Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ASMARA861
2006-10-17 14:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

ERITREA MOVES TROOPS AND ARMOR INTO THE TSZ

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL KPKO UNSC MOPS ER 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 2885
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0167
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RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000861 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KPKO UNSC MOPS ER
SUBJECT: ERITREA MOVES TROOPS AND ARMOR INTO THE TSZ

REF: A) DAO ASMARA ER 161416Z OCT 06 IIR 6 908 0026
07 B) ADDIS 2793

Classified By: Amb. Scott H. DeLisi for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000861

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KPKO UNSC MOPS ER
SUBJECT: ERITREA MOVES TROOPS AND ARMOR INTO THE TSZ

REF: A) DAO ASMARA ER 161416Z OCT 06 IIR 6 908 0026
07 B) ADDIS 2793

Classified By: Amb. Scott H. DeLisi for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) On the morning of October 16, the GSE moved troops,
tanks and heavy equipment transporters into the Western
Sector of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). UNMEE reported
at a meeting of the P5 representatives that approximately
1000 troops with 10 tanks had crossed the TSZ checkpoint at
Maeleba south of Tesseney near the Sudan border.
Additionally, at the TSZ checkpoint at Kerkesha,
approximately 500 troops with 5 tanks entered the TSZ
stopping about 15 kilometers from the border on the route to
Badme. (Ref A and B). UNMEE SRSG Azouz Ennifar characterized
the Eritrean action as a clear violation of the Algiers
Accord and immediately sought a meeting with the GSE.
Eritrea,s Commissioner to UNMEE, Col. Zacharias Ogbagaber,
ultimately met with Ennifar on October 16 but offered no
substantive response to his questions nor an explanation of
the rationale for the GSE movement into the TSZ. Zacharias
declined to meet with Embassy officers when contacted on
October 17. As of 15:00 October 17, Post had heard reports
that the number of tanks could have increased to as high as
50 and the number of troops to 5000 but these reports remain
unconfirmed.


2. (U) The public Eritrean response thus far has been
limited. Yemane Ghebremeskel of the Office of the President,
claimed in a Reuters article published the morning of October
17 that the troops were in the area to do development
projects. Yemane told Reuters, &We have a broad range of
development projects in the area. What is the fuss about?
This is sovereign Eritrean territory and this is perfectly
understandable.8 Information Minister Ali Abdu reportedly
told AFP that the troops had entered the TSZ to &harvest
crops8 as they do every year at this time. He maintained
that the tanks were there because when soldiers move they
&have to take their equipment.8


3. (C) During the October 16 movement into the TSZ, the
Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) took control of the checkpoint
at Maeleba from the UNMEE Jordanian troops who patrol the
region and directed them to return to their camp. At the
Kerkesha checkpoint, the UNMEE Jordanian troops were not
challenged and maintained control of the checkpoint. The EDF
reportedly also stopped an UNMEE observer team traveling from
Shambiko to Kerkesha and ordered them to return to the team
site. An UNMEE fuel truck was also ordered to turn around.
(Ref A)


4. (C) Comment: Although it is true that the GSE routinely
has sent troops into the TSZ to assist with the harvest their
actions have never been so blatant. Nor have the troops in
past brought tanks and artillery pieces with them for
harvesting exercises. Assuming that harvesting is not the
true intent, however, the timing of the GSE action, coming on
the heels of the just-concluded mediation of the Eastern
Sudan Peace Agreement, seems to carelessly squander any
international goodwill that the GSE may have garnered from
its successful role in that effort. Meanwhile, the troop
movement is too small to be, by itself, considered an
offensive threat. It is, however, large enough to be
provocative and unhelpful in a broader regional context.


5. (C) Comment continued. The prevailing assessment locally
is that the GSE may be acting preemptively to secure key
portions of the TSZ along the border in advance of a possible
UNMEE withdrawal (either following the next UNSC mandate
review or as the result of a GSE expulsion order). At the
same time, we are mindful that in the past months the GSE has
continued its efforts to reshape the regional political
dynamic. In that context, the GSE action in the TSZ is also
likely intended to complicate the regional equation for
Ethiopia, if Ethiopia is indeed contemplating a broader
military engagement in Somalia. Although we do not, at this
point, see evidence that Eritrea would take advantage of
Ethiopian preoccupation with Somalia to launch a strike
across the disputed border, the possibility remains an
unspoken threat that the GSE hopes will leave Ethiopia
uncertain about GSE intentions. Meanwhile, this military
posturing in the TSZ when coupled with Eritrea,s increased
engagement in Sudan, its support for the CIC in Somalia, and
its linkages to OLF and ONLF separatists, reminds all of
Eritrea,s neighbors that it is increasingly a force in the
region and cannot be ignored. End Comment.
DELISI