Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA6666
2006-12-15 13:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY: DR. BAYKAL AND

Tags:  PGOV PREL TU EUN CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006666 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU EUN CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY: REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY: DR. BAYKAL AND
MR. HYDE


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006666

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU EUN CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY: REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY: DR. BAYKAL AND
MR. HYDE


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. In an unexpected charm offensive, Republican
People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal hosted the
Ambassador for almost two hours on December 6, offering his
views on the coming election year, the EU, and Cyprus. He
agreed that CHP and the Embassy should have more open
channels of communication in the coming year. There was no
sign of the Baykal who practices opposition for opposition's
sake and who swipes at US policy at every opportunity.
According to press afterwards, Baykal was similarly
circumspect in his readout, describing the meeting as
"useful" and "natural." END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
Election Year 2007: Hoping to Gain from AKP's Shortcomings
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Baykal said Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan will no
doubt stand for the May presidential election, but for fear
of reaction will not announce his candidacy until the very
last opportunity. Baykal opposes Erdogan's candidacy because
the PM "doesn't believe in the very basics of our order." As
an example, Erdogan proposed examining the constitution's
article on secularity, one of its immutable provisions. In
addition, the PM's appointments and advisors further
illustrate how he is working to undermine the republic,
according to Baykal. Although Erdogan tries to act without
provoking suspicion, "if you could see inside him, you'd
know."


3. (C) Baykal expressed doubts about the legitimacy of the
timing of the presidential vote; he pointed out that this is
the first time a government is electing the president at the
end of its five year term. Misuse of presidential authority
is a great concern to CHP, Baykal explained, because the
president appoints the chief of the TGS and the Higher
Education Council (which in turn appoints rectors, deans,
professors). Religious organizations are hiding just behind
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP),looking for
opportunities, he alleged.


4. (C) Baykal admitted he didn't know whether an Erdogan

presidency would help CHP or not, although he speculated that
the sentiment that the subsequent parliamentary election was
the "last chance" for secular forces might play an important
role. Soon, AKP will hold the parliament, the prime
ministry, the speakership, and the presidency: "We aren't
ready to hand over the keys to the castle," Baykal stated.
May to November 2007 will be a period of "re-establishment,"
in which groups waiting for the post-Erdogan period will test
their strength, he predicted.


5. (C) Baykal evaluated the performance and public standing
of AKP. He claimed that Turkey's economic stability is
"borrowed from very unstable conditions." He argued that
although AKP does have great legitimacy among Turks because
of its religious nature, that characteristic doesn't erase
AKP's flaws. Unemployment continues at high levels,
corruption persists, the situation in Iraq is worsening, the
PKK continues to be a serious security threat, and problems
with the EU continue to drag Turkey down. He claimed that
AKP would receive less than 30% of votes and CHP would get
more than 20%.

--------------
Turkey's European Union Process
--------------


6. (C) Bringing Turkey into the European Union has inherent
difficulties, Baykal said. CHP did not expect a formal
period of "renunciation" by the European Commission, and the
"tiresome" process will continue. Baykal predicted that the
process will continue more easily after June 2009, the date
of the European parliamentary elections; there is no
meaningful difference between the EP and national elections,
Baykal said. By the end of 2008, depending on the complexion
on the Turkish parliament and changes in European national
governments, Turkey should reach a modus vivendi with the EU.
Then the Europeans will have an opportunity to alleviate
tensions by taking steps on Cyprus.


7. (C) Turkey needs to be convinced that at the end of the
day, it will be accepted as a full member, Baykal said.

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Because Brussels has applied different rules to Turkey and
different standards pertaining to free movement of labor,
agricultural supports, the regional fund, and the "open-ended
process," the Turks have begun to doubt Brussels' sincerity.
He cited universal suffrage in Turkey as evidence of Turkey's
decision to become modern and western. Although there have
been three military interventions, no one doubted that
democracy would return; those who intervened were forced out
again when Turkey decided to be a free and democratic
society. "We are ready to do whatever is required of us --
to pay what Poland or Bulgaria pays," for instance, Baykal
said. CHP is the most sincere supporter of the European
cause, he claimed, but even Ataturk, Turkey's most
pro-western leader, had a strained relationship with Europe.
Turkey can only continue down the European path if it sees
more convincing engagement from Europe.

--------------
Cyprus
--------------


8. (C) Baykal said that it is not rational to have Greek
Cypriots at the negotiating table because the dream of giving
Turkish Cypriots equal rights was lost with the 2004 Annan
Plan referendum that the Greek Cypriots rejected. What we
can do, he said, is legalize, step by step, Turkish Cyprus.
Ambassador pointed out US efforts to facilitate openings to
the north while reiterating that US policy acknowledges only
one Cyprus. Baykal observed that the only way to pressure
Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos was to ignore his
demands, which inappropriately link the Cyprus issue and
Turkey's EU accession process. When the Ambassador pointed
out that Turkey will not get into the EU without a Cyprus
solution, Baykal interrupted to say that Cyprus could not be
solved until Turkey entered the EU. Baykal also suggested
pressuring the Greek Cypriots by threatening partition.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) Baykal's graciousness in this meeting was unexpected.
CHP has been notoriously unconstructive on virtually all
topics under the AKP administration and relations with the
U.S. have been no exception. This time, Baykal had not even
a notetaker in the room, but his subsequent readout to the
press was a mild as the meeting itself. This tracks with
recent efforts by other CHP members to call for improved
relations with the US. Unsurprisingly, Baykal's plan for the
election year appears to involve exploiting AKP failings more
than promoting an affirmative social democratic agenda, which
CHP appears to have abandoned under Baykal in favor of a more
nationalist stance. Baykal's comments indicate that on both
Cyprus and the EU, CHP plans to continue its obstructionist
behavior, subjecting this government to accusations of
selling out Turkish nationa interests at any hint of
progress. END COMMET.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON