PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHEBREMESKEL DISCUSSES U.S.-

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000698

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHER
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR ER
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHEBREMESKEL DISCUSSES U.S.-
ERITREAN RELATIONS

Classified By: CDA Jennifer McIntyre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) Cable includes an action request for AF/E. See para

11.


2. (C) Summary: Charg d,Affaires met with the Director in
the Office of the President Yemane Ghebremeskel on August 28,
at his request, to discuss the status of the proposed phone
call from Secretary Rice and to reiterate a proposal for a
high-level Eritrean delegation to meet with the Secretary.
Charg used the opportunity to raise concerns about the
negative trends in our bilateral relations, discuss
Eritrea,s role regionally and to urge the Eritreans to adopt
a less provocative stance towards the U.S. Post requests AF
guidance on responding to Ghebremeskel,s request for high
level meetings in Washington. End Summary.

Call from the Secretary and Proposal for Meeting
-------------- ---


3. (C) Ghebremeskel inquired about the status of the proposed
call from Secretary Rice to President Isaias. Ghebremeskel
noted that the President would be heavily engaged in meetings
and staying in Massawa through part of the week but indicated
that the President would be available for the call. Charg
said that she believed that the call was still forthcoming.
She would check with Washington and get back with him.


4. (C) Ghebremeskel stated that a high level visit with the
Secretary in Washington would prove more useful and asked

SIPDIS
whether this would be possible. When asked who would
represent the Eritreans and what would be the proposed topics
for discussions if such a visit were to occur, Ghebremeskel
replied that Yemane Ghebreab, Head of Political Affairs for
the People,s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) would
likely lead the delegation and topics would include the
border, bilateral relations and regional issues such as Sudan
and Somalia.

State of Bilateral Relations
--------------


5. (C) Charg stated her belief that under the present
circumstances, a direct meeting with the Secretary was
unlikely without concrete indications that the Eritreans
wished to improve bilateral relations. In almost all areas,
the U.S.-Eritrean relationship has become unproductive and
communication with the GSE severely circumscribed. For
example, the Ambassador has not had access to the President
in over a year. Unhelpful actions run the gamut from the
GSE,s closing of USAID last fall, the removal of Western
UNMEE monitors, cessation of military programs and exchanges,
lack of access of Embassy personnel to government officials,
as well as administrative obstacles placed on getting visas
for official travelers and gaining permission to travel
in-country.


6. (C) As recent examples of gratuitously provocative
actions, Charg referred to an anti-American video clip which
had been airing repeatedly on Eri-TV throughout the previous
week, and a full page editorial in the Saturday edition of
the Eritrea profile with the headline, &U.S. Policy
Threatens War in Horn of Africa8. (Note: The TV clip was
e-mailed to AF/E and AF/PD on August 25 and consists of a
one-minute segment of President Bush speaking about democracy
and tolerance juxtaposed against a series of images edited to
illustrate U.S. military human rights abuses in Iraq. The
newspaper editorial is one of several recently published
blaming the unrest in Somalia on U.S. meddling. End note.)
Ghebremeskel professed no knowledge of the TV clip and
dismissed the newspaper editorial as an opinion piece.
Charg noted that since the Eritrean Profile is the official
news organ of the government, inclusion and prominence of
such editorials are clearly with the government,s approval.
She also pointed to President Isaias, anti-American remarks
during his Martyr,s Day Speech in May and his recent speech

in Nakfa on August 24 blaming the U.S. administration for
lack of progress on the border issue. (Reported previously in
septels.)


7. (C) Ghebremeskel noted that even several years ago, when
Eritrea was cooperating on a range of bilateral programs with
the U.S., the U.S. had taken a number of negative actions.
For example, Eritrea had not been included with five other
countries as a recipient for regional U.S. counter-terrorism
assistance. (Comment: Post assumes he is referring to the
EACTI program announced in June 2003. End Comment.) He also
cited the 2004 sanctions levied under the International
Religious Freedom Act and the exclusion of Eritrea from
participating in AGOA. The sanctions, he noted, were unfair
because the U.S. Government does not apply such sanctions
consistently across all nations. Charg responded that these
sanctions and programs should be viewed in the bilateral
context and not in comparison with other countries. U.S.
relations with each country are unique and reflect an
aggregate of interests across the full bilateral
relationship, as well as domestic considerations.
Ghebremeskel also commented that the U.S. had historically
favored Ethiopia, including identifying Ethiopia as an
&anchor8 state despite its own human rights problems and
had portrayed both the Eritrean government and President
Isaias in a negative light, most recently in A/S Frazer,s
July 11 testimony to Congress.

Discussion of Border Issues
--------------


8. (C) Ghebremeskel noted that border demarcation remains of
paramount importance to the Eritreans. He reiterated the
complaint that the U.S. position favors Ethiopia, averring
that the U.S. has done little to address the issue in the
past three years. He referred to the sum of previous UN
envoy Axworthy,s efforts as &delaying tactics8 in favor of
the Ethiopians and noted that General Fulford was on record
as discussing changing the border lines with the EEBC. He
added that the Eritrean government had sent a letter to
President Bush and &others8 in the U.S. government
following Ethiopia,s refusal of the demarcation decision and
had never received a response. In a familiar refrain, he
noted that the U.S. could make the Ethiopians comply with the
boundary decision, if it chose to do so.


8. (C) Charg stated that the U.S. has always expressed
backing for the EEBC decision and strongly supports a final
demarcation. U.S. interest clearly lies in a peaceful,
stable Horn of Africa with good bilateral relations with all
countries and between those countries. U.S. relations with
Ethiopia and Eritrea should not be viewed as a zero sum game,
a point to which Ghebremeskel agreed. Logically then, the
U.S. and Eritrea share a mutual interest in not only
demarcation but the eventual reestablishment of cordial
relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which will
necessitate engagement between the two countries at some
juncture in the future. The Charg added that the Eritreans
need to bear in mind that the U.S. is supporting a UN, not a
U.S., effort. The contesting parties, i.e. Ethiopia and
Eritrea, have to be willing to remain engaged for a solution
to work. In terms of the current U.S.-Eritrean bilateral
relationship, though, the GSE,s single-minded focus on the
border demarcation and reticence in engaging the U.S. in
other areas is unhelpful, and is fueling perceptions that the
GSE does not want a cooperative relationship.

Somalia and Regional Concerns
--------------


9. (C) Charg noted that the lack of open communication with
the GSE is also fueling concerns about Eritrea,s intentions
in the region, especially Somalia but also vis-a-vis Darfur.
She referred to recent press reports alleging Eritrean
material and troop support to the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC) in contravention of the arms embargo and inquired why

Eritrea does not support an IGAD peace-keeping force.
Ghebremeskel noted that the Eritrean position on Somalia was
misunderstood by the U.S. First, Eritrea,s perspective
differs from the U.S.; Eritrea does not see Somalia as the
next Afghanistan. Secondly, he said there is no evidence to
show that Eritrea is supporting the UIC and countered that he
had read press reports in the spring alleging U.S. support to
Somali warlords. (Comment: Touch. End Comment.) Regarding
IGAD, Ghebremeskel added that not only Eritrea, but few of
the IGAD countries agree on whether to send in a
peace-keeping force. The Eritreans have concerns about an
IGAD force,s capabilities to conduct such a mission and
about its purpose, which in their view, is only for the
protection of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
&And, what is the TFG really?,8 he asked. The Courts are at
least bringing a semblance of order to the country.



10. (C) Charg responded that the U.S. does not see Somalia
as a replica of Afghanistan, but certainly has serious
concerns about extremist elements in the UIC, including known
terrorists with ties to Al-Qaeda. She noted that the U.S.
supports talks between the UIC and the TFG, and established
the Somalia Contact Group to this purpose. Eritrea should be
cognizant of the legitimate concerns of the U.S. regarding
the role of extremist elements like Sheikh Hasan Aweys within
the UIC.


11. (C) Comment: While Ghebremeskel covered familiar ground
in the substance of discussions, the mere fact that the
Eritreans initiated the meeting represents one of the few
positive actions by the GSE in months. Charg encouraged
Ghebremeskel to look first at expanding dialogue on these
topics through our respective Embassies and for the Eritreans
to use UNGA as an opportunity to discuss a proposal for
higher level engagement with AF bureau officials. Certainly
any consideration for higher level meetings in Washington
should be predicated first on the tenor of the conversation
between the Secretary and President Isaias and a clear
willingness by the Eritreans to discuss not only the border
but also the broader bilateral relationship. Post would
appreciate guidance from AF on responding to the request for
high-level meetings in Washington. End Comment.
MCINTYRE