GETTING ATHENS ON BOARD WITH KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 003111

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV YI GR
SUBJECT: GETTING ATHENS ON BOARD WITH KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS

REF: SECSTATE 186217

Classified By: CDA THOMAS COUNTRYMAN. REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Embassy Athens is pressing the Greek
government, now that the Ahtisaari proposal has been delayed,
to avoid advocating any further delay. Ambassador and DCM
have urged senior officials, once the proposal is presented
in late January, to press Belgrade for a more constructive
engagement on behalf of the interests of Kosovo Serbs. Greek
officials agreed in principle but continued to insist on the
need to avoid Serbia's "humiliation." END SUMMARY.

MFA's ROCANAS
--------------


2. C) On November 21, DCM discussed Greece's role in the
Kosovo status process with MFA Director General Charalambos
Rocanas and MFA D2 Directorate for NATO/WEU Ambassador
Panayotis Zografos. The DCM noted Washington,s perception
that Greece had not been helpful on the Kosovo status process
because of its outspoken advocacy for a slow down. While we
understood that Greece has had legitimate concerns about
political stability in Serbia, now that UN Special Envoy
Martti Ahtissaari had announced a delay in the process,
Greece should not argue for further delays. Rather, it
should get on board with the desire of most of the members of
the Contact Group to move the process forward as quickly as
possible.


3. (C) Rocanas expressed agreement but with qualifications.
He agreed that there was no longer any need for Greece to
attempt to delay the process. Indeed, according to Rocanas,
Greece did not want to be perceived as an agent of the Serbs
and needed to cultivate good relations with Albanians both in
Albania and in Kosovo, who would be Greece's neighbors. At
the same time, Rocanas argued that Greece needed to maintain
a "moderate" tone. Publicly, the GOG needed to placate
uninformed Greeks who wanted to side with their fellow
Orthodox Serbs. Moreover, by taking a "moderate" approach,
Rocanas argued, Greece could support the pro-Western elements
and could be seen as a friend who could tell Serbia what it
needed to do. "Overdoing it would turn the Serbs into
Nazis." Lastly, Rocanas noted that unlike Secretary Rice's
call for what he termed a "dramatic" approach ("throw a frog
into boiling water and it will either drown or leap"),FM
Dora Bakoyannis preferred a quieter approach that would "let
the situation mature."

PM DIP ADVISOR BITSIOS
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4. (C) On November 24, the DCM discussed Kosovo with the PM's
Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Konstantinos Bitsios. In addition
to the points he raised with Rocanas, the DCM also noted the
importance of Serbian politicians thinking not only about the
next election but also future relations with the Kosovars.
Like Rocanas, Bitsios agreed that further delays were
unnecessary but also stressed the importance of Greece taking
a "moderate" tact with the Serbs. Bitsios said PM
Karamanlis, guiding principle on Kosovo was the need to
avoid "humiliating" the Serbs since to do so would only
invite more trouble.

MFA BALKANS OFFICE DIRECTOR CHRISTIDIS
--------------


5. (C) On November 30, Ambassador Ries discussed the issue
again with MFA Balkans office director Michael Christidis, a
key player in the GoG,s approach to Kosovo. Christidis
noted that Ahtisaari,s delay until after the January 21
elections in Serbia was useful. He thought that some Contact
Group members were getting &cold feet8 because Moscow --
and Beijing -- were showing more resistance than expected;
this would take some time to address. FM Bakoyiannis had
&suggested, I repeat, suggested8 to Ahtisaari that he
present his proposal after the new Serbian government was
established to avoid it becoming an issue in the political
process of forming a coalition. Athens understood, however,
the need to avoid drawing out the process; &our interest is
in regional stability.8 Christidis said that the GoG
continued to advise Belgrade to be more realistic in its
negotiations but was not getting any good response during the
election period. He said that Belgrade would not explicitly
accept any solution detaching Kosovo, but a plan could be
crafted that would gain Serbia,s &tacit acceptance.8


6. (c) Christidis also described last week,s meeting in
Athens between Bakoyiannis and Kosovo PM Ceku. Bakoyiannis
advised Ceku that Greece understand full well the
expectations of Kosovo Albanians. It was important, she
said, that the Kosovo government and political groups show
reserve and maturity in coming months, even if the Ahtisaari
proposal brought what Kosovars expect &only in phases8
(i.e., explained Christidis, if Kosovo did not immediately
have its own United Nations seat, foreign ministry, army,
etc.) Ceku told Bakoyannis that he understood fully the need
to avoid any unilateral moves.


7. (C) COMMENT: Post will continue to press the GoG to drop
the emphasis it laid (during the last several months) on
slowing the Kosovo process, while continuing to use their
influence with Belgrade to urge serious engagement. Perhaps
the main reason we expect to succeed is that on December 31
Greece will finish its two-year term on the UN Security
Council. We suspect that a major motivation for seeking
delay was so that Athens could avoid a lose-lose situation
(choosing to line up with the rest of the EU or with
Belgrade) when it came time for an actual public vote in New
York. END COMMENT.
COUNTRYMAN