Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ASMARA793
2006-10-02 14:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

EU REPRESENTATIVE FOR SUDAN BRIEFS ON DARFUR

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAE #0793/01 2751439
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021439Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8447
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0208
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 5974
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0344
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 2855
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1033
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1213
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4641
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0228
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1388
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0547
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000793 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
STATE PASS TO USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU
SUBJECT: EU REPRESENTATIVE FOR SUDAN BRIEFS ON DARFUR
DEVELOPMENTS


Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000793

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
STATE PASS TO USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU
SUBJECT: EU REPRESENTATIVE FOR SUDAN BRIEFS ON DARFUR
DEVELOPMENTS


Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On September 29, EU Special Representative
for Sudan, Pekka Haavisto briefed the diplomatic community on
recent developments in Darfur. Haavisto highlighted the
shifting alliances in Darfur and raised concerns over the
role of Eritrea in Darfur politics and the creation of the
National Redemption Front (NRF). In that regard, Post would
welcome Washington guidance should Eritrea succeed in uniting
the Darfur opposition under the NRF umbrella and then seek a
leading role in renegotiating or amending the DPA. Haavisto
also spoke briefly spoke about the initialing of the Security
Arrangement Protocol for eastern Sudan and concern over power
sharing in the overall agreement. End Summary.

SHIFTING ALLIANCES...
--------------


2. (C) EU Special Representative for Sudan, Pekka Haavisto
returned to Asmara on September 27 to both meet with SLM and
NRF Darfurians present in Asmara and to discuss with the
Eastern Front leadership the general state of negotiations on
eastern Sudan. While interested in both regions, his focus
during his briefing to the diplomatic community on September
29 - just before departing for Khartoum - was focused on
shifting alliances in Darfur and Eritrean support for them.


3. (C) Haavisto began the briefing by explaining that SLM/A
AbdulWahid Mohamed Ahmed Nur had finally broken down and
aligned himself with the National Redemption Front (NRF) and
had made amends with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),
particularly Khalil Ibrahim himself. He said that the two
had issued a communiqu stateing that the SLM/A and JEM will
cooperate. Haavisto acknowledged the irony in this move
given AbdulWahid,s tirades against Ibrahim in the past, but
attributed it to AbdulWahid,s desire to make himself
relevant again in the Darfur process. He also admitted that
he did not know what Ahmed Abdel Shafi,s opinion of these
new alliances was, but felt he must be in a difficult place,

being the only non-signatory who has not joined the NRF. The
French Ambassador, who met Abdel Shafi on October 1, said
that Shafi had as his first priority the mending of the SLM
splits. Haavisto observed that while this new alliance might
allow AbdulWahid to avoid dealing with Shafi directly about
the SLM split, it did not really move the parties closer to
resolving overall divisions within the Darfur opposition.
Nor did it bring them closer to agreement on accepting the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),he said.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS CAUSE CONCERN FOR GNU
--------------


3. (C) Within the GNU, the possibility of continued conflict
in Darfur has given both the National Congress Party (NCP)
and the Sudan People,s Liberation Movement (SPLM) cause for
concern. The SPLM, he said, fears that continued fissures in
the Darfur opposition and renewed fighting could put the SPLM
in a very difficult situation. He reported that both the NCP
and SPLM want to see another mediation of sorts in Darfur,
however they differ on how it should be dealt with and who
should take the lead. The NCP is looking to Egypt and other
Arab nations in the region to take the lead, whereas the SPLM
would like to host an internal mediation with Eritrea,s
involvement.


4. (C) Haavisto fears that the worst case scenario for
Darfur, also seems the most likely outcome: that both sides
reject the possibility of negotiations and look for a
military solution. He worries that the opposition movements,
in particular the NRF, may continue fighting and gain further
victories in Darfur thus making a negotiated settlement more
elusive. He also feared that intensified conflict could

spark a public uprising that would target the government in
the many camps in Darfur, especially around El Fasher.
Haavisto stressed that the international community must work
to avoid this worse case scenario at all costs, because he
believes if the NRF succeeds in Darfur they will likely
continue on to Kurdafan.

WHAT EXACTLY IS ERITREA,S ROLE?
--------------


5. (C) Eritrea,s role in the Darfur process remains murky.
Eritrea maintains that they are trying to get all the
non-signatories under one umbrella to reach an enduring
agreement to end the problems in Darfur. Their interest,
they maintain, is in regional stability and in recognizing
the just concerns of all elements of Darfur society.
Haavisto reported that the various non-signatories are all
en route to Asmara at the GSE,s request. He noted that the
GSE had similarly brought the Darfurian non-signatories
together following the signing of the DPA in Abuja, leading
among other things to the creation of the NRF.


6. (C) Haavisto believes, as do we, that the Eritreans are
intent on playing a continuing role in Sudan. The GSE, he
said, seeks to play a key role in any future Darfur
negotiations ) negotiations which the GSE believes are
essential for resolution of the problems in Darfur. And,
said Haavisto, the GSE by virtue of its links to the NRF and
other non-signatories, as well as its ties to the SPLM, may
emerge as a broker. This is not, however, necessarily a good
development for the AU, UN or the international community
overall. Eritrea continues to argue that neither the UN nor
the AU need to be involved in Darfur and states that it is
not the right time to blue hat the AU troops in Darfur.
Moreover, the Eritreans now seem to have influenced
AbdulWahid, the NRF and JEM into articulating this same line:
¬ now for the UN in Darfur.8

... AND THE EAST?
--------------


6. (C) Haavisto had met with the Eastern Front leadership
while in Asmara, but had very little to offer on where he saw
the agreement heading. He confirmed that the security
agreement had been finalized, but that the parties continued
to work on the last two sticking points, the development fund
and the issue of making one region of eastern Sudan (see
septel). He believed that an agreement would be finalized in
the coming week. He concluded that the NCP seemed focused on
sidelining Eritrea following the conclusion of the agreement,
but that Eritrea was similarly focused on ways to be
essential in Sudan after negotiations on eastern Sudan
concluded.

CONCLUSION
--------------


7. (C) Post has been unable to confirm the communiqu on
AbdulWahid joining the NRF, but will work with contacts to
obtain a copy. If AbdulWahid has indeed joined the NRF, it
will leave Shafi as the only holdout and put considerable
pressure on him to also join ) especially from the Eritreans
who seem determined to create a united Darfur opposition
under the NRF umbrella. Dirage returned to Asmara on
September 27 and Khamis Abdalla Ababr and Khalil Ibrahim are
expected back in Asmara in the coming days. We anticipate
that Eritrea will make itself a player, one way or the other,
and would welcome guidance from Washington on possible GSE
efforts to encourage negotiations to alter/amend the DPA.

DELISI