. Embassy supports the monetization decision and
believes that the GOI should monetize gradually, starting in
a province where private food distribution and marketing
channels are already fairly strong, and then expanding to
other provinces over time. As the monetization program
spreads, the GOI will likely need to continue providing
flour, rice, sugar, and cooking oil to the provinces where
monetization has not yet been implemented.


BAGHDAD 00001286 003 OF 004



10. (C) The GOI recently completed a "catch-up" voucher
program, through which they compensated all Iraqi households

for food shortages from January through August 2005. The GOI
distributed approximately $450 million through over four
million vouchers, which Iraqis cashed at the nearest branch
of the Rafidan or Rashid state-owned bank. According to
Embassy, DFID, and GOI officials, the program was successful,
despite glitches in a few cities. DPM Chalabi said the
program demonstrated the GOI's ability to monetize the PDS
successfully.


11. (C) According to USAID's Agriculture Reconstruction and
Development Program in Iraq (ARDI),most of Iraq's retail
markets would likely be capable of providing sufficient
quantities of most PDS items in the absence of a
government-operated PDS. The main exception would possibly
be flour. Embassy Econ has collected market surveys that
monitor price and availability of PDS items across Iraq, and,
though the December fuel-price increases have caused food
prices to go up in some areas, most PDS items have been
readily available during "spot" surveys. It is uncertain how
much of the local markets' food comes from PDS items sold
into the market by undesiring recipients or corrupt MoT
officials.


12. (C) As the GOI gradually discontinues procuring immense
amounts of food, initially there may be supply shortages and
price spikes in certain areas as private markets become fully
functional. DPM Chalabi has said that the GOI plans to
maintain reserves of flour and rice to sell on the open
market at predetermined price marks (above market prices) to
help hedge against food-price inflation. Embassy supports
this action and believes that the GOI should also maintain
reserves of cooking oil and sugar because there is no
domestic production of these key PDS items. The GOI could
also distribute the reserves to impoverished areas if food
shortages occur.

--------------
Encouraging Private-Sector Growth
--------------


13. (C) DPM Chalabi told us that he has instructed the MoT
to procure domestically as much of its flour and rice
reserves as possible, exhausting all Iraqi procurement
options before turning to foreign suppliers. MoT Chief of
Staff Azad confirms that the MoT follows this policy. Iraq's
population is projected to grow to 43 million by 2030, and it
will need to import food supplies for the foreseeable future;
however, this policy of maximizing domestic procurement will
encourage Iraqi farmers to produce more wheat and rice,
traditionally strong agricultural products for Iraq. It will
also indirectly encourage private-sector development in
Iraq's food distribution and marketing channels.


14. (U) Embassy PDS Reform Team will encourage the GOI to
institute additional policies and programs to encourage
private-sector development in Iraq's food distribution and
marketing channels. One way would be for the GOI to sell its
imported wheat to Iraq's 120 privately-owned flour mills, and
for millers to in turn make a market in the flour they
produce through developing private-sector distribution
channels. Currently, the MoT provides wheat and pays the
mills to produce flour, which the MoT then distributes
through the PDS. Another way for the GOI to encourage
private-sector growth would be to target loan programs to
entrepreneurs who want to establish small- to medium-sized
food-processing or distribution companies. The GOI could
also use the savings from the declining PDS budget to improve
infrastructure and support programs that would contribute to
improved private-sector activity.

--------------
Eliminating the PDS
--------------


15. (C) The GOI has said it intends to eliminate the PDS
over a four-year period, gradually drawing down the budget as
food production, processing, and distribution strengthen and
freeing up resources for increased public investment.
Several GOI officials, including Finance Minister Allawi,
have said the PDS budget should be cut by 25 percent per year
for four years and then eliminated. The 25 percent budget
reduction from 2005 to 2006 supports the seriousness of these
official statements. (Note: The PDS budget was also cut by
20 percent from 2004 to 2005. End note.)


16. (U) PDS expenditure is not mandated as an economic
reform by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is a
reform that exceeds what the IMF has asked for (reform
through "enhanced financial monitoring and improved
procurement procedures") and demonstrates a progressive

BAGHDAD 00001286 004 OF 004


attitude by some Iraqi leaders toward subsidy reforms.


--------------
Educating the Iraqi Public
--------------


17. (U) As the GOI reforms and eventually eliminates the
multi-billion dollar PDS subsidy, Embassy will encourage the
GOI to link the recently implemented Social Safety Net to PDS
reform in the public mind. This new Safety Net is intended
to protect the poorest Iraqis as economic reforms are
implemented, and, according to Iraqi public affairs
officials, Iraqis will not be supportive of subsidy
reductions unless they believe the Safety Net works. We will
also encourage the GOI to educate average Iraqis on how
corruption and inefficiency have plagued the PDS system,
outweighing any benefits.


18. (SBU) Embassy Econ and the MoF co-chair the Economic
Reform Public Education Working Group, which also includes
Embassy Public Affairs, Treasury, USAID, DFID, the Iraqi
Government Communications Directorate (GCD),and
representatives from most Iraqi ministries. PDS reform
public-education messages could be coordinated effectively
through this working group, which is currently developing and
delivering public messages to support fuel-subsidy reductions
and anti-corruption efforts.

--------------
Comment: Stopping the Cultural Damage
--------------


19. (C) Two of the main impediments to Iraq's development of
a healthy market-driven economy are massive government
subsidies and endemic government corruption. The PDS
contributes significantly to both of these. Most critically,
however, there is no objective measure for how damaging the
current PDS is (and has been) to Iraq's development into a
free and democratic society. As long as the GOI continues to
pour billions of dollars into the PDS, average Iraqis will be
faced with a corrupt government bureaucracy that saps
personal initiative without supplying any real benefit to the
population. As MoT Chief of Staff Azad has told us: "We do
not want to teach the Iraqi people to be lazy." To achieve
the transparency and citizen self-reliance necessary for
successful democratic government, the GOI should eliminate
the PDS and continue to strengthen the new Social Safety Net
that supports Iraq's truly needy.


20. (U) We will do everything in our power to encourage the
new Iraqi government to continue the PDS reform policies of
its predecessor, following the established principles of
cutting "nonessential" items, providing freedom of choice
through monetization, encouraging private-sector growth,
gradually eliminating the PDS, and educating the Iraqi
citizenry.
KHALILZAD