THE DARFUR BUZZ FROM ASMARA: NO GOOD NEWS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000624

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU
SUBJECT: THE DARFUR BUZZ FROM ASMARA: NO GOOD NEWS FOR
THE DPA

CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Since early June, Embassy Asmara has
been following the rumors and activities of key Darfur
players in Asmara. PolOff has met with each of the
leaders of the newly formed National Redemption Front
(NRF) as well as AbdulWahid Nour and his father-in-law
Abul Gasem. NRF leaders in Asmara claim that support
is waning for both AbdulWahid (reports received July
31 suggest that he has been replaced; septel) and Mini
Minawi. The NRF leaders also forcefully reject the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) as currently drafted.
While information from the parties is often
contradictory, all have indicated that they could work
within the DPA framework if amended to better address
issues of security, compensation and representation
for the people of Darfur. Although the GSE has, like
the NRF, publicly criticized the DPA, there is
speculation that is nonetheless trying to get the
Darfurian non-signatories to ascribe to a common - and
hopefully constructive - position. The GSE, however,
continues to keep its own counsel. Until we know
more, and in light of the GSE's reported support for
the ICU in Somalia, we will continue to remain wary
about GSE intentions. End Summary.

BACKGROUND: THE FORMATION OF THE NRF
--------------


2. (C) In early June, the National Redemption Front
was formed in Asmara, Eritrea by a number of the non-
signatories to the DPA. The NRF is made up of former
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leaders Sharif Harir
and Khamis Abdalla Abakar, as well as Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim and
Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) founder and
former governor of Darfur, Ahmed Diraige. While there
was some talk that SLM/A leader AbdulWahid would sign
on to the NRF, he has stated that he cannot align
himself with "Islamic fundamentalist" Khalil Ibrahim.


3. (C) The initial June founding document of the NRF
called on the people of Darfur to reject the Abuja
process and DPA, but did not provide much in terms of
rationale or recommendations. The July 14 "Darfur
People Demands and the Rejection of Abuja Document,"
offers greater clarification. In particular, the
document lays out the NRF's main requirements for
security arrangements, power sharing and access to
wealth. Core demands include disarmament of the
janjaweed and other militias; security arrangements
for protecting the people in the region; fair and
adequate compensation; recognition of Darfur as one
state; and fair representation of Darfurians at all
levels of government. (Note: The original documents
have been faxed to AF/SPG. End Note.)

VIEWS OF THE NRF
--------------


4. (C) In separate meetings with Poloff, each of the
NRF leaders claimed that Mini Minawi and AbdulWahid
have lost support on the ground. They stated that many
of the SLM/A and SLM/M commanders - the G-19 - who had
been loyal previously to AbdulWahid or Mini have
shifted support to the NRF. In addition, several
claimed that Mini's political advisor, Ibrahim Ahmed
Ibrahim, and a number of AbdulWahid's close group of
nine advisors have defected. The NRF believes it is
imperative to defeat Mini militarily, to "put him in
his place." Sharif and Khamis reasoned that if the
NRF continues to attack Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and
can defeat Mini then the international community will
be forced to recognize the NRF's intrinsic role in
achieving peace in Darfur. With joined forces of the
G-19 and JEM, they believe Mini could be crushed in a
matter of weeks.

VIEWS OF ABDULWAHID'S FATHER-IN-LAW
--------------


5. (C) In a July 21 meeting with Abul Gasem,
AbdulWahid's father-in-law, Abul Gasem stated that
AbdulWahid would sign the DPA if certain items could
be amended or supplemented. He also stated that
AbdulWahid could be convinced to step down as leader
the SLM/A and that Diraige of the NRF was being
considered as a possible replacement. When asked why
he believed so, Abul Gasem alluded to rumors of
AbdulWahid being ill and internal personality
conflicts with other SLM members. In meetings with
Diraige and AbdulWahid, Abul Gasem's comment on a
change of leadership in the SLM/A appears to be far
from the truth. However, as of July 31, a press
release from the SLM/A reports a possible dethroning
of AbdulWahid by one of his close advisors and
commanders. It is unclear at this time what the
results may be or whether a change in leadership will
push the SLM/A closer to signing the DPA or aligning
with the NRF.

VIEWS OF ABDULWAHID
--------------


6. (C) PolOff met with AbdulWahid and his advisor Dr.
Ahmed Abdallah on July 26 to gauge his support for the
DPA at this stage and elicit his perspectives on the
NRF. From the outset, he appeared agitated by any
talk about the NRF or Mini Minawi, stating that "you
guys created Mini". Throughout the meeting, he would
occasionally ask where Mini was and seemed upset when
Dr. Ahmed replied that he was in the U.S. meeting at
the White House. AbdulWahid adamantly denied rumors
that he was losing his support base. He asserted that
if he signed onto the DPA or other agreement, the
commanders would lay down their arms and there would
be peace in Darfur, because the people of Darfur
listen to him.


7. (C) AbdulWahid explained at length why he opposes the
DPA, echoing points similar to those voiced by the
NRF. He conceded that he could work with the DPA, as
long as it could be amended to address some of these
outstanding concerns. AbdulWahid emphasized that an
amended DPA needs to designate Darfur as one federal
region and to stipulate that Darfurians be represented
at all levels of government with representation
proportional to their percentage of the population.
In his view, without majority rule in Darfur, the SLM
or any other party would have difficulty implementing
a peace agreement. AbdulWahid called for the immediate
disarmament of the janjaweed and other militia forces
to enable IDPs to move back into their villages and
homes. However, the GNU could not be responsible for
providing security, at least immediately. For people
to feel safe and return to their homes in Darfur, a UN
or NATO force must provide security in the region and
undertake the disarmament of the janjaweed and
militias. "Without this, there will be no peace in
Darfur," he noted.


8. (C) Once the security and power sharing
arrangements are worked out, AbdulWahid explained, the
people of Darfur should be compensated for what they
have endured. Darfur, he said, "is different from the
South. The people of Darfur were not just caught in
the fire, they were victimized." Compensation should
address not only rehabilitation, but also entail
"corrective justice," to include moral, financial, and
educational compensation. While AbdulWahid was
adamant that it was not just about the money, he did
emphasize that the $30 million in seed money was
inadequate to fully compensate the Darfurians. (Note:
AbdulWahid did not provide an amount but others in
Asmara have been using the figure of $150-200 million.
End Note.) When asked whether he believed that the
international community should be responsible, he
explained that some if not all of the money should
come from the national government itself and derived
from national revenues.

ERITREA'S ROLE IN DARFUR
--------------


9. (C) The Sudan watchers in Asmara remain baffled as
to the extent of GSE involvement or its intent vis-a-
vis Darfur. Speculation runs the gamut from a GSE
strategy to undermine Bashir to one that instead seeks
to strengthen bilateral relations with Sudan. The GSE
continues to deny any ulterior motives in bringing the
non-signatories to the Darfur agreement together in
Asmara and has not publicly acknowledged any role in
the creation of the NRF. The GSE has, in its view,
been upfront with the GNU about its role in Darfur and
they arguably could be playing the role of honest
broker, much as they seem to be in the negotiations
between the GNU and the Eastern Front. Even during
the last round of Abuja, the Eritrean representative
there reportedly told VP Taha, when it seemed apparent
that some parties would not sign on to the DPA, that
he believed it was important to keep all the non-
signatories together and continue to try for unity.
We also have been told that the Eritreans have
reiterated this point directly with Bashir and told
him that the Eritreans would invite the non-
signatories to Asmara.

NRF WHEREABOUTS
--------------


10. (C) Many of the NRF will be out of Asmara for most
of August. Khalil left July 20 for Paris. We have
been told he had meetings in Berlin earlier this week
and believe he is traveling on to N'djamena in the
near future. Diraige departed the evening of July 26
for London and Botswana. Sharif is rumored to have
departed July 30 for Norway and plans to visit Darfur
in the coming weeks. Khamis also claims to be leaving
town in the next few days for Darfur. AbdulWahid did
not seem to have any plans to leave Asmara. Abul
Gasem has informed post that he will depart Asmara on
August 1.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The buzz in Asmara indicates a decline in
support for both AbdulWahid and Mini Minawi but
quantifying the level of either man's support remains
difficult as allegiances continue to shift like the
sand. The decline in both men's standing among the
Darfurians we encounter, however, seems clear and the
most likely beneficiary is the NRF. Although even the
NRF remains open to using the DPA as a starting point
for further discussion, we have yet to see any
indication that new signatories for the DPA "as is"
are ready to come forward.


12. (C) As for the GSE's intentions regarding Sudan,
they continue to keep their own counsel. Their
actions as mediator in the Eastern Front negotiations
have appeared to be constructive and we welcome their
efforts to date. However, no one is clear as to what
role, if any, the GSE played in the formation of the
NRF. Nor do we really know whether its goal is
stability in western Sudan or whether it sees
continued instability (and a GSE handle on the NRF) as
giving it greater leverage there. Time will tell.
However, given the GSE's opposition to a UN force in
Darfur, its recent caustic rhetoric about the USG role
in the Horn, and its reported support for the ICU in
Somalia, we will, for now, remain wary about GSE
intentions in Sudan.

End Comment.

DELISI