Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ATHENS2282
2006-08-31 12:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:
LEBANON/IRAN: GREECE FOCUSES ON MIDDLE EAST IN
VZCZCXRO0248 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHTH #2282/01 2431235 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 311235Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6633 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0542 RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0164 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0250 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0558 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0121 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0196 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0177
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002282
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS UNSC IAEA GR IS CY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON/IRAN: GREECE FOCUSES ON MIDDLE EAST IN
ADVANCE OF UNSC PRESIDENCY
REF: A) STATE 143323 B) ATHENS 2178 C) STATE 137427
ATHENS 00002282 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002282
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS UNSC IAEA GR IS CY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON/IRAN: GREECE FOCUSES ON MIDDLE EAST IN
ADVANCE OF UNSC PRESIDENCY
REF: A) STATE 143323 B) ATHENS 2178 C) STATE 137427
ATHENS 00002282 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On August 30, DCM met with Ambassador
Kostas Chalastanis, director of FM Bakoyannis' cabinet, for a
readout of Bakoyannis' visit to Middle East capitals August
22-25. Chalastanis informed us that, in addition to her
consultations in Beirut, Amman, and Tel Aviv, Bakoyannis
would meet with the deputy directory of Iran's NSC, Mohammad
Nahavandian on August 31. Prior to that meeting, post
relayed ref A points to Chalastanis, emphasizing that
Nahavandian should leave Athens with a clear message that the
EU was united behind the P-5 1 and Iran should take up their
offer. Chalastanis agreed, noting that Greece had delivered
a similar message to Iranian officials in the past. Readout
of FM Bakoyannis' meeting with Nahavandian will follow
septel. END SUMMARY.
FM BAKOYANNIS TO MEET IRANIAN NSC DEPUTY
2. (C) During the August 30 meeting, Chalastanis noted that
the FM's trip was part of her preparation for Greece's UNSC
Presidency, which starts September 1. The FM would also see
the Iranian Deputy NSC director, Mohammad Nahavandian, on
August 31 to discuss Iran's position vis-a-vis the 5 1
proposal. The GOG planned to emphasize the importance of
Iran accepting the offer; it was not too late to reconsider.
On August 31, DCM delivered ref a points to Chalastanis in
advance of the meeting, stressing that Nahavandian should
leave Athens with a clear message that the EU was united
behind the P-5 1 proposal and that Greece strongly encouraged
Iran to take up their offer. Chalastanis agreed, pointing
out that Bakoyannis had delivered a similar message to the
last two Iranian visitors on this topic. Chalastanis
promised a readout of the discussion, which will follow
septel.
MIDDLE EAST TRIP: BAKOYANNIS GETS A DOWNBEAT MESSAGE . . .
3. (C) Reviewing the FM's visit, Chalastanis told the DCM
that all leaders shared deep concern about the fragile
situation in the region and the need to implement UNSC 1701.
Leaders both in Arab states and in Israel feared that
radicalism appeared to be gaining the upper hand over
moderate forces. The Jordanians were particularly concerned
about Hezbollah's increased power; they beleived urgent
reactivation of the peace process -- with U.S. support -- was
essential. The Jordanians were preparing some ideas to
prompt such reactivation, though it was unclear whether their
proposal would be within the framework of an Arab League
initiative to the U.N.
4. (C) However, Chalastanis noted that while the Israelis
were strongly against the Arab League proposal, they seemed
to be open to talks with Abbas -- provided he could form a
functional government (Israeli officials were skeptical).
Abbas himself told the FM that he continued efforts to form a
government "on the basis of principles, not persons" and
appealed for GOG support for economic development.
Chalastanis admitted that Abbas "did not seem very
optimistic," however. Looking ahead to Greece's UNSC
presidency, Chalastanis predicted that it would be hard to
avoid any UNSC discussion of Israel-Palestine should
proposals be brought to the table. That said, Chalastanis
agreed with DCM that it would be detrimental to all sides to
hold a highly-visible UNSC discussion on the topic that
achieved nothing.
5. (C) In Lebanon, PM Siniora was proud of the Lebanese
Army's swift deployment (Chalastanis said Siniora appeared
"astonished" they'd done so well). First on Siniora's agenda
now was lifting the blockade. But Lebanon also badly needed
UNIFIL troops on the ground and international support for the
reconstruction effort. Siniora told FM Bakoyannis that he
was working on efforts to fast-track reconstruction
financing. He also stated that both Lebanon and Syria wanted
to improve their bilateral relations. However, he believed
that Syria was preoccupied with internal issues.
. . . WHILE STRESSING IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC 1701
6. (C) DCM told Chalastanis that we appreciated FM
ATHENS 00002282 002.2 OF 002
Bakoyannis' strong support for implementation of UNSC 1701 in
her statements to the press. We remained concerned about
efforts during the Donor's Conference to urge "selective"
implementation -- for example, urging lifting of the blockade
by Israel without reference to other provisions regarding the
provision of weapons to Hezbollah. UNSC 1701 needed to be
implemented fully. Chalastanis agreed, citing the GAERC
statement as indicative of the EU's balanced approach.
7. (C) DCM probed Chalastanis on Greece's contribution to
UNIFIL. Certainly we welcomed the GOG's readiness to offer
naval assets; these would be important not just as a buffer
but as a tool for stopping and inspecting dubious cargo. Was
Greece also considering offering troops, such as an
engineering battalion? Chalastanis told DCM that a
commitment of Greek ground forces was not currently on the
table. He welcomed the Turkish government's decision to
participate in UNIFIL (particularly useful as coming from a
Muslim country).
COMMENT
8. (C) We expect that, while FM Bakoyannis may feel
slightly constrained in what she can say to Nahavandian given
Greece's upcoming UNSC Presidency, she will deliver a strong
message of support for the P-5 1 -- emphasizing that it is
not too late for Iran to take up the international
community's offer. On the Arab League initiative for a
Security Council discussion of Palestine: Bakoyannis' trip
could not bring her any closer to defining a useful outcome
for such a meeting, despite ardent efforts by the Jordanians.
If the Arab League -- or Jordan -- advance the proposal,
Greece will seek coordination with the U.S. on how to manage
the issue constructively, but will not oppose or resist the
request. The belief that Greece can play a useful role on
the Palestinian issue is embedded in Greek political thought.
Bakoyannis will also have an eye on domestic politics, and
opposition leader Papandreou's efforts to establish himself
as a mediator on a range of mid-East issues.
RIES
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS UNSC IAEA GR IS CY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON/IRAN: GREECE FOCUSES ON MIDDLE EAST IN
ADVANCE OF UNSC PRESIDENCY
REF: A) STATE 143323 B) ATHENS 2178 C) STATE 137427
ATHENS 00002282 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On August 30, DCM met with Ambassador
Kostas Chalastanis, director of FM Bakoyannis' cabinet, for a
readout of Bakoyannis' visit to Middle East capitals August
22-25. Chalastanis informed us that, in addition to her
consultations in Beirut, Amman, and Tel Aviv, Bakoyannis
would meet with the deputy directory of Iran's NSC, Mohammad
Nahavandian on August 31. Prior to that meeting, post
relayed ref A points to Chalastanis, emphasizing that
Nahavandian should leave Athens with a clear message that the
EU was united behind the P-5 1 and Iran should take up their
offer. Chalastanis agreed, noting that Greece had delivered
a similar message to Iranian officials in the past. Readout
of FM Bakoyannis' meeting with Nahavandian will follow
septel. END SUMMARY.
FM BAKOYANNIS TO MEET IRANIAN NSC DEPUTY
2. (C) During the August 30 meeting, Chalastanis noted that
the FM's trip was part of her preparation for Greece's UNSC
Presidency, which starts September 1. The FM would also see
the Iranian Deputy NSC director, Mohammad Nahavandian, on
August 31 to discuss Iran's position vis-a-vis the 5 1
proposal. The GOG planned to emphasize the importance of
Iran accepting the offer; it was not too late to reconsider.
On August 31, DCM delivered ref a points to Chalastanis in
advance of the meeting, stressing that Nahavandian should
leave Athens with a clear message that the EU was united
behind the P-5 1 proposal and that Greece strongly encouraged
Iran to take up their offer. Chalastanis agreed, pointing
out that Bakoyannis had delivered a similar message to the
last two Iranian visitors on this topic. Chalastanis
promised a readout of the discussion, which will follow
septel.
MIDDLE EAST TRIP: BAKOYANNIS GETS A DOWNBEAT MESSAGE . . .
3. (C) Reviewing the FM's visit, Chalastanis told the DCM
that all leaders shared deep concern about the fragile
situation in the region and the need to implement UNSC 1701.
Leaders both in Arab states and in Israel feared that
radicalism appeared to be gaining the upper hand over
moderate forces. The Jordanians were particularly concerned
about Hezbollah's increased power; they beleived urgent
reactivation of the peace process -- with U.S. support -- was
essential. The Jordanians were preparing some ideas to
prompt such reactivation, though it was unclear whether their
proposal would be within the framework of an Arab League
initiative to the U.N.
4. (C) However, Chalastanis noted that while the Israelis
were strongly against the Arab League proposal, they seemed
to be open to talks with Abbas -- provided he could form a
functional government (Israeli officials were skeptical).
Abbas himself told the FM that he continued efforts to form a
government "on the basis of principles, not persons" and
appealed for GOG support for economic development.
Chalastanis admitted that Abbas "did not seem very
optimistic," however. Looking ahead to Greece's UNSC
presidency, Chalastanis predicted that it would be hard to
avoid any UNSC discussion of Israel-Palestine should
proposals be brought to the table. That said, Chalastanis
agreed with DCM that it would be detrimental to all sides to
hold a highly-visible UNSC discussion on the topic that
achieved nothing.
5. (C) In Lebanon, PM Siniora was proud of the Lebanese
Army's swift deployment (Chalastanis said Siniora appeared
"astonished" they'd done so well). First on Siniora's agenda
now was lifting the blockade. But Lebanon also badly needed
UNIFIL troops on the ground and international support for the
reconstruction effort. Siniora told FM Bakoyannis that he
was working on efforts to fast-track reconstruction
financing. He also stated that both Lebanon and Syria wanted
to improve their bilateral relations. However, he believed
that Syria was preoccupied with internal issues.
. . . WHILE STRESSING IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC 1701
6. (C) DCM told Chalastanis that we appreciated FM
ATHENS 00002282 002.2 OF 002
Bakoyannis' strong support for implementation of UNSC 1701 in
her statements to the press. We remained concerned about
efforts during the Donor's Conference to urge "selective"
implementation -- for example, urging lifting of the blockade
by Israel without reference to other provisions regarding the
provision of weapons to Hezbollah. UNSC 1701 needed to be
implemented fully. Chalastanis agreed, citing the GAERC
statement as indicative of the EU's balanced approach.
7. (C) DCM probed Chalastanis on Greece's contribution to
UNIFIL. Certainly we welcomed the GOG's readiness to offer
naval assets; these would be important not just as a buffer
but as a tool for stopping and inspecting dubious cargo. Was
Greece also considering offering troops, such as an
engineering battalion? Chalastanis told DCM that a
commitment of Greek ground forces was not currently on the
table. He welcomed the Turkish government's decision to
participate in UNIFIL (particularly useful as coming from a
Muslim country).
COMMENT
8. (C) We expect that, while FM Bakoyannis may feel
slightly constrained in what she can say to Nahavandian given
Greece's upcoming UNSC Presidency, she will deliver a strong
message of support for the P-5 1 -- emphasizing that it is
not too late for Iran to take up the international
community's offer. On the Arab League initiative for a
Security Council discussion of Palestine: Bakoyannis' trip
could not bring her any closer to defining a useful outcome
for such a meeting, despite ardent efforts by the Jordanians.
If the Arab League -- or Jordan -- advance the proposal,
Greece will seek coordination with the U.S. on how to manage
the issue constructively, but will not oppose or resist the
request. The belief that Greece can play a useful role on
the Palestinian issue is embedded in Greek political thought.
Bakoyannis will also have an eye on domestic politics, and
opposition leader Papandreou's efforts to establish himself
as a mediator on a range of mid-East issues.
RIES