Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ASMARA933
2006-11-08 14:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

ABDULWAHID PLANS DEPARTURE FROM ASMARA AND ASKS

Tags:  PREL PINR PGOV ER SU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000933 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV ER SU
SUBJECT: ABDULWAHID PLANS DEPARTURE FROM ASMARA AND ASKS
FOR USG ASSISTANCE


Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000933

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV ER SU
SUBJECT: ABDULWAHID PLANS DEPARTURE FROM ASMARA AND ASKS
FOR USG ASSISTANCE


Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: AbdulWahid al-Nur recently has told Emboff
he plans to depart Asmara on November 8 for Europe and then
Darfur, to meet with his supporters. He proposed tacking
on travel to the U.S., requesting USG visa and financial
assistance for the trip. AbdulWahid expressed support for
the upcoming SLM military commanders meetings in Darfur, --
so long as the political leadership did not participate.
He asserted the G-19 have returned to the Sudan Liberation
Movement (SLM) and now support him. Finally, he claimed to
have spoken with Nigerian President Obasanjo about Nigeria
playing a role in a future Darfur Peace Agreement-plus
mediation, noting his concerns about any mediation being
conducted in Asmara, whether led by the GSE or not. End
Summary.


2. (C) In meetings this week with Emboff, AbdulWahid al-Nur
stated he intends to depart Asmara on November 8 for
Europe, where he would spend a few days consulting in the
Netherlands and France with officials and the Darfur
diaspora. He said he plans to continue on to Darfur by the
end of November. AbdulWahid said his November 8 departure
date would be contingent on his ability to obtain a new
Schengen visa. He confirmed that the Government of the
State of Eritrea (GSE) has released his passport and given
him an exit visa. Abdulwahid proposed a trip to the United
States and requested USG assistance in procuring plane
tickets and other financial assistance for himself and six
of his supporters. (Comment: Post sees little purpose in
AbdulWahid's proposed visit to the U.S. at this time.
Rather than offering a clear vision for achieving consensus
on the DPA, he seems more concerned with using a visit to
strengthen his image vis-(-vis other Darfurian leaders.
Until the SLM's internal leadership issues are sorted out,
we would not encourage an AbdulWahid visit to Washington.
End Comment)


3. (C) AbdulWahid said the purpose of his travel to Darfur
was to consult with his supporters and move forward an SLM

mediation with the Government of National Unity (GNU). He
commented that he does not support an SLM leadership
conference in Darfur at this time, as such a conference
would put many of his supporters at risk given the security
concerns on the ground. While AbdulWahid supports the
upcoming military commanders' meeting, he noted attendance
should be limited to the military leaders and not include
the SLM political leadership. If AbdulWahid had his way,
the meeting would result in the military leaders renaming
him as Chairman of the SLM, reinstating Khamis as Vice-
Chairman of the SLM and affirming SLM support for renewed
mediation, building on the DPA.


4. (C) AbdulWahid opined that other Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) non-signatories, such as Khamis Abdalia Abakr, Ahmed
Abdul Shaffi and Sharif Harir, should only be permitted to
participate in a future DPA-plus mediation if they first
rejoin the SLM under his leadership. He saw little value
in having Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige involved at all in a
mediation, and confided to Emboff that he believes that
Khalil Ibrahim of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
was working out a separate secret agreement with the
National Congress Party (NCP).


5. (C) AbdulWahid emphasized that the international
community must play a key role in any future discussions
and noted that while he supports the idea of a GSE-led
mediaton, he remained somewhat cautious about holding the
mediation in Eritrea where international observers might
not be included as fully as he would like. When Emboff
asked his views on suggestions that Chad play a larger role
in a mediation, or possibly even co-mediate, he stated that
Chad was an integral player to achieving peace in Darfur


and should be involved. That said, he did not seem
insistent on Chad playing a co-mediating role. AbdulWahid
noted that he had spoken with Nigerian President Obasanjo
by telephone two weeks ago about Nigeria playing a role in
a future mediation. During this call, Obasanjo had invited
him to Nigeria to discuss the idea further. He had tried
to call again on November 7, but Obasanjo was in China.
AbdulWahid commented to Emboff that since the mediation
process began in Abuja, it should return there. However,
he viewed the Nigerian role as only providing the venue
with the Eritreans in a mediating role.


6. (C) AbdulWahid, with passport and exit visa in hand,
appears intent on departing Eritrea as soon as possible;
finances may be the only obstacle holding him back. Post is
not certain, however, that AbdulWahid will actually proceed
to Darfur following his meetings in Europe, especially
given his past history of cancellation of trips to the
region. At least one Sudanese source here argues that
AbdulWahid does not have the on-ground support of the
commanders -- and knows it --and he would not risk
appearing in Darfur where this fact would become obvious to
outside observers. No matter what AbdulWahid choose to do,
however, other Asmara-located Darfurians do appear to be
heading home. Emboff was told by Abdul Shaffi that he too
has his passport and a green light from the GSE to leave
Asmara and will confirm his travel plans on November 8.
Sharif and Khamis are reportedly already in Darfur
consulting with the military commanders in the field in
advance of the November 15 meeting.


7. (C) Comment: The GSE has never publicly acknowledged
that it at times limits the travel of the various Sudanese
parties who accept its "hospitality" in Asmara. Its
decision to allow AbdulWahid and others to travel freely
for now, however, may reflect their appreciation of the
need for the non-signatories to consult with the field and
come to a common ground prior to the GSE launching a
mediation effort. Senior GSE officials, Yemane Ghebreab
and Abdalla Jabir, met with NCP officials in Khartoum last
week, and these meetings may have also led the GSE to
believe the time was right to allow the non-signatories
some latitude. Ambassador will be meeting with Ghebreab
upon his return to Asmara for an update on Eritrean
thinking and strategy. End Comment.
DELISI