IRAQ/TURKEY: TURKEY MULLING IRAN DIALOGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006764

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ IR SA
SUBJECT: IRAQ/TURKEY: TURKEY MULLING IRAN DIALOGUE

REF: A. ANKARA 6729 AND PREVIOUS

B. ANKARA 6674

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Turkey is considering options for regional
dialogue with the Iranians about Iraq, with the goal of
establishing stability and reconciliation, GOT Special Envoy
for Iraq Celikkol told the DCM on Dec. 27. Such a dialogue
can take place without U.S. participation, he said, but the
U.S. should push the GOI to cooperate with the initiative.
Celikkol wants to spell out these ideas further during his
January consultations in Washington. Celikkol claimed the
Iraqi Kurds were working against Iraqi unity by further
expanding their territory below the green line. In an
earlier meeting, U/S Apakan stressed the need for intensive
U.S.-Turkey cooperation and consultations on Iraq. End
summary.


2. (C) DCM met with new MFA Undersecretary (D-equivalent)
Ertugrul Apakan on Dec. 27 at his request, followed by a
longer session with GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Celikkol.
Apakan called for intensive U.S.-Turkey cooperation and
dialogue on Iraq, noting FonMin Gul's request to meet the
Secretary in February (ref b) and Celikkol's plans to visit

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Washington in January. Apakan summarized Turkey's consistent
policy views on Iraq: The need for Iraq's political unity and
territorial integrity, stability and law and order, and
provision of basic services. He called for an equitable
balance and "meaningful" power sharing among the different
Iraqi communities. Apakan asserted that the Iraqi Kurds have
had a disproportionately large role in Iraqi politics, and
that regional federalism is working against the establishment
of an Iraqi identity. Turkey supports a solution to the
Kirkuk issue through Iraqi national consensus, restriction of
further territorial expansion of the KRG, protection of
Iraq's Turkoman population, and an end to the PKK's presence
in northern Iraq. Apakan emphasized that Turkey's immediate
priority is to help Iraq establish law and order. DCM
responded that we share Turkey's concerns about stability and
civil order, appreciate the GOT's efforts to support the
Iraqi government, and said that we will continue to consult
closely at all levels.


3. (C) In their subsequent meeting, Celikkol informed the DCM
that Turkey continues to consult with Iraq's neighbors.
After visiting Washington (tentatively scheduled for Jan.
21-23),Celikkol will visit Riyadh Jan. 28 and Tehran in
February. The GOT is considering options for discussions
with the Iranians on Iraq matters, preferably on a regional
basis. Celikkol will ask for USG views on such a dialogue
during his visit to Washington. He reported that he had
recently met twice with the Iranian Ambassador to Ankara, who
told him that Iran wanted to cooperate with the GOT on Iraq.
The Iranian was vague on specifics, however. Celikkol
asserted that Turkey has only discussed Iraq issues with the
Iranians in very general terms and at senior (generally
ministerial) levels. His trip to Tehran will be the first
in-depth consultations on this issue between Turkey and Iran
for years.


4. (C) Celikkol believed that regional (and U.S.) pressure
could persuade Tehran to "force" radical Iraqi Shias to
accept reconciliation with the Sunni Arabs. He emphasized
that Turkey's main role is to "push groups in Iraq together"
in hopes of improving the security situation and creating an
atmosphere for reconciliation, and that Turkey has tried to
push those over whom it may have influence (i.e., the Sunni
Arabs) toward dialogue.


5. (C) DCM noted previous unsuccessful attempts to solicit a
more constructive Iranian role. Celikkol underscored that
the U.S. need not be involved, but should weigh in with the
Iraqi government to gain its support for this nascent
initiative. Turkey can act as a "clearinghouse" to pass
Tehran's views to Washington. Celikkol admitted that this
dialogue with Iran may fail, but the stakes are too high not
to try. DCM advised Celikkol to raise this in Washington,

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but cautioned that Iran's actions have not raised our
confidence level. Additionally, Iran's provision of money
and weapons to Iraqi Shia militias seems to demonstrate that
Iran may prefer chaos in Iraq, not stability.


6. (C) Celikkol expressed appreciation for the Secretary's
Dec. 21 remarks which differentiated between Turkey's helpful
role in Iraq and the unhelpful role of other neighbors. He
added that he has been surprised at how many Sunni Arab
groups in Iraq have reached out to Turkey, and how many tell
him that the U.S. is cooperating with Iran to create a
Shia-dominated state. He said he does not believe this, and
recommends to Sunnis that they reach out to us and seek
reconciliation with the Shia.


7. (C) Celikkol complained that the Iraqi Kurds are
endangering Iraqi stability and unity by seeking to expand
not only into Kirkuk but also Ninewah province, including
Mosul city. He asserted that many Kurds who the KDP and PUK
had sent to live in Mosul have been forced by a violent Arab
reaction to return home. Arab anger over this "expansionism"
could endanger the peace the Kurds enjoy in the three
northern provinces.


8. (C) Celikkol reported that he met Dec. 23 with leaders of
the Kurdistan Islamic Union, who had come to Turkey directly
from contacts in Tehran. According to Celikkol, the KIU
representatives asked that the U.S. treat them on a par with
the major Kurdish parties (KDP and PUK). KIU leaders are
planning a trip to Washington (NFI). Celikkol said they
claimed that their followers are increasing in number, and
that they seek non-violent change in the north.


9. (C) Comment: Turkey is casting about for a meaningful
regional role to deal with the sectarian violence and what it
views as increasing instability in Iraq. The GOT is
increasingly concerned about Iran's growing influence, and is
anxious that Tehran not be allowed to take the lead in Iraq.
Turkey's overarching priorities for Iraq and the immediate
region are the same as ours. Thus it is all the more
important that we seriously engage on both an operational and
strategic level with the Turks on Iraq. Celikkol's visit to
Washington next month is the most immediate opportunity to do
so. The February visits of FonMin Gul and CHOD Buyukanit
will allow us to continue this dialogue at senior levels.
End comment.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON