Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ASMARA339
2006-04-13 07:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

FOOD AID FOR ERITREA: A PENDING CRISIS WITHOUT A

Tags:  PHUM PGOV PREL EAID ECON EGAD ER 
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DE RUEHAE #0339/01 1030700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130700Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8070
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 5836
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 2744
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0058
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0970
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1694
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1116
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1286
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4540
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000339 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AIDAC

STATE FOR AF/E
STATE FOR AF/EPS
STATE FOR EB
STATE FOR PRM/AF
STATE FOR IO
USAID FOR AA/DCHA, FFP, OFDA
USAID FOR AA/AFR AND AFR/EA
KAMPALA FOR USAID/FFPO
NAIROBI FOR REDSO/RFFP
ADDIS FOR USAID/FHA
KHARTOUM FOR SHA
LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL EAID ECON EGAD ER
SUBJECT: FOOD AID FOR ERITREA: A PENDING CRISIS WITHOUT A
RESPONSE

CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

REFTEL: A) Asmara 201 B) Asmara 280

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000339

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AIDAC

STATE FOR AF/E
STATE FOR AF/EPS
STATE FOR EB
STATE FOR PRM/AF
STATE FOR IO
USAID FOR AA/DCHA, FFP, OFDA
USAID FOR AA/AFR AND AFR/EA
KAMPALA FOR USAID/FFPO
NAIROBI FOR REDSO/RFFP
ADDIS FOR USAID/FHA
KHARTOUM FOR SHA
LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL EAID ECON EGAD ER
SUBJECT: FOOD AID FOR ERITREA: A PENDING CRISIS WITHOUT A
RESPONSE

CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

REFTEL: A) Asmara 201 B) Asmara 280


1. (C) With the ever growing humanitarian crisis in the
Horn of Africa, concerns over Eritrea's food needs and the
Government of the State of Eritrea's (GSE's) plans
escalate. Reports from the various regions present a dire
picture regarding food security and livestock health. Food
remains undistributed and of the approximately 98,000
metric tons in warehouses 70% nears its shelf life. The
unofficial results of the incomplete National Nutrition
Survey conducted nearly two months ago show global
malnutrition values of over 20% in some areas. The GSE's
National Household Survey (to determine food needs and the
ability to work) has been terminated, reportedly due to
statistical problems and an alternate "registration" begun.
The GSE also still appears determined to implement a Food
for Work program, which would be problematic for some
donors and NGOs. (Septel)


2. (C) Ambassador will meet WFP-Eritrea Director Cebron on
April 12 and will urge him to draw together donors and UN
agencies to discuss next steps with GSE and a strategy to
respond to humanitarian concerns in Eritrea. We know that
several donors are already examining the issue individually
and pondering next steps but coordination among donors is a
critical missing component. The UN is planning for a late
April visit of UN Special Humanitarian Envoy for the Horn
of Africa, former Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne
Bondevik. According to the UN FAO representative, the
agenda for his planned visit has not yet been set,
including at what level he hopes to meet with GSE

officials. Last week the Dutch mission sent a notice to
The Hague regarding food security, presenting in more
detail the situation here and inquiring about Dutch
thinking and plans. A recent visit to Eritrea by DFID
staff also examined food security, however, any additional
British support for food aid would be targeted and most
likely focused on supplemental feeding. The German mission
continues to inform Berlin of the growing problem here yet
has no immediate plans to take action.


3. (C) Humanitarian Aid partners, such as UNFAO, UNWFP,
Mercy Corps and Catholic Relief Services, express great
worry over the situation in the different regions, offering
anecdotes that paint a dire picture of the situation -
80,000 livestock dead, the livestock market withering away
(a common occurrence in times of food stress),empty
therapeutic feeding centers because there is only food for
the infants and not enough for the caregivers, schools
closing early as they can not feed the students, and
traders unable to procure grains. Efforts to get an
accurate picture are complicated by a marked unwillingness
in communities to talk candidly about food shortages or
government failings. WFP recently began thinking about
options for the donor-provided food already in-country,
considering transferring the food out of Eritrea or using
it for in-patient hospital feeding rather than allowing it

to rot while awaiting GSE agreement to resume general
distributions. The NGOs, meanwhile want to act but feel
subject to the mercurial whims of the GSE and to donors'
commitments and political concerns. Meanwhile, the cry for
help from the population, if not from the government, is
getting louder.


4. (C) Comment: Eritrea's pending food crisis is different
from the rest of the Horn of Africa only in that the GSE
refuses to fully acknowledge the problem or engage the
international community in an effort to address it. An
unyielding determination to be self-reliant and avoid
dependence on donors (who Eritrea views almost universally
with suspicion) will not change the fact that Eritrea will
face a severe food security crisis and will need food. The
GSE's lack of engagement with the international partners,
including the World Food Program, and its seven-month long
suspension of general distribution of food already in
country raises serious questions about GSE thinking and
intentions.


5. (C) Comment continued: Meanwhile, GSE sensitivities
about others telling it how to care for the people of
Eritrea are acute and the visit of the Special Envoy may -
for the GSE - bring unwelcome international attention to
the food security issues in the country. The GSE may
interpret a high profile and well publicized visit as an
attempt to back them into a corner, a position that usually
results in the GSE to digging in its heels. Such a
publicized visit may provide "cover" for the donors and the
UN, however, as we seek to get food moving again. Post
will continue to explore options with WFP but proposals to
transfer food out of Eritrea will require careful
consideration and may be non-starters given GSE control of
warehouses, trucks, ports, etc. Post will also urge the UN
agencies here to take a stronger leadership role, with
support of the donors, in pressing the GSE for more
constructive engagement and for a food aid plan. End
Comment.

DeLisi