GREEK MFA INVOLVED IN ARRANGING VESSELS FOR BEIRUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001853

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TASK FORCE ONE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016
TAGS: AEMR CASC EWWT GR LE MARR PINS PREL ETRA KHLS
SUBJECT: GREEK MFA INVOLVED IN ARRANGING VESSELS FOR BEIRUT
EVACUATIONS


1. (U) Summary: Ambassador called on Deputy Foreign
Minister Kassimis on July 17 to advise the GoG of current USG
efforts regarding potential evacuations from Beirut, as well
as enlist GoG aid in locating appropriate vessels for RFP
N00033-06-R-5523, and raise the possibility that Souda Bay
might be called upon to house and process evacuees in the
event of a large-scale evacuation that overloads Limassol's
capabilities. Kassimis provided a quick summary of on-going
GoG evacuation efforts on behalf of Greek and other
third-country nationals and Greek commercial ships contracted
to the French and Swedish governments for evacuations. He
also raised the issue that in his opinion Beirut was becoming
an unsafe port, and that the GoG was evacuating from Tripoli
and Latakia instead. Kassimis reacted positively to the
possibility of using Souda Bay to process evacuees, should
that become necessary, and made it clear that the Greek
Embassy in Beirut would be ready to assist Amcits if
required. End Summary.


2. (U) Ambassador called on Deputy Foreign Minister
Kassimis on July 17 to discuss the possibility of large-scale
evacuations of U.S. citizens from Beirut. Ambassador noted
that it was prudent to assume that the crisis between Israel
and Lebanon could continue, and that while the international
community condemned the hostage taking, wants to see the
Israeli hostages released, and has called on the Israeli
government to show restraint, it was also useful to discuss
evacuation planning with the GoG with an eye towards
coordination. We especially would be interested in Greek
help in identifying Greek vessels that could be used to
shuttle U.S. and third country nationals from Lebanon to
Cyprus.


3. (C) Kassimis observed that the GoG was already involved
in evacuation efforts. The French Government contracted the
passenger liner Iera Petra, which is already en route to
Beirut. An "Anek-type" ferry (capacity 1100 passengers),the
Coretta II, had already been chartered to the Swedish
Government and was on its way to Tripoli. He said he had
been in communication with Greek Minister of Mercantile
Marine Kefaloyannis as to whether the Coretta II could make
an additional trip as well. Kassimis also noted that the
Hellenic Navy frigate Tsara was in Limassol today, and would
be departing for Tripoli on the 18th to evacuate 200 people.
He further added that the port in Beirut was rapidly becoming
unsafe, and that current Greek efforts called for evacuations
from the northern Lebanese port of Tripoli, or the Syrian
port of Latakia. (Note: during the meeting, Kassimis was
given an unverified report that an Italian frigate had just
been fired upon in Beirut, which Kassimis presented as
further proof of the deteriorating security conditions there.
End note.)


4. (U) Ambassador provided Kassimis with a copy of Military
Sealift Command's contract call for passenger vessels
(N000033-06-R-5523),and asked for the Minister's assistance
in getting the message to any and all Greek ship owners and
agencies that might have appropriate vessels available.
Ambassador observed that there might be as many as 25,000
Amcits in Lebanon, and that all assistance would be
appreciated if a general evacuation were to commence.
Ambassador also noted that it might be especially risky for
Amcits to travel safely overland to Tripoli or Latakia, and
that Beirut might prove to be the only valid evacuation
point. Kassimis noted that this was high tourist/travel
season in Greece and that available vessels are scarce, but
that he would do what he could to assist USG efforts.


5. (C) Finally, Ambassador informed the Minister that we had
begun thinking of contingency U.S. facilities at NSA Souda
Bay for evacuees, in the event that Limassol became
overburdened. Souda Bay has barracks space for up to 650
persons, and according to the base commander, could
facilitate the onward transfer of up to 1000 evacuees a day.
The main problem with Souda is its distance: almost 24-32
hours from Limassol, depending on the speed of the vessel
used. Ambassador said that should use of Souda be necessary,
the U.S. would want to work closely with Greek naval,
immigration, and foreign ministry authorities to stand it up
quickly.


6. (C) Kassimis seemed favorably inclined towards the

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possible use of Souda Bay, although he did not expressly give
GoG assent. He observed that the GoG had "suddenly become
important" because of the situation, and would be making
every effort to be of assistance to its European and American
allies. Kassimis did ask if the U.S. contemplated closing
Embassy Beirut. Ambassador indicated that he was not aware
of any such plan, but that he would inform Kassimis if the
situation changed. Kassimis stressed that the Greek Embassy
in Beirut would do whatever it could for any Amcits that
found themselves in distress; Ambassador noted the reverse
was also true.


7. (C) Comment: Kassimis was clearly involved in and well
informed of GoG efforts in assisting evacuations from Beirut,
and was obviously interested in being as helpful as possible.
Although the discussion of the use of Souda Bay was only
theoretical (and additional consultations would be needed
should we wish to pursue it),Kassimis was quite positive,
and quickly grasped the potential value of the Souda
facilities for such a humanitarian mission. Post will remain
engaged with Kassimis to secure Greek vessels to support any
eventual evacuation efforts. End Comment.
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