Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ASMARA1034
2006-12-14 13:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

PFDJ POLITICAL CHIEF ON DARFUR, SOMALIA AND THE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM KREC ER 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 001034 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KREC ER
SUBJECT: PFDJ POLITICAL CHIEF ON DARFUR, SOMALIA AND THE
STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS


Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 001034

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KREC ER
SUBJECT: PFDJ POLITICAL CHIEF ON DARFUR, SOMALIA AND THE
STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS


Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. The Ambassador met with People's Front for
Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) Political Director Yemane
Ghebreab on December 12. On Sudan, the Government of the
State of Eritrea (GSE) remains hopeful - unrealistically so
it appears for now ) that it may still play a role in
helping to mediate between Khartoum and Darfurian rebels.
Regarding Somalia, Ghebreab was sharply critical of USG
policy while the Ambassador reminded him that the GSE had no
credibility criticizing foreign intervention, such as the
proposed AU force, so long as the GSE continues to send
weapons and military trainers into Somalia to support the
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). The Ambassador also
emphasized to Ghebreab the negative consequences for
bilateral relations if the GSE continues to refuse visas for
official TDYers and otherwise to impede the functions of U.S.
Embassy operations. End Summary.

--------------
Darfur
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador inquired about the status of the proposal
for an Eritrean-mediated conference between the DPA
non-signatories and the Government of National Unity (GNU).
Ghebreab said "they were still working on it." Ghebreab
noted that the GSE still was seeking a role for Chad in the
process as well but that the last meeting in Tripoli, at
which Chad had been present as well, tensions had clearly
remained high between Chad and Sudan. Getting the GNU to
accept a Chadian role was clearly going to be difficult, he
opined. When asked about the multitude of initiatives for
working with the DPA non-signatories, Ghebreab noted that no
one had been "keen" on Libya's leadership and, in the end,
the GNU had reaffirmed its interest in the Eritreans
mediating. The Ambassador asked Ghebreab his view of
Egypt,s role, to which Ghebreab replied that Egypt wants to
help but doesn't see itself as playing a leading role.
Ghebreab expressed his view that AU/UN-led negotiations
showed little promise. According to Ghebreab, Bashir has

said that such negotiations were a non-starter, in part
because he believes that the DPA non-signatories are not
prepared to take the idea seriously.


3. (C) Ambassador commented that the U.S. was deeply
concerned about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in
Darfur and the need for movement on the proposal for an AU/UN
hybrid force. He voiced his concern about reports that the
Sudanese President was unlikely to follow through on
commitments made in Abuja and Ghebreab agreed that it appears
unlikely that President Bashir will accept a hybrid force.
The Ambassador said the USG has concerns about Eritrea's own
position on Darfur; he noted that the GSE too has opposed
efforts to put a UN force into Darfur and previously sought
to minimize the seriousness of the humanitarian crisis there.
He told Ghebreab that the GSE's actions in the face of the
severe human rights problems in Darfur very much affect the
credibility of the GSE's proposed mediation role. In the
face of increasing violence there, this is even more of a
concern. Without specifically addressing Eritrea,s stance,
Ghebreab did note that in recent conversations with National
Congress Party and Darfur non-signatory interlocutors, he had
encouraged them to honor the Cessation of Hostilities
agreement, but neither side seemed interested. So long as
both sides continue to believe in the superiority of their
forces, or are convinced they need to make military gains to
bolster their negotiating posture, they will continue to
pursue a militarily edge, he posited.

--------------
Somalia
--------------


4. (C) On Somalia, Ghebreab commented (predictably) that UNSC
Resolution 1725 was bad policy and would not serve the
interests of Somalia, the region, or the U.S. The Somalis
should be left alone to settle their internal disputes
without foreign interference. The Ambassador challenged

ASMARA 00001034 002 OF 003


Ghebreab on the credibility of the GSE's public statements
denouncing foreign intervention in Somalia, given that
Eritrea is providing weapons and personnel support to the
CIC. Without denying Eritrean support to the Courts,
Ghebreab characterized Somalia as a "lopsided problem" with
the greatest issue being Ethiopia's misplaced policies and
occupation of Somali territory. "If you don,t want Eritrea
to do anything in Somalia, you have to push out Ethiopia," he
said.


5. (C) Ghebreab said the GSE's objective was the
reconstitution of Somalia, and if there were no external
support propping up the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG),then the TFG would not exist. If the U.S. wishes to
play a role in reconstituting Somalia (and he pointedly noted
that he doesn't believe the U.S. wants this),then we should
not have supported the warlords who have been destabilizing
the country. The CIC has brought a semblance of peace and
order to Somalia and without foreign intervention would
likely be able to extend this to the rest of the country, he
concluded. The Ambassador countered that what "progress" the
CIC had made in Somalia was hardly peaceful but by means of
force of arms. Moreover, their "progress" which came with
the support of external actors such as Eritrea, might have
allowed the CIC to impose its will on the population but this
was no guarantee that the Courts enjoyed the widespread
popular support Ghebreab asserted. Recognizing that the U.S.
and GSE had very different assessments of the best way
forward in Somalia, the Ambassador closed by offering
Ghebreab his view that the GSE's benign characterization of
CIC intentions would likely prove to be mistaken.

--------------
Bilateral Operational Problems
--------------


6. (C) Turning to the bilateral relationship, the Ambassador
acknowledged that while this issue did not fall directly in
Ghebreab's official area of responsibility, as Political
Chief of the PFDJ, he wanted to alert him to a looming
problem affecting the Embassy,s ability to operate. (Note:
Ghebreab is, in fact, one of the key policy advisors to
President Isaias on issues related to the relationship with
the USG.) The Ambassador outlined the range of operating
problems created by the GSE's continuing denial of visas for
TDY support staff, mentioning as examples refusals for our
regional medical personnel, OBO building contractors, and
technical staff for repair and maintenance of our buildings
and systems. The situation has reached the point, he said,
where the Embassy's operational integrity is being eroded by
the GSE. As a result, the post is reviewing whether we can
continue to operate in-country at current staffing levels or
whether we will need to modify our operations and reduce our
presence and services. As an example, the Ambassador
mentioned the current suspension of NIV services due to the
GSE's refusal to issue visas for our TDY consular officers.
The GSE to date, he continued, has provided no reasons for
the denial of these visas, shown no consistency in its
visa-issuing procedures and offered no assistance toward
rectifying the problem.


7. (C) The Ambassador recalled a similar conversation with
Ghebreab a year ago, when he had warned of the consequences
if the GSE maintained travel restrictions on diplomatic
personnel in Asmara. The GSE had in fact intensified the
restrictions and the result was the unfavorable outcome of
reciprocal travel restrictions on Eritrean diplomats in the
U.S. The Ambassador noted he did not want to see the visa
issue follow a similar path -- but made it clear that the USG
could not continue to accept the status quo. The Ambassador
asked whether the GSE was pursuing a deliberate course of
trying to push out the U.S. Embassy by making it impossible
to operate in-country, because that was the conclusion most
likely to be drawn from the GSE's actions. If this was not
the case, the GSE's choices were nonetheless moving us in
that direction. Ghebreab commented that while he was not
fully aware of day-to-day operational issues between the
diplomatic community and the GSE, he did not believe the GSE
was pursuing a deliberate policy of harassment. On a

ASMARA 00001034 003 OF 003


personal level, he added, he believed that the U.S. and
Eritrea needed to re-engage in a productive relationship on
both an operational and policy level.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) Ghebreab, like many of the government officials, has
been traveling in recent weeks. While the meeting was
intended largely to "catch-up" with Ghebreab on a range of
issues, the Ambassador also wished to use the opportunity to
clearly relay the message of the seriousness of GSE actions
in continuing to refuse our official visa requests and the
potential consequences. This message has been reiterated in
different venues for many weeks with our MFA contacts - with
little forward progress. While Ghebreab seemed surprised at
the extent of the problem, whether the message will get back
to those responsible for resolving the visa imbroglio is
unknown. Post will continue to emphatically deliver this
message through the limited governmental channels open to us.
We think that Ghebreab likely does believe it is important
to Eritrea to re-engage with the USG but note the care he
took to express the thought in terms of his personal opinion
rather than as representing the GSE's views. We fear that
no matter how much Ghebreab and others like him might worry
that the GSE is going too far in pushing the USG away,
President Isaias and others in the government are unlikely to
shift course any time soon.
DELISI