Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ASMARA317
2006-04-05 15:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

UNMEE Force Commander Cautions Against

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO MARR ER ET 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 5830
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 2737
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000317 

SIPDIS

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LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO MARR ER ET
SUBJECT: UNMEE Force Commander Cautions Against
Restructuring That Undercuts Demarcation

CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000317

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO MARR ER ET
SUBJECT: UNMEE Force Commander Cautions Against
Restructuring That Undercuts Demarcation

CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In an April 3 meeting with DAS Don
Yamamoto, UNMEE Force Commander Major General Rajender
Singh offered a clear and comprehensive technical strategy
for the demarcation process. Operating on the principle
that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed", Singh
also argued that there was a critical need for political
discussions to occur in conjunction with demarcation.
Singh also voiced his serious concerns that UNMEE
restructuring not be approached so hastily that the
resulting entity would lack the resources to perform its
most important task; supporting demarcation. If that
happened, any cost savings in the short term would be
likely be lost in the long-run. We found a number of
Singh's arguments to be well-considered and hope that his
concerns will be carefully considered as we consider
UNMEE's reconfiguration. END SUMMARY.


DEMARCATION: THE FIVE STAGES
--------------


2. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary Don Yamamoto and
Ambassador, joined by AF/E's Bill Schofield, Poloff and
DATT, called on soon to be departing UNMEE Force Commander
General Rajender Singh April 3. Focusing on the key issue
of demarcation, Singh suggested to DAS Yamamoto, a five
stage process and a possible, but very tentative, time
frame. First, reconnaissance and surveying must occur
along the border before a single pillar is placed in the
ground. UNMEE must know exactly the location of each pillar
before the process begins. Second, during the actual
pillar placement, Singh recommended having a minimum of two
task forces supported by a reserve company and the deminers
in order to "sanitize" the border. Singh believes that the
border could be demarcated at two places simultaneously
either in the same sector or in different sectors, yet the
border must be constantly assessed for landmines. Over nine

months, these task forces would engage in the surveying,
demining, and pillar installation.


3. (C) Turning to his third point, Singh said that once
the pillars are in the ground, the change of control and
population shifts will need to be closely monitored for
approximately three months with the support of both the
Eritrean and Ethiopian military forces. Fourth,
consolidation supported by UNMEE to ensure that populations
are safe and have come to terms with their new realities
would need to occur for five to six months. And finally,
the former-temporary security zone would be returned to the
full control of Eritrea, Eritrean Defense Forces would be
reintroduced and most likely the Ethiopian troops would
return to areas adjacent to the border as well. Only after
this is complete would UNMEE completely withdraw.

UNMEE'S IMPORTANCE DURING DEMARCATION
--------------


4. (C) Acknowledging the upcoming UNSC consideration of
UNMEE's mandate and possible reconfiguration, Singh
strongly advised against any changes to the current
structure, forcefully promoting UNMEE's importance to
ensuring security for the demarcation process. According
to Singh, in some areas a public outcry is anticipated,
particularly in the Irob, Badme and Tserona. In these
areas Singh expects the population may agitate or engage in
demonstrations. Others, miscreants and those opposed to
the GSE or GOE, may engage in surreptitiously increasing
mining or in attacking the deminers and demarcators. Also,
after demarcation some may be resistant to the handover or
re-occupation and may try to remove or deface the pillars
or undermine the border.


5. (C) In Singh's view, a reduction in UNMEE presence in
the TSZ at this key time could have disastrous
consequences. Reconfiguring UNMEE as an observer mission
would significantly decrease troop levels and, despite a

small increase in the number of observers, it would reduce
the total eyes and ears in the TSZ and the resources
available. The troops here know the terrain and the
people, to remove them and ask the observers to move
forward with only the protection of the blue UN flag may be
foolhardy. They would have neither the numbers, nor the
show of strength that Singh believes will be needed.
While saving money, the observer mission option would not,
in his view, provide the necessary security for
demarcation. Cautioning against drawing down if we think
that ultimately we would have to reintroduce forces to
assist with demarcation, Singh noted, "it takes four months
to deinduct troops and six months to induct." Singh urged
that any decision on reconfiguration be put off until the
future of the demarcation effort was clearer. At a
minimum, Singh recommended a minimum of 2500 infantry
troops, with 1 reserve company, 1 engineering company, 2
demining companies, a helicopter team and medical staff to
support the demarcation process.

POLITICAL ISSUES WILL ARISE DURING DEMARCATION
-------------- -


6. (C) While the EEBC and UNMEE can between them manage the
technical aspects of demarcation, Singh reiterated that
political issues will also inevitably arise during the
process. A means for addressing issues such as access to
the sea, trade and normalized relations must be in place
before proceeding. While the issues themselves need not be
completely addressed before the pillars are placed, both
parties must be participating in political talks while
demarcation occurs. He argued that both sides would need
to consent to political talks and to the specifics of
border demarcation, stating "nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed."

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) We believe Singh raised a number of thought
provoking points about what the demarcation process
could/should look like. We also think that Singh is on
target when he urges that any decisions regarding UNMEE's
reconfiguration be carefully assessed to ensure that the
resulting entity is capable of performing its most
important job - demarcation. END COMMENT.

DeLisi