CYPRIOT PRESIDENT GETS BOOST FROM PM ON HANDLING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000681

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016
TAGS: PREL CY GR CYPRUS
SUBJECT: CYPRIOT PRESIDENT GETS BOOST FROM PM ON HANDLING
OF CYPRUS ISSUE


Classified By: AMB. CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In Athens March 7-9 on one of his frequent
working visits, Cypriot President Papadopoulos met top party
leaders and GoG officials, including PM Karamanlis, and got a
boost for his handling of the Cyprus issue. In a joint press
conference, PM Karamanlis praised the February 28 UNSYG
Annan-Papadopoulos meeting in Paris as a step toward eventual
resumption of negotiations and reiterated that Turkey must
meet its EU obligations. Press coverage was universally
positive with the theme that the ball was now in Turkey's
court. Papadopoulos was once more able to command Greek
support in his efforts to place the onus on Turkey and the
Turkish Cypriots. END SUMMARY.

Papadopoulos Gets Boost From PM
--------------


2. (U) Cypriot President Papadopoulos, visiting Athens
March 7-9, met with the top Greek leadership, including PM
Karamanlis, President Papoulias and FM Bakoyannis, and got
strong statements of support for his handling of the Cyprus
issue and, implicitly, for his interpretation of his meeting
with the UNSYG. In a joint press conference after their
meeting, PM Karamanlis welcomed as an "extremely important
development" the February 28 meeting between UNSYG Annan and
Papadopoulos, a result of which was their proposal for
technical talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The PM
also stressed the need to create the proper conditions for a
resumption of talks "without constricting timelines" and
warned that "we do not have the luxury of another failure."
Karamanlis praised Cyprus for "once again" proving that it is
interested in a "just, lasting and viable" solution to the
problem.


3. (U) For his part, Papadopoulos, in answering a press
conference question, took a swipe at the U.S. interest in
direct trade with Cyprus. In so doing he rejected the
argument that such trade could help ease the isolation of the
Turkish Cypriots or equalize the economic imbalance between
the two sides.


4. (U) The visit attracted very positive and fairly
extensive press coverage, with reports emphasizing
Papadopoulos and Karamanlis agreeing that the ball is now in
Turkey's court and highlighting the need for Turkey to
implement the Ankara Protocol -- i.e., open its airports and
seaports to Greek Cypriot vessels.

Message to Papadopoulos
--------------


5. (C) In a March 8 meeting and in subsequent
conversations, MFA spokesman Koumoutsakos confirmed to poloff
that the private GoG message to President Papadopoulos was to
push to re-start negotiations. Asked if Greece worried that
Turkey's EU accession process might be in jeopardy if
negotiations do not resume, Koumoutsakos responded that it
was first and foremost Turkey's responsibility to honor its
EU obligations. However, he did admit that the GoG was
concerned that there was not a more positive environment
regarding a resumption of talks, even though publicly the GoG
was touting the February 28 Paris meeting as an important
step in this direction. Being able to indicate such
progress, he went on, would help the atmosphere within the EU
vis-a-vis Turkey when the Commission issues its avis in the
fall.


6. (C) Koumoutsakos rejected the notion that the GoG just
blindly supported whatever Papadopoulos proposed, saying that
former FM Molyviatis had been very active in moderating
Papadopoulos' behavior in the run-up to Turkey's October 3 EU
accession invitation. He added that this was in line with
the GoG's continued desire to keep its relations with Turkey
and the Cyprus issue on two different tracks.


7. (C) British Ambassador Gass told us that in his own
conversations, MFA Cyprus Director George Papadopoulos (no
relation) had told him that there was "understandable
euphoria" in Athens regarding the Annan-Papadopoulos meeting.
George Papadopoulos explained that President Papadopoulos'
idea for two parallel tracks -- one on
technical issues (health, the environment) and another more
substantial track that would deal with sensitive issues
(returns, for example) -- had essentially breathed new life
into efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem.

Annan Plan
--------------


8. (C) Ambassador met briefly with EU Enlargement
Commissioner Ollie Rehn, on the margins of Rehn's March 9
speech sponsored by ELIAMEP, one of Greece's premier foreign
policy thinktanks. Ambassador recalled that the European
Commission had decided in 2004 that the Annan Plan was not
inconsistent with the EU acquis. Lately, Ambassador said,
Nicosia had been making repeated assertions that its
accession to the EU in 2004 totally changed the circumstances
for reunification (and thereby calling into question the
Annan Plan's conformity with the acquis.) Ambassador noted
that, in fact, nothing had changed, and he continued to make
this point from time to time. Rehn took the point and said
he would similarly look for ways to recall that in its final
form the Annan Plan had been found to be not inconsistent
with EU norms. (Comment: Recently, FM Bakoyannis declared
the Annan Plan "history," but in the context that it had been
rejected in its current form by a large majority of Greek
Cypriots, not because it might be inconsistent with the EU
acquis or unable to serve as a framework for a solution. End
Comment.)


9. (C) COMMENT: Papadopoulos used his February 28 meeting
with Annan to leverage endorsement from PM Karamanlis and
others here for his efforts to portray himself as truly
interested in resuming talks under UN auspices, as well as to
place the onus on Turkey/Turkish Cypriots to respond to the
technical talks offer.
Ries