Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ASHGABAT1142
2006-11-03 13:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ashgabat
Cable title:  

NIYAZOV'S GRIM FAIRY TALE - TURKMENISTAN AFTER 15

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR TX EPET 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8873
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAH #1142/01 3071326
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031326Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7973
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 5460
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 2869
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0031
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0057
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 0031
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1687
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0428
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0032
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0486
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 4985
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0045
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2/REA/NMJIC-J2// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5/RUE// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ASHGABAT 001142 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (PERRY)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TX EPET
SUBJECT: NIYAZOV'S GRIM FAIRY TALE - TURKMENISTAN AFTER 15
YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

REF: A. (A) ASHGABAT 1106

B. (B) ASHGABAT 1055

C. (C) ASHGABAT 1135

ASHGABAT 00001142 001.2 OF 006


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Jennifer L. Brush for reasons
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ASHGABAT 001142

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (PERRY)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TX EPET
SUBJECT: NIYAZOV'S GRIM FAIRY TALE - TURKMENISTAN AFTER 15
YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

REF: A. (A) ASHGABAT 1106

B. (B) ASHGABAT 1055

C. (C) ASHGABAT 1135

ASHGABAT 00001142 001.2 OF 006


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Jennifer L. Brush for reasons 1.
4 (B) and (D).

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) Amidst the fake joy and practiced pageantry that
constituted Turkmenistan's celebration of its 15th year of
independence, there was palpable fear and resignation
throughout Ashgabat. Teachers took children out of school
for two months preceding the events to rehearse for the
stadium event and four-hour long parade, and, new to the
usual repertoire, to practice riding on attractions at the
new $50 million "Turkmen Fairy Tales" amusement park, which
opened to $500,000 worth of fireworks and closed the next day
for lack of a management contract. Main thoroughfares have
been blocked for months so that construction could proceed on
a $63 million artificial river, which was so poorly designed,
that the river itself is unusable for any recreational
activity and the riverwalk is interrupted every few hundred
yards by busy roads. And the massive housing demolitions
continued unabated to make room for more of Niyazov's vanity
projects but mostly to clear space for thousands of tiny
sickly pine saplings -- a presidential obsession. Parts of
Ashgabat resemble Warsaw in 1944 with the eerie addition of
high-rise marble palaces overlooking the rubble. Niyazov's
showpiece event, the People's Council (Halk Maslahaty),was
shorter and less substantive than in past years. Although he
promised to raise government workers salaries and pensions,
he also focused the session on fantastic visions of wealth
based on increased oil and gas sales/revenue through 2030.
The fact that the proceeds rarely reach the people will only
contribute to a general feeling of alienation and
helplessness. Niyazov, contrary to the recurring rumors
about his health, appeared rested and focused -- as if he
plans to stick around until 2030.



2. (C) Against this backdrop, many long-time observers see
the steady rise of the Ministry of National Security (MNB)
still known locally as the "KGB." For the first time, a MNB
officer attended a meeting between the Charge and Foreign
Minister (ref A),and Turkmenistani authorities have been
more blatant in intimidating locals and warning them against
engagement with the United States or Europe. Following
Charge's September 25-26 visit to Dashoguz (ref B),a local
grantee was called in and threatened by the MNB and several
other grantees also were called in and requested to return
their grants. In Mary Province, following the mid-October
visit of a senior USAID official, a kindergarten director
grantee was demoted to a smaller school. Authorities in
Lebap Province closed down a cafe on October 30 where local
children were attending an American Corner sponsored
Halloween party and then closed down a smaller event the next
day at the American Corner itself. General harassment of
RFE/RL reporters continues with authorities cutting phone
lines, intermittent surveillance, harassment of family
members, and continued threats to the family of local
reporter Ogulsapar Myradova, who died in prison in August
under mysterious circumstances (ref C).


3. (C) The challenges to USG engagement or assistance in
this environment are enormous. Embassy and other donors
believe that unlike in Uzbekistan, the government will not
openly seek to shut us down or kick us out. Rather they will
target their own citizens with threats and intimidation in
order to discourage contact. USG assistance, therefore,
needs to be as non-provocative and inclusive of local

ASHGABAT 00001142 002.2 OF 006


authorities as possible. Opportunities exist in the areas of
agriculture and health. We should be leery of encouraging
locals to play in a nasty dangerous game in which the USG can
offer little, if any, protection. But more importantly, we
need to maintain our assistance levels in order to support
the brave locals still willing to engage with us, and
maintain our credibility, in case there's an unexpected
change in the regime. In addition, we need to encourage
friends and allies such as the EU and Japan, to establish a
more significant presence here, if only to counter the
perception (mostly Moscow-driven) that the United States is
trying to invade Russia's near abroad.


4. (C) Our diplomatic levers are few and minimally
effective, but essential. Last year Turkmenistan
unsuccessfully lobbied hard to defeat a UN General Assembly
resolution, but this year's lack of a resolution will allow
Niyazov to escape international condemnation of his regime.
For the first time, this year the government paid attention
to one of the USG's annual reports, in this case the USG
Foreign Investment Climate report (ref A),but only because
the government mistakenly perceived portions of the report as
hurting its chances to have an international arbitration case
heard before the U.S. Supreme Court. Turkmenistan also has
shown interest in not being labeled a Country of Particular
Concern vis a vis its Religious Freedom record, and also
extension of its waiver under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
concerning freedom of movement. The government also has
reacted to a recent attempt by the U.S. Congress to pass a
resolution condemning Turkmenistan for its human rights
record. The OSCE also is an active force in assisting with
human rights in general and with specific cases. Unilateral,
but even more so, multilateral entreaties to Turkmenistan
will continue to be essential to keeping the spotlight on
Niyazov's policies and showing global condemnation of his
warped and sadistic vision of a "Golden Century" for the
people of Turkmenistan. End Summary and Comment.

Celebrating Niyazov's Health
--------------


5. (C) Looking rested and focused, Niyazov enthusiastically
took part in a week-long celebration more in honor of him
than of Turkmenistan's 15 years of independence. A number of
diplomats who were trotted out to the various openings and
ceremonies noted that Niyazov seemed barely fatigued at all,
whereas the rest of us were worn out. Indeed, Niyazov even
had his German doctors flown in for the festivities, who
reported that Niyazov's health remained "excellent." Though
embassy continues to consider succession scenarios, given
Niyazov's performance and general concerns over his health
during the past few years, an increasingly likely scenario
for the near and medium term is that Niyazov will be in
charge for years to come. Though embassy had an opening to
pursue democratic reform following EUR/DAS Pascoe's visit in
2004, subsequent events in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan have apparently convinced Niyazov that
relinquishing control would be a threat to his regime. We
can expect Niyazov to further consolidate his control both
over the government and over the everyday lives of the people
of Turkmenistan, including determining where they live, what
they study at school, and how they practice their faith.
Continuing rotations of local government officials and
appointments drawn from the ranks of security forces point to
a regime that values loyalty over competence and stability
over open society

The $500,000,000 Anniversary
--------------


6. (SBU) Niyazov chose to celebrate Turkmenistan's 15th year

ASHGABAT 00001142 003.2 OF 006


of independence with an unprecedented series of openings and
lavish spectacles. Scheduled openings included:

-- Turkmenistan's "Disneyland" ($35 million);
-- a four-kilometer cable car system in the Kopet Dag
mountains overlooking the southern part of the city ($21
million);
-- an artificial river/park complex through southern Ashgabat
($63 million);
-- an "Alp-Arslan National Youth Theater" ($17 million);
-- a new "national library" and cultural center ($75 million);
-- a pyramid-like structure commemorating 15 years of
independence ($4.5 million);
-- a massive "Olympic" natatorium complex ($25 million);
-- a new administrative building for the Ministry of Energy
($19 million).

Of these, only the first four were formally opened with
fanfare, the near-mandatory participation of the diplomatic
corps and (in all cases except the "Disneyland") a
presidential appearance. The authorities decided halfway
through October to postpone the opening of the national
library until the president's birthday in February. The
grand openings for the remaining three buildings, however,
were suddenly cancelled after the invitations were sent out,
perhaps because the president was preserving his stamina
and/or perhaps because was unsatisfied with the progress of
the construction.


7. (C) In addition to the openings, Niyazov presided over
the annual "Red Square"-like parade, where he stood on the
Kremlin-equivalent viewing stand next to the commanders of
his security services (Defense, KGB, Border Guards, Police).
Niyazov delayed the parade's beginning by an hour in order to
meet with a visiting Ukrainian gas delegation, making the
whole event, which assembled participants two hours before
the parade was planned to begin, a six hour ordeal for parade
participants and designated spectators. After the show of
requisite military hardware, each district of Ashgabat and
each province filed by with a dance troupe that performed a
15 minute routine in front of the president. One Ashgabat
district even included American style cheerleaders and
breakdancers, a departure from the president's emphasis on
the purity of Turkmen culture. As Charge left about half-way
through the parade, she noted to a Turkish construction
executive that she was leaving because her son was bored.
"Who isn't?" the Turk sighed.


8. (SBU) Conoff attended the requisite stadium event, which
was more or less an exact repeat of last year's event with
the odd exception of the VIP treatment of the visiting "U.S.
delegation." This delegation turned out to consist of a
Southern California-based evangelical group who embraced the
Ruhnama as a religious text. The group also was given
front-row seats at the parade and seated with VIPs at the
celebratory horse race. Apparently the leader of the group
gave a adulatory interview to Turkmenistan television, though
embassy has no evidence the interview was aired. A
somber-looking Orazov, Turkmenistan's Ambassador to the
United States was assigned chaperone duties, which included
trying to introduce the group to embassy representatives at
every stop.

Fantastic Wealth and Higher Wages
--------------


9. (SBU) The showstopper of the Independence Day activities,
the convening of the People's Council (Halk Maslahaty) had
all the flag and Niyazov portrait waving of prior years,
though several long-time observers noted many of the 2000
members of the session looked more bored and responded less

ASHGABAT 00001142 004.2 OF 006


enthusiastically than in prior years. The session itself was
the shortest on record, with the lion's share of the time
devoted to reports of fantastic wealth accruing to
Turkmenistan as a result of the president's ambitious
2007-2030 Oil and Gas Plan (details of the plan to be
reported septel). Other business included an elections
update and the second annual unanimous outburst against
holding presidential elections in 2009. When the president
asked about preparations for the 2009 presidential elections,
Elections Commissioner Garryev responded, "Don't talk about
such things!" -- a comment that provoked five minutes of
sustained applause. The session also included a
formalization of the amnesty decrees freeing 10,056 convicts,
though the prisoners had been released the prior week.
Niyazov then "surprised" the Halk Maslahaty with an
announcement that he would extend the government's policy of
providing free natural gas, electricity, water, and salt from
2020 till 2030, that gasoline prices (approximately six cents
a gallon at the unofficial rate) would remain constant until
2030, and that he would double salaries of all government
employees, student stipends, pensions, and handicapped
benefits effective January 1, 2008.

Ascent of Turkmenistan's KGB
--------------


10. (C) Concurrent with these celebrations was the steadily
increasing influence of the MNB, referred to locally as the
"KGB." One of the most blatant manifestations of this
influence was the presence of a MNB Deputy Minister during
Charge's October 22 meeting with Foreign Minister Meredov to
discuss a case being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court.
During this meeting Meredov also took Charge to task for
embassy officials' meetings with the relatives of exiled
Turkmenistani "opposition figures," even though these
meetings occurred months ago and Charge had seen Meredov
frequently in the interim. Charge's preliminary take on the
MNB's presence was control over Meredov. Subsequently a
long-time resident EU representative, who usually gets it
right, reported to embassy that in fact Meredov had now been
co-opted by the MNB. "It makes sense," this source reported,
"Meredov's a lawyer and also is in the best position to know
of any locals engaged with USG or other international
programs." This source confirmed growing embassy suspicions
that, unlike in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan would not directly
shut down or oust foreign entities considered to be fomenting
revolution or unrest. Instead security forces would target
their own citizens and intimidate and threaten them into not
engaging with the United States and other donors. Examples
of this intimidation include threatening grantees who met
with Charge during a September 25-26 visit to Dashoguz
Province, demoting a kindergarten teacher grantee in Mary
Province who met with a visiting USAID official and closing
down two attempts to hold a children's Halloween party, one
at a private cafe and one at the American Corner in Lebap
Province.


11. (C) In addition, threats and intimidation of
RFE/RL-related locals continues. As reported ref C, the
daughter of deceased journalist Ogulsapar Myradova was called
in and threatened with a fate "worse than her mother's" if
she continued to talk to U.S. or European diplomats, and
harassment continued of the family of Pen Club Award winner
Rahim Esenov, who currently is in Moscow rehabilitating after
surgery.


12. (C) Embassy also has noticed an increased number of
security officials taking non-security positions, including
the appointment of security officers as the new Chief of
Customs and the Governor of Dashoguz Province. For now,
these observations only point to a trend, but embassy will

ASHGABAT 00001142 005.3 OF 006


continue to monitor indications of continued rise of MNB
influence.

How We Can Help
--------------


13. (C) The need for continued U.S. assistance programs is
even more acute in the atmosphere described above. Though
risks to private citizens of engagement with us have grown,
more and more Turkmenistanis still are willing to take the
risk. Almost all engagement figures are up from 2005,
including Internet Resource Center users, Democracy
Commission Grants, applicants for USAID grants, and
participants in USG-funded workshops and training programs.
Embassy continues to believe that local citizens engaging
with us know the risks and decide to take them in the hopes
of bettering themselves and their local communities. To
paraphrase the Polish national anthem, "Turkmenistan is not
lost while we live."


14. (C) Embassy is uncomfortable in its role as largest
bilateral donor by far in Turkmenistan. Not only does it
make participants in our programs particularly vulnerable,
but also plays into a very active Moscow-driven black
propaganda campaign aimed at showing the Americans as
hell-bent on over-throwing the existing regimes in Central
Asia. It probably is no accident Niyazov allows the
proliferation of satellite dishes in the cities so that
locals can get a full dose of the Russian view of world
events. We are encouraged by recent German initiatives to
play a more active role in Central Asia, in particular
Foreign Minister Steinmeier's harsh words to President
Niyazov during the former's November 2 visit here (to be
reported septel). During a series of meetings leading up to
Steinmeier's visit, Charge had encouraged visiting German
diplomats to join U.S. assistance efforts in order to lower
the USG's profile and have more international buy-in. Charge
repeated these views to visiting Japanese Central Asian Desk
Director Hideki Uyama during an October 23 visit. Uyama
agreed with the need for Japan to increase its engagement in
Central Asia and noted his government was considering regular
consultations on Central Asia both with the EU and the United
States.


15. (C) The USG also needs to make full use of the
diplomatic tools at its disposal. These would have included
a country-specific resolution at the UN General Assembly;
given the lack of a resolution, we have missed the
opportunity to focus worldwide condemnation on Turkmenistan
and again raised the USG's profile as one of the few
countries that seems to care about human rights in
Turkmenistan. Though USG influence may have slightly waned
once Niyazov successfully parlayed U.S. interest in multiple
pipelines into a higher gas price from the Russians, he still
cares about maintaining the veneer that he's our friend in
the Global War on Terror and other security-related themes.
Continuing regular VIP visits at the DAS level and below help
get us in Niyazov's door and frequently break loose one or
more festering issues. PDAS Mann was able to get the
government's concurrence on allowing Peace Corps to obtain a
satellite dish, for example, an issue that had been
unresolved for two years. PDAS Mann also was able to follow
up with Meredov to obtain Turkmenistan's sustained vote for
Guatemala during the UNSC elections. Embassy yields to the
Department on the merits of an A/S Boucher visit. On the one
hand, as with Steinmeier's visit, A/S Boucher would be able
to deliver a high-level and widely publicized message to
Niyazov; on the otherm, such a high-level visit would play
locally to Niyazov's spin on how all the great leaders of the
world come to him. Embassy continues to believe that Niyazov
also is personally offended by the long gap between U.S.

ASHGABAT 00001142 006.2 OF 006


ambassadors and, while this may also send a message of
overall USG displeasure, it denies embassy the use of a
resident "big stick."


16. (C) In addition to VIP visits, Congressional interest in
Turkmenistan gets the government's attention. The MFA sent
back a blistering rebuttal of Senator Brownback's draft
resolution on Turkmenistan, for example, though embassy did
not provide MFA with a copy. Meredov always has Euronews on
in his office and undoubtedly has his staff regularly check
the Internet for any information on Turkmenistan. Meredov
showed first-time interest in any embassy annual reporting
when he requested we revise our Foreign Investment Climate
statement, mistakenly thinking that this report would
influence U.S. Supreme Court willingness to consider an
international arbitration case involving Turkmenistan.
Embassy will continue to encourage dialogue on these reports.



17. (C) Jackson-Vanik and Country of Particular Concern
designation also continue to concern Turkmenistan, though in
the former case, the threat of non-continuation of the waiver
does not seem to have effected any improvement in freedom of
movement since 2005. In the latter case, religious freedom
has improved dramatically. Registered religious group
generally are able to practice their faith with no
harassment.


18. (C) Turkmenistan remains primarily interested in
security cooperation with the United States and is likely to
continue Gas and Go and overflight operations. Niyazov's
reluctance to sign a formal divert agreement for Mary Airbase
more likely represents fear of Russian or Iranian
repercussions than a lack of willingness to provide landing
rights to the base in case of emergency. The government also
has been remarkably cooperative on letting the USG fund and
build border crossing stations on the Iranian and
Afghanistani border. The government also believes there are
tentative plans for CENTCOM to fund three more border
stations. Using lack of progress on human right and
democracy as a reason for not continuing with the remaining
three stations remains an option.


19. (C) And lastly, embassy welcomes increased multilateral
focus on Turkmenistan, including OSCE interest as well as the
devastating, but (alas) completely unpublicized UN Convention
on the Child report. USG channels within the UN should be
mobilized to encouraged greater UN involvement on a political
level.


20. (C) In spite of the increasingly repressive
circumstances, there remains considerable latitude for U.S.
and international assistance and diplomatic leverage. The
worst scenario for the people of Turkmenistan -- and the best
scenario for Niyazov's diabolical plans -- would be for the
United States to walk away. Increased funding for programs,
continued dialogue at high level and a selective willingness
to engage with Turkmenistan demonstrate that we are with the
people of Turkmenistan for the long haul.
BRUSH