SRSG LEGWAILA DOWNPLAYS GSE DETENTION OF UNMEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000176

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR UNSC KPKO MARR EFIN ET ER
SUBJECT: SRSG LEGWAILA DOWNPLAYS GSE DETENTION OF UNMEE
LOCAL STAFF

REF: ASMARA 173

Classified By: Amb. Scott H. DeLisi. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) SRSG Leqwaila and UNMEE staff members provided an
update on detained staff on February 15. They report that 22
staff members (of a total local staff of approximately 200)
had been detained but that 11 of those have already been
released. Status of another 17 staff members continue to be
in "unknown." Legwaila said that given past experience he
believed it most likely that those 17 were in hiding but had
not contacted UNMEE in the way that 4 other staff members had
before they too disappeared from sight. As reported reftel,
it appears as though the staff members being held are most
likely detained for failure to perform national service but
the GSE has declined to offer UNMEE any details on the
detentions.


2. (C) Legwaila, in briefing Ambassador and selected
European Heads of Mission, emphasized that he had told DPKO
officials in New York that these developments were "nothing
new." He noted that one day last year the GSE had detained
68 UNMEE staff and that these problems are a routine part of
UNMEE's long-standing tensions with the GSE. Legwaila did
not believe the detentions were related to other GSE
restrictions on UNMEE flight operations or on the composition
of UNMEE's non-Eritrean staff. He appeared bemused by the
intensity of the reaction in New York and surprised that DPKO
chief Guehenno had brought the matter to the attention of the
Security Council. Legwaila noted that DPKO had never paid
any particular attention in the past to GSE detentions of
local staff and, while acknowledging the heightened tensions
which have focused more attention on the UNMEE-GSE
relationship, he suggested that he nonetheless still thought
DKPO was over-reacting to the current problem.


3. (C) Legwaila went on to recount in some detail the
challenges that UNMEE has had in dealing with the GSE on
local staff issues since UNMEE's inception. Issues related
to providing the GSE lists of UNMEE staffers, copies of their
identification (UNMEE and national identity cards),etc. have
been constant sources of irritation leading to more
confrontations for UNMEE than for bilateral diplomatic
missions. Legwaila commented that the GSE had long believed
that UNMEE employment was a refuge of Eritrean malcontents
and thus scrutinized the staff more closely. At the same
time, however, he also observed that he believed the GSE did
not want UNMEE to leave or even to reduce its staffing -
possibilities offered by the Secretary General in response to
the GSE's challenges to UNMEE and the UN. The problem,
however, was that at the same time the GSE was not prepared
to take the steps to "treat UNMEE right."


4. (C) Comment: Post concurs with Legwaila's assessment
that the staff detentions reflect long-standing headaches in
the GSE-UNMEE relationship rather than a deliberate
escalation of tensions by the GSE. However, even if Legwaila
is correct in believing that the GSE would prefer UNMEE to
stay, and we think he is, we should not assume that this will
lead the GSE to either ease restrictions on UNMEE or to
"treat UNMEE right" in the future. These day-to-day problems
will remain part of the relationship so long as UNMEE remains
in Eritrea. And, no matter which option the Security Council
chooses when it ultimately addresses the issue of NMEE's
future, we have no reason to think that the GSE may consider
easing the restrictions that keep UNMEE from performing
effectively or efficiently. End Comment.

DELISI