EU SPECIAL ENVOY KUBIS GIVES READOUT OF NIYAZOV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000177

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CACEN, SA DAS GASTRIGHT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET GG KZ PGOV PREL RS TX UP US
SUBJECT: EU SPECIAL ENVOY KUBIS GIVES READOUT OF NIYAZOV
MEETING

REF: A. ASHGABAT 151

B. ASHGABAT 144

Classified By: Ambassador Tracey Ann Jacobson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (SBU) EU Emissary to Central Asia Jan Kubis told the
ambassador on 2/7 that he had raised energy issues with
Niyazov at their meeting the previous day and tried to drive
home the point that, despite the current lack of a
coordinated EU energy policy, energy developments in
Turkmenistan are of import to the EU. Kubis felt he had made
plain to Niyazov that energy "is no more just the domain of
national policies" in the evolving EU: the latter is
preparing to engage as a unit in energy-issue dialogue with
other parties. Issuance of the EU Green Book, probably in
late March, should mark the next stage in this process.
Tacitly conceding that his and the EU,s dialogue with
Niyazov had not/not previously featured the energy dimension,
Kubis assessed it as serendipitous that he had broached the
subject now, on a visit falling by chance amidst multiple
other energy-linked VIP meetings in Ashgabat (Iranians on
2/3, GazProm on 2/19, TAP stakeholders 2/13, Ukrainians
2/14). At the same time, he was frank about having come with
no mandate for anything more than "listening mode" - let
alone to negotiate -- and about his unfamiliarity with even
broad technical details of the subject.


2. (SBU) Judging from Kubis,s account, Niyazov,s comments
during their talk about Turkmenistan,s energy scene were
much akin to those he made to the Ambassador on January 23
(Ref A): in particular, an unenthusiastic review of the pros
and cons of a Trans Caspian Pipeline, together with a rather
more positive depiction of a potential Caspian-littoral
pipeline, to be built jointly with Russia. He repeated to
Kubis what he last week told the Ambassador: that Putin told
him the Kremlin would never consent to direct gas sales to
Ukraine. Kubis said Niyazov sounded adamant about not
committing Turkmenistan,s gas long-term or indefinitely to
Gazprom, though he would consider signing an agreement for up
to two, maybe three, years. At the same time, Kubis had a
strong sense that Niyazov is acutely fearful of Moscow,s
potential to do him harm, including physically. Kubis,s
overall impression: Niyazov feels deeply isolated and is
"frantically" trying to escape from the corner into which the
Russians have squeezed him, but cannot himself actively
promote the pipeline alternatives which would save him.



3. (C) Ambassador asked Kubis about the social-issue
content of his meeting. Kubis responded that he had asked
Niyazov a "normal" question about the GOTX,s recent pension
"recalculation" (Ref B),referring to general reports of
social distress in its wake. Evincing surprise, Niyazov
looked to his Ministers, who quickly assured him there had
been absolutely no negative results. Both the Foreign and
Finance Ministers were "physically shaking" as the topic was
discussed, Kubis related in near-amazement. He surmised that
no-one dares inform Niyazov of simple unpalatable facts.


4. (C) Kubis went on to say that he would no longer raise
the ICRC access issue as one of his standard points with the
GOTX. Recent feedback from the ICRC is that the latter "at
least at the operating, if not political level" itself does
not view strong public representation to be currently
desirable. In particular, Geneva was reportedly ruffled when
its request for "toned-down" language in the latest UNGA
resolution was disregarded by the EU co-sponsors last
November.


5. (C) Kubis said he had raised the case of Maral Yklimova,
held under house arrest as a result of her father,s
conviction in abstentia of coup plotting, with FM Meredov.
Meredov agreed to report to the president, but stuck to the
standard GOTX line that because she must have known what her
father had been up to, she could not be permitted to leave
Turkmenistan and join her family in Sweden.


6. (U) Finally, Kubis noted that the EU now sees it must pay
added attention to education programs in Turkmenistan. The
regime,s ongoing damage to its education system and future
national competitiveness is worsening and has already spawned
a yawning gap between Turkmenistan and even the other four
former Soviet Central Asian republics. He hopes to follow up

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on this topic during future visits.


7. (C) COMMENT: The official GOTX press release after the
Niyazov-Kubis exchange bears out that Kubis,s readiness to
discuss, in very general terms, EU interest in
Turkmenistan,s energy-sector events had an acknowledged
impact. That said, Kubis afterwards reiterated to us that he
not only does not now have, but cannot readily foresee
having, a solid EU mandate with regard to given policies
vis--vis Turkmenistan energy questions. Ambivalent
attitudes on the subject are liable to divide not only the
EU,s membership, but its corporate and business interests,
he pointed out.
JACOBSON