Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ASMARA490
2006-06-07 14:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

GSE ASKS FOR USG ROLE IN EF NEGOTIATIONS

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8209
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RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 5898
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1145
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4580
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1318
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0179
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0197
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0997
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0307
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0505
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000490 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU
SUBJECT: GSE ASKS FOR USG ROLE IN EF NEGOTIATIONS

CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000490

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU
SUBJECT: GSE ASKS FOR USG ROLE IN EF NEGOTIATIONS

CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with PFDJ Political
Advisor Yemane Ghebreab on June 6, 2006, Ambassador
was told that the Government of the State of Eritrea
(GSE) continues to move ahead with planning for
preparatory talks on June 13 with the Eastern Front
and Government of National Unity (GNU). Ghebreab
explained that he has not received as much input from
the parties as expected, but believes most issues
should be resolved during the discussions next week.
He noted that the parties had decided not to invite
observers for the preparatory talks but he was
confident there would be a role for international
partners once the formal negotiations got underway.
However, he said he would nonetheless welcome USG
assistance and advice on how to structure both the
talks and an agreement for eastern Sudan, suggesting
possible meetings with USG experts in advance of the
start of the negotiations. "Fresh" ideas on how to
achieve a lasting agreement, especially in light of
the problems affecting the implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),would be
helpful, he said. End Summary.


2. (C) On June 6, 2006, Ambassador met with PFDJ
Political Advisor Yemane Ghebreab to discuss recent
developments on the Eastern Front and GNU
negotiations. Ghebreab explained that the GSE would
be ready for the June 13 preparatory talks, but was
frustrated that the GSE had yet to receive agenda
items from the parties or even the names of the
representatives for the GNU. That said, he believes
that both parties are committed to the process and to
sorting out the outstanding issues for the launch of
negotiations during the preparatory session.


3. (C) When asked about whether observers would be
present for the preparatory talks, he explained that
both parties had agreed that observers would not/not
be present at those sessions. The preparatory talks
would instead be used to resolve between the parties
their differing views on observers for the formal
negotiations themselves. Yemane noted that the GNU

has been resistant to the idea of observers and the
Eastern Front would like to invite most of the
international community. He stated that the GSE has
no preference other than to find a compromise that
both sides can live with and it will work with the
parties to reach some agreement. He added that the
GSE would need technical advice from the
international community, especially from those
governments who have been involved in Naivasha and
Abuja. Ghebreab also admitted that the GSE will need
the assistance of countries who have leverage with
the GNU and can put pressure on them if need be, and
made it clear that the U.S. would be an instrumental
partner.


4. (C) Ghebreab continued by noting he had little
doubt that there would be a role for international
actors during the formal negotiations, and more or
less assumed the U.S. would be asked to play a role
once the parties reached agreement at the pre-talks.
Surprisingly, he queried if it would be possible for
a USG expert on Sudan to come to Asmara either before
or, perhaps better, after the preparatory talks to
meet with him and the GSE team and discuss what an
agreement in the East should look like. He wanted to
draw on our prior experience with Khartoum and would
welcome, he said, our input into what a realistic and
achievable agreement that could meet both political
imperatives and the needs of the people in the east
might look like. In particular, he asked us for
assistance in coming up with "fresh" ideas in how we
should approach such an agreement, looking beyond the
CPA. Ghebreab discussed as well other areas where
our help could be important as the eastern
negotiations move forward and seemed eager to work
with us.


5. (C) Comment: The meeting with Ghebreab on Sudan
signaled a considerable step for the GSE in terms of
asking directly for the USG to provide technical
assistance and policy input on the negotiations and
agreement. We know that Norwegian colleagues who
have also been providing input to the Eritreans have
urged them to reach out to the USG but even they were
surprised that Ghebreab, who they considered
previously to be skeptical about doing so, had been
so forthcoming. They suggested that this decision
might reflect a policy shift agreed upon at the
highest levels in the GSE. Whatever the reasons, we
believe that the GSE request gives us a unique
opportunity to influence the course of developments
in eastern Sudan and also to engage the GSE more
directly on support for the Darfur peace agreement as
well - especially important given the recent arrival
here of both the SLM and JEM non-signatories to the
agreement. While no decisions on observers or timing
for negotiations have been set, post would like
Department's input at the earliest on the possibility
of providing technical assistance to the GSE,
guidance on engaging the parties prior to
negotiations and the role, if any, of observers.
End Comment.

DELISI