Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ASMARA757
2006-09-25 12:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

EASTERN FRONT NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED; OPTIMISM

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR SU ER 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAE #0757/01 2681231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251231Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8431
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0140
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 2849
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 5964
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1381
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1206
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4635
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0202
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0222
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1027
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0333
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0543
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000757 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR SU ER
SUBJECT: EASTERN FRONT NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED; OPTIMISM
OVERSTATED

Classified By: CDA Jennifer McIntyre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000757

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR SU ER
SUBJECT: EASTERN FRONT NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED; OPTIMISM
OVERSTATED

Classified By: CDA Jennifer McIntyre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Negotiations between the Sudanese
Government of National Unity (GNU) and Eastern Front (EF) are
proceeding apace with the third and final committee currently
in session. While the GNU, the Government of the State of
Eritrea (GSE) mediator and many in the diplomatic community
seem pleased with the progress of negotiations since their
resumption August 8, advisors for the Eastern Front and other
outside observers continue to articulate concern about the
direction of the discussions and the ability of the Eastern
Front to implement the agreement. The divisions within the
Eastern Front have grown. All parties believe an agreement
will be reached soon, possibly within the next month.
However, the terms of the agreement indicate the GNU is
railroading the Eastern Front and with the weaknesses within
the Eastern Front concerns regarding implementation arise.
End Summary.

--------------
GSE MEDIATOR: ALL IS WELL
--------------


2. (C) On September 20, PFDJ Political Head and Chief
mediator Yemane Ghebreab briefed the diplomatic corps on the
status of negotiations. Ghebreab characterized the work of
the committees as largely successful with a &narrowing gap8
for all outstanding issues. While the negotiations will not
conclude prior to Ramadan,s start on September 24 as
originally hoped, he believes an agreement can be reached
within a short timeframe.


3. (C) Ghebreab outlined the outstanding issues still
remaining from each of the three committees: wealth-sharing,
security arrangements and power-sharing (the committee
currently meeting). With regards to wealth sharing, the
primary issue for resolution is the amount to be provided by
the GNU for the national development fund. Ghebreab
expressed optimism that both sides would be able to negotiate
an acceptable figure shortly. On issues of security, he
noted that an agreement is nearly complete and the mechanisms
for monitoring compliance, after an agreement is signed are

being discussed.


4. (C) In discussions on power-sharing, Ghebreab said that
the Eastern Front and GNU remain at loggerheads. The Eastern
Front continues to push for a single state structure while
the GNU maintains they cannot change the whole national
system of three levels of government to accommodate a
different system only for the East. Ghebreab said that one
compromise under discussion is the possible establishment of
a ®ional coordinating body8 for the East in lieu of a
formal regional government, however, details have yet to be
articulated. He also mentioned that the GNU is considering a
nation-wide conference to review the whole government
structure in light of its political commitments under the
Naivasha agreements and demands for greater political
representation from Darfur entities. Ghebreab posited that
the one-state issue for the East will likely be postponed
beyond these negotiations for future resolution.


5. (C) In an interesting aside, Ghebreab noted that as a
result of the negotiations the Eastern Front has been
consolidating itself into a unified political entity which
will enable it to work effectively with the GNU on
implementation. (Comment: This upbeat assessment contradicts
what we are hearing about Eastern Front relationships,
described further below. End Comment.)

--------------
SUDANESE CHARGE: ALL IS WELL
--------------

6. (C) On September 14, Charge and Poloff met with Sudanese
Charge Hussein Mohamed Hussein. Hussein said the negotiations
were going well and agreements on wealth-sharing and security
were nearly complete. On wealth-sharing, he noted that the
GNU proposal of USD 300 million fell far short of the Eastern
Front,s expectation of USD 1 billion, however, the GNU had
on-going projects they felt should be credited. He did
concede the GNU might be willing to provide as much as USD
500 million for the fund over a three-phased, seven-year
period, the first year being a grace period during which a
feasibility study would be conducted.


7. (C) On the security arrangements, he acknowledged a
standoff between the Eastern Front and the GNU on the Eastern
Front,s unwillingness to release the location and number of
their military forces. According to Hussein, the GNU needs
to have this information to develop appropriate plans to
either incorporate the Eastern Front forces into the Sudanese
military, security or police forces or integrate them into
civil society. He emphasized GNU interest in increasing
representation from the East (not necessarily the Eastern
Front) in the SAF, police and security forces, noting that
the East is currently underrepresented in these services.


8. (C) Hussein underscored the GNU position against the
establishment of a single Eastern state, which would create
too many governmental levels. Hussein believes that the
Eastern Front will relinquish this demand as the GNU is
offering &very good representation at all levels of
government.8 Moreover, Hussein went on, there are already
representatives from the East in the central and state
governments and that this must be considered in the
negotiations (thus insinuating that the Eastern Front should
not get too greedy in their requests as the GNU considers
anybody from the East, whether or not they are members of the
groups represented by the Eastern Front, to be part of the
agreement). Ultimately, he claimed the Eastern Front &will
accept the situation as it is.8


9. (C) Hussein praised the GSE mediators for their efforts
although he repeated the GNU refrain that the GSE are &most
likely in favor of the opposition.8 He claimed the Eastern
Front is also &very happy8 so far with the mediators and
felt that the Eastern Front and the GNU had &built strong
relations.8

--------------
NORWEGIAN ADVISOR: ALL IS WELL
--------------


10. (C) Also on September 14, the Norwegian Ambassador
convened an Eritrean-based Sudan Contact Group, with
membership paralleling the membership of the group who
recently met in Oslo. Dr. Kjell Hodnebo, Senior Advisor on
Sudan for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, briefed
the group on the negotiations noting, &good progress had
been made over the summer8. While he echoed much of what
was said by the Sudanese Charge, he added some new
information. First, the decision not to discuss the pipeline,
mineral wealth and Port Sudan as part of a wealth-sharing
agreement was made by the GNU with the reluctant consent of
the Eastern Front, and not a mutual decision as claimed by
the GNU. Secondly, he confirmed that the GNU is adamant
about keeping the East divided into three states and noted
that the Eastern Front has indicated that it would be willing
to concede this point in end-game negotiations, so long as a
future referendum could be held in the East on this point.



11. (C) Kjell commented that the Eastern Front negotiations
were proving much easier than those in Abuja, He cited as
reasons: the relatively peaceful security situation in the
East versus Darfur; the willingness of the GNU to engage in

negotiations and eagerness to reach resolution; and greater
SPLM influence with the GNU in the EF negotiations; the
greater unity of the Eastern Front than the parties in
Darfur; and finally the effectiveness of the GSE as mediator.
He also passed on that the Eastern Front members, namely Dr.
Dirar, told him they were pleased with the mediator and had
not been &rolled over8 by the mediator.

--------------
EASTERN FRONT ADVISOR: ALL IS NOT WELL
--------------


12. (C) Dr. Taisier Ali (protect) of the Center for
Peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa, a key advisor for the
Eastern Front with close relationships to SPLM members of the
GNU negotiating team, relayed his concerns to Poloff about
breakdowns within the Eastern Front negotiating team.
According to Dr. Ali, the Eastern Front negotiators have no
common approach and do not meet to strategize before
committee meetings. During the discussions on
wealth-sharing, disagreements on strategy and desired
outcomes within the Eastern Front nearly resulted in Dr. Amna
Dirar,s departure from the team. Musa Muhammed Ahmed, the
Chair of the Eastern Front, has refused to make any plans for
implementation or accept any offers of training. In
addition, the week of September 10, Musa insisted that the
Eastern Front did not want face-to-face negotiations with the
GNU because it would result in insults and recriminations,
and insisted that that the mediators meet separately with the
parties.


13. (C) Dr. Ali shared with Poloff parts of his conversation
with Malik Agar Ayar, the GNU,s Minister of Investment, SPLM
member and part of the GNU,s negotiating team. Malik told
Ali that the Eastern Front &had gotten a good deal8 with
regards to the security arrangements, but admitted the GNU
was playing on the tribal divisions, disorganization and
weaknesses of the Eastern Front. Politically, the GNU is
seeking to control the allotments of local government
positions as a means to isolate specific communities in the
East. Dr. Ali described Malik,s interpretation of the
proposed national development fund as &dangling a carrot8
in front of individual members of the Eastern Front and
commented that some EF members seem to be willingly
participating in the GNU,s buy-off.

--------------
UNMIS AND EU: ALL MAY NOT BE WHAT IT SEEMS
--------------


14. (C) In separate conversations with UNMIS Political
Affairs Officer Judith Goetz and the EU Special
Representative for Sudan Pekka Haavisto, both expressed their
concerns to Poloff about the Eastern Front,s capacity in
negotiations and noted that the GNU seems to be calling the
shots with the full cooperation of the GSE. Both speculated
whether the GSE,s position, initially seen as being
pro-Eastern Front, has in fact shifted given the recent
normalization of relations between the GSE and Sudan. Both
feel that the GNU is exploiting weaknesses in the Eastern
Front and offering proposals that reinforce the tribal divide
within the Eastern Front.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) If obtaining a GNU/EF signed agreement is the sole
benchmark for success, then the negotiations by all accounts
are proceeding admirably well. However, despite the upbeat
assessments of the GSE and many in the diplomatic community,
the negotiations do not seem to be moving in favor of Eastern
interests. While initially post was hopeful that the Eastern
Front would maintain a strong negotiating position, the
Eastern Front team is showing cracks as talks continue and
individual members appear to be ready to accept side offers
from the GNU. The GNU clearly will not consent in the
negotiations to one state in the East and seems to have
correctly assessed that they eventually will be offered a
compromise proposal. Few in the community seem to recognize,
or are willing to admit to, the splits occurring within the
Eastern Front negotiating group. These splits promise to
present even greater challenges to the Eastern Front after
the negotiations conclude and implementation begins. End
Comment.
MCINTYRE