Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ASMARA877
2006-10-20 12:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

ERITREA: DETERMINED TO PLAY ON DARFUR MEDIATION

Tags:  PREL PINR PGOV ER SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHAE #0877/01 2931228
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FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8504
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0223
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 6007
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0361
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 2889
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0171
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1240
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4659
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0243
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1415
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0572
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000877 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV ER SU
SUBJECT: ERITREA: DETERMINED TO PLAY ON DARFUR MEDIATION

REF: ASMARA 838

Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000877

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV ER SU
SUBJECT: ERITREA: DETERMINED TO PLAY ON DARFUR MEDIATION

REF: ASMARA 838

Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Only one day after the signing of the
Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA),Eritrea turned its
attention to Darfur, meeting a National Congress Party
(NCP) delegation led by Presidential Assistant Nafie ali
Nafie and NCP Director of Intelligence and Security Saleh
Gosh. Reports indicate that the visit was intended to
begin discussions between the NCP and GSE about a Darfur
mediation led by Eritrea. The DPA non-signatories in
Eritrea are offering us the same message: a durable
solution to the crisis in Darfur will require more
discussion of wealth and power sharing, humanitarian
relief, security, and compensation. They also agree that
the international community will need to play a key role in
the mediation. At the same time, the personalities who
comprise the leadership of the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM),Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM),and
National Redemption Front (NRF),may make it difficult for
the non-signatories to come together effectively in a
mediation. The GSE remains uncertain about its next steps
and is pressing the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM) to engage more actively to help balance NCP
influence in a mediation effort. Despite the challenges,
however, the GSE seems determined to be a key player in any
mediation effort and looks to begin the process as soon as
possible. End Summary.

ERITREA TO MEDIATE ... BUT NOT JUST YET
--------------


2. (C) While reports in the press suggest that Eritrea has
actually started mediating between the NCP and DPA non-
signatories; the GSE adamantly denies that any course of
action on Darfur has been agreed to. In a meeting with
visiting UK Khartoum Poloff and UK Ambassador on October
18, Yemane Ghebreab (the GSE's primary voice on Sudan)
denied that a decision had been made on the GSE taking lead
role in a Darfur mediation but reaffirmed that the GSE is
willing to assist in whatever way they can to help solve
the problems of Darfur (see reftel). However, in

discussions with other members of the diplomatic community,
GSE officials have confirmed that they intend at least to
discuss a possible mediation with each side individually to
get a sense of each side's positions and the possible
parameters for negotiations. In the second phase they
would engage certain member of the international community
and then begin an official mediation.

NCP DELEGATION RETURNS TO ASMARA WITHOUT SPLM
--------------


3. (C) Emboff was informed by Sudan contacts that an NCP
delegation led by Nafie ali Nafie and Saleh Gosh visited
Asmara Monday, October 16 and departed early the following
day. The purpose of the visit was to follow up on a visit
made just one week earlier (see reftel) which reportedly
gave the GSE the green light to move ahead with a mediation
between the NCP and DPA non-signatories. The Egyptian DCM
as well as other Sudan sources report that the NCP and GSE
engaged in preliminary discussions for a possible Eritrean
led mediation. Reportedly, the NCP told the Eritreans that
a new mediation cannot reopen the DPA - it can only discuss
amendments to it. The NCP also reportedly told the
Eritreans that the negotiations could not discuss the
establishment of a Darfur region nor could they offer any
additional presidential positions.


4. (C) Many believe the visit was the direct result of a
request by President Isaias who, following the ESPA signing
on October 14, reportedly asked both the NCP and SPLM to
send delegations back to Asmara to discuss a future
Eritrean-led mediation on Darfur. We are told that Isaias'
meeting with the SPLM's Salva Kiir occurred after the
departure of Sudanese President Al-Bashir from Asmara on
October 14. Isaias reportedly told Kiir that although the
GSE was intent on keeping the SPLM involved in the process,
the SPLM needed to follow through on its proposals and more
actively demonstrate its interest in playing a role in
Darfur. Isaias cautioned Kiir that the NCP was seeking to
sideline the SPLM's engagement on Darfur and could succeed
in its efforts if the SPLM did not become more engaged.
Isaias made it clear that the SPLM needed to send a senior-
level delegation to work with the GSE on Darfur. To date,
no delegation has arrived in Asmara.

DPA NON-SIGNATORIES UNITY TENUOUS AT BEST
--------------


5. (C) While a majority of the DPA non-signatories are
presently in Asmara, their unity is tenuous at best. In
discussions with DPA non-signatories all have highlighted
concerns over security, humanitarian relief, compensation
and power sharing, and they believe that these issues were
not addressed adequately in the DPA. They all also
emphasize that the role of international actors/observers
will be critical in any renewed mediation. The non-
signatories we have met with have also all publicly or
privately accepted Eritrea as a mediator for possible talks
and all have highlighted their desire to return to Darfur
and consult with Darfurians. They diverge, however, on who
the relevant stakeholders in Darfur actually are.


6. (C) The differences among the non-signatories are
equally clear, however, and could threaten their ability to
participate effectively in a mediation. For example, in
early October, Abdulwahid al-Nur and Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) representatives met with EU Special
Representative for Sudan Pekka Haavisto and provided him a
copy of a "Comprehensive Roadmap for Resolving the Sudanese
Conflict in Darfur." The document itself, signed by the
NRF and Abdulwahid for the SLM, is much more demanding in
terms of power sharing and wealth sharing than they are in
private discussions, and calls for more concessions from
the government. Additionally, it calls for Sudan to return
to the federal structure and demarcation lines of 1956.
(Note: Post will forward document to AF/SPG and Khartoum.
End Note).


7. (C) Despite this joint document, Abdulwahid al-Nur told
Emboff on October 13 that his alignment with the JEM and
NRF has been purely to please the Eritreans and that as
soon as he is able to leave Eritrea he will denounce the
JEM. He explained that he wanted to work on uniting the
SLM and would not be opposed to working though problems
with Ahmed Abdulshaffi. He also said he would welcome the
return of Sharif Harir and Khamis Abdalla Ababr from the
NRF, but was clear that he did not want JEM's Khalil
Ibrahim involved. Nor did he think that the NRF's Ahmed
Diraige retains any credibility in Darfur. Despite, his
remarks to us on the 13th, however, Abdulwahid has, on any
given day, declared his support for or alliance with any of
the above and has told other interlocutors in Asmara that
he is committed to the NRF, to an NRF-SLM alignment, etc.


8. (C) In meetings with Sharif, Emboff was told that while
all the DPA non-signatories want to achieve the same goals,
there is some divergence on who they want to consult with
in the field. Sharif explained that he believed the NRF
and Abdulwahid and Shaffi should come to a common position
here in Asmara and then return to consult with the people
of Darfur. He was adamant that it should not be focused on
the SLM, which he believes already has split into possibly
five entities. When pushed, Sharif hinted that he believed
they should hold a consultative meeting in North Darfur and
seemed to intimate that the key stakeholders would be the
military commanders. Sharif also explained that in a
recent meeting with Shaffi, the NRF commanders had called
to ask Shaffi to formally join the NRF. He has declined
for the moment, but agreed that they had the same goals in
mind.


9. (C) Meanwhile, in meetings with UK colleagues, Shaffi
remained firm that he does not intend on giving up his SLM
allegiances to join the NRF, but confirmed Sharif's
assertion that he sees common ground between the DPA non-
signatories. As he did throughout July, Shaffi highlighted
the need for an SLM leadership conference, acknowledging
that more than one individual may come out on top. He
believes this needs to be done immediately and until that
happens the SLM will not be able to work with other DPA
non-signatories on issues related to mediation.

CAN ABDULWAHID AND SHAFFI LEAVE ASMARA?
--------------


10. (C) In the October 13 meeting with Abdulwahid, he
explained to Emboff that he had obtained a visa to travel
to Europe and was planning on going to Paris, but when he
tried to depart Asmara on October 11, the Eritreans blocked
him from leaving. The EU's Haavisto told us on October 16,
that he understood that Abdulwahid had attempted to depart
the country again on October 14 and was again turned
around. It is unclear why Abdulwahid wishes to leave
Asmara now. There are a number of rumors, including wide-
spread speculation that his urgency is fueled by a bribe
from the NCP (or Libya) to keep him from aligning with the
NRF. In any event, rumor has him seeking to travel to
Paris to meet French authorities; to attend an NCP
sponsored meeting in Paris between him, Minni Minawi and
Khalil Ibrahim; or, even to travel on to Tripoli for a
meeting with the Libyans. Abdulwahid refused to tell
Emboff why he needed to leave so urgently. Meanwhile,
Emboff also learned from UK colleagues, that Shaffi too has
complained of being unable to depart Asmara and claims that
the GSE is holding his travel documents.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The DPA non-signatories all seem willing to at
least talk about talks with the GSE and all share a common
perception on the core issues for discussion. However, it
seems equally clear that the personalities vying for
dominance will continue to clash and will continue to get
in the way of unity among the non-signatories. That said,
the Eritreans - despite their disclaimers - seem intent on
playing a role in any Darfur mediation. They appear to
recognize the challenges and that they may need help,
including having the SPLM play a role balancing the NCP.
Thus they are all the more frustrated with Kiir's seeming
inability to follow through on previous proposals and
discussions with the Eritreans on Darfur. The next steps
remain very much uncertain. Post believes, however, that
the Eritreans consider themselves to be, in essence, the
designated mediator and are intent on beginning
negotiations as soon as possible. End Comment.
DELISI