PRESIDENT NIYAZOV BACKS AWAY FROM FORMAL DIVERT

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASHGABAT 001093

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR TX
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT NIYAZOV BACKS AWAY FROM FORMAL DIVERT
AGREEMENT IN MEETING WITH DASD MACDOUGALL AND NSC DIRECTOR
MERKEL


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Jennifer L. Brush for
Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY



1. (C) During a two-hour meeting October 18 with Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) James MacDougall
and NSC Director David Merkel, Turkmenistan's President
Niyazov said that he was not prepared to sign a formal
divert agreement allowing U.S. planes to make emergency
landings at Mary II Airbase. However, he was willing
to make an oral agreement to allow "any plane" to land
at the airbase "at any time." Niyazov and MacDougall
agreed that the Ministry of Defense and the U.S. defense
attache office will work out the technical details
required to support emergency landings at Mary. The
president also suggested that he would respond favorably
to a letter from the United Nations General Secretary
requesting use of Mary airbase for U.S. and NATO
"humanitarian flights;" this option would allow
Turkmenistan to cite its support for "peacekeeping
operations" when it comes under pressure from Tehran and
Moscow to forbid such landings. Niyazov also reiterated
the request he made in August to the State Department's
Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephen Mann for
the U.S. to use its influence to promote a settlement of
the territorial dispute between Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan in the Caspian Sea. MacDougall and Merkel
emphasized the importance of economic and political
reform to the future stability of Turkmenistan and the
region. The president cited a long list of
Turkmenistan's accomplishments, seemingly oblivious to
the existence of any problems in the country. In a
subsequent meeting, the Minister of Defense
Mammetgeldiyev and MacDougall agreed to begin work on a
draft exchange of diplomatic notes laying out SOPs for
emergency landings. End Summary.


MARY DIVERT AGREEMENT NO LONGER POSSIBLE


2. (C) DASD James MacDougall and the NSC's David Merkel
met October 18 for two hours with Turkmenistan's
President Saparmurat Niyazov to discuss signature of an
agreement that would lay out standard operating
procedures (SOPs) allowing U.S. military flights to make
emergency landings at Turkmenistan's Mary II Airbase.
Niyazov had initially proposed the agreement in a 2004
meeting with then-EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Lynn
Pascoe, but asked earlier this year to postpone signature
of an agreement until after Iranian President
Ahmadinejad's visit in August. Afterwards, MacDougall
and Merkel also met with Minister of Defense General
Agageldi Mammetgeldiyev and Foreign Minister Rashit Meredov.


3. (C) In response to a question from MacDougall, Niyazov
said that access to Mary II Airbase would be provided to
U.S. and NATO aircraft if there was a need. "We have no
intention of refusing (such landing requests); it is only
that there cannot be a formal document that can be seen."
Niyazov cited pressure from Russia and Iran and reiterated
that the Government of Turkmenistan would allow "any plane
at any time" to make an emergency landing. Stating that his
government would not charge for fueling the plane or seek to
"control" the repair area, he asked only that an official
from the Government of Turkmenistan could enter the repair
area.


4. (C) A second option, Niyazov continued, was for the new
United Nations General Secretary to write a letter to
Turkmenistan requesting use of the Mary II Airbase for
"humanitarian flights." A letter, which would make clear
the base was being used only for "peacekeeping operations,"
was a "good option" for Turkmenistan and would give his
country the political cover it needed to allow U.S. and NATO
aircraft to land. The letter would also allow the fact of


Turkmenistan's participation in a humanitarian action to be
made public.


5. (C) Thanking Niyazov for his forward-leaning position,
MacDougall clarified that the president was granting the U.S.
permission to land planes in emergency situations at the Mary
II Airbase. He also said that the president's second option
might also be a good idea -- and one which NATO would find
interesting -- because NATO's contribution to Afghanistan was
increasing. However, MacDougall added, the UN option would
take longer, and would have to be carefully thought through,
since Russia could exercise its veto within the UN Security
Council. Niyazov pointed out that a letter from the General
Secretary would only need agreement within the General

SIPDIS
Assembly, and not Security Council approval. MacDougall
agreed to explore the UN option, while also moving ahead on a
bilateral basis.


6. (C) In his subsequent meeting with the Minister of
Defense,
MacDougall, referring to the president's agreement to allow
U.S. planes to land at Mary, noted the importance of having
SOPs in place ahead of time in order to ensure both sides
shared a mutual understanding of the steps that should be
taken
in handling any emergency landing. Rather than sign an
agreement, he proposed, the two sides should study the
agreement
and consider an exchange of diplomatic notes outlining SOPs.
The minister agreed, and suggested that his attache for
international affairs should work with the embassy's defense
attache to develop these documents for review by both sides.
MacDougall agreed.

IRAN, THE NUCLEAR THREAT FROM THE SOUTH...


7. (C) MacDougall stated that any possible link up of
terrorists and nuclear weapons was a major concern to the
United States. He thanked the president for his support in
counter-terrorism and non-proliferation areas, specifically
for denying overflight clearance to suspect Iranian planes.
The president noted that Turkmenistan had condemned Iran's
nuclear program, but "they are cunning." That said, Niyazov
added, it was quite obvious that Iran's nuclear program is
not oriented toward peace. Although it was unclear how
strongly Russia supported Iran, it was significant that
Moscow still had not condemned Tehran's activities. "We
support your opposition to Iran, but we don't make a big
thing of that support. However, we can openly condemn North
Korea," he said. The president also noted that, when
President Ahmadinejad had been in town, he had threatened
to attack any Central Asian country that allowed itself to
be used as a platform for a U.S. attack against Iran.
Ahmadinejad had also talked about 40,000 Iranian trucks
crossing into Turkmenistan and had been indignant about
the careful scrutiny of Iranian trucks at the Turkmenistan
border. But, Niyazov continued, "we know they are here
watching everything, and we have to check out the trucks."


8. (C) During a subsequent meeting with MacDougall, the
Minister of Defense went even further. Asking MacDougall
about U.S. plans for addressing Iran's growing nuclear
threat,
he did not seem to believe that the diplomatic measures that
the United States was taking would persuade Iran to reverse
its course. He noted that Iran's development of nuclear
weapons could trigger flows of refugees and other problems
for the region and stressed Niyazov's position that there
should be no weapons of mass destruction in the region.
"Nobody wants Iran to develop nuclear weapons; it would have
a negative impact on the region.... They can have an army
and weapons, but we want Iran to remain nuclear-free."

...AND RUSSIA, THE MANIPULATOR FROM THE NORTH


9. (C) Niyazov also expressed suspicion of Russian
maneuvering


in the region. Noting the meeting of heads of Caspian
littoral
states that would take place in Tehran on October 31,
President
Niyazov said that President Putin had called him on October
17
to find out whether there would be agreement from Iran,
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on Caspian Sea boundaries. If
the
answer was "yes," then Putin would attend the conference.
However, Niyazov continued, it was clear that neither Iran
nor
Russia was interested in resolving the territorial disputes
in
the Caspian Sea because those disputes were good for their
countries. Niyazov also indicated that Moscow had been
pushing
Ashgabat to allow the Russians to establish a naval base near
Turkmenbashy, arguing that the United States was increasing
its
presence in Baku. "We argue we are neutral, but it is very
complicated to argue with Russia," he said. Russia was
suspicious and wanted more privileges in Turkmenistan, but
the
president claimed he was using his policy of non-interference
to counter those proposals.

U.S. COOPERATION ON MARITIME SECURITY?


10. (C) MacDougall reported to President Niyazov that the
United
States was cooperating with Azerbaijan on a maritime security
program directed toward helping Azerbaijan develop its own
Coast
Guard capabilities. Notwithstanding Russian claims, the
United
States. has no plans to establish a base in the Caspian
region.
However, he suggested, as bilateral cooperation between the
United States and Turkmenistan continued to increase, the
United
States might be able to help Turkmenistan, too, to strengthen
its
own maritime security.

NIYAZOV REQUESTS U.S. ASSISTANCE WITH AZERBAIJAN


11. (C) Niyazov asked for the United States to use its
influence
to help settle the disputes over Caspian Sea boundaries so
that
the rich hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian Sea could be
extracted. Noting that the remaining Caspian disputes were
between Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran, the president
indicated
that it would be easier to counter Iran's claim to 20% of the
Caspian if Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan were able to resolve
their
disputes: That way, "if anybody (like Russia) were still to
support Iran's claims, it could come out of their territory."


NIYAZOV ON HIS NEIGHBORS: GENGHIS KHAN, TAMERLANE AND THE
"MONGOLOID"


12. (C) When asked about Turkmenistan's relations with its
neighbors, Niyazov had little good to say. All Central Asian
countries have serious social and economic problems that came
both
from the personalities of their leaders and from the
development
courses that the countries had chosen. Niyazov was proud of
the
fact that only Turkmenistan had turned down the IMF's loan
offer
in the 1990's, and he claimed that none of the leaders was
paying


enough attention to internal development. Characterizing
Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev as "Genghis Khan," Uzbekistan's
Karimov as
"Tamerlane" and Tajikistan's Rahmonov as "a Mongoloid," the
president seemed to believe that only Turkmenistan was on the
right
track of stable economic and political development. That
said, he
expressed an interest in finding a mechanism which would
allow only
the five Central Asian countries and Afghanistan to cooperate
on an
equal footing on many regional issues.


13. (C) Returning later to the issue of Nazarbayev, he
described
Kazakhstan's president as a "two-faced individual who can
change
his position on any agreement in a week or two."
Politically,
Nazarbayev believes that he is Genghis Khan and is focused on
Russia
and the CIS. "I sometimes scold him, because I'm two months
older."
However, Niyazov continued, Nazarbayev has been president for
a long
time, and was quite smart. Niyazov said that he has known
both
Nazarbayev and Karimov for a long time, and Nazarbayev is
"better"
than Karimov. While it was possible to work with Nazarbayev,
it
was best to be as powerful as the United States or Russia;
otherwise, the situation can become "very cold very quickly."

U.S. EMPHASIZES NEED FOR DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC REFORM


14. (C) In all three meetings, MacDougall and Merkel
emphasized
the importance of democratic and economic reform, alongside
efforts
to strengthen security. With President Niyazov, Merkel
stressed
that the United States valued cooperation in three areas:
security, economic reform and democracy building. President
Bush
believes that long-term stability comes from democracy. With
the
Minister of Defense, MacDougall and Merkel pressed for
stronger
Turkmenistan participation in regional fora and urged
Turkmenistan
to take advantage of all educational exchange opportunities.
With
Foreign Minister Meredov, they expanded these points; Merkel
also
urged the Foreign Minister to investigate the circumstances
of
journalist Ogulsapar Myradova's death and to make the results
public.

COMMENT


15. (C) That President Niyazov has had second thoughts about
a
formal divert agreement is hardly surprising, given the
pressure he
clearly has been receiving from both Tehran and Moscow.
Based on
the president's assurances that any plane will be allowed to
land
at Mary II Airbase, we agree that work on an exchange of
diplomatic
notes outlining SOPs be concluded soonest, in order to ensure
that
the exchange goes forward while memories of the president's
comments


remain fresh.

BIO NOTE


16. (C) Niyazov appeared healthy and focused throughout the
entire
meeting. This is particularly significant given his almost
daily
appearances at openings related to Independence Day (on
October 19
he will open the "Turkmen Fairy Tales" theme park and on
October 20
he will open another new theater in Ashgabat, accompanied by
simultaneous televized openings in four regional capitals.)
He
resumed wearing the huge gaudy jewelry he had temporarily
stopped
wearing, or at least had not worn during his August meeting
with PDAS
Mann. He clearly enjoyed this opportunity to show off to
Americans
the depth of his grasp of issues related to Turkmenistan, and
actually
seemed to regret having to say goodbye after only two hours.


TROUTMAN