Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA6391
2006-11-09 16:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY ON EU/CYPRUS: SEEKING A NARROWER,

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU EU CY 
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DE RUEHAK #6391/01 3131656
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091656Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9899
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006391 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU EU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY ON EU/CYPRUS: SEEKING A NARROWER,
NON-VAROSHA PACKAGE


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006391

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU EU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY ON EU/CYPRUS: SEEKING A NARROWER,
NON-VAROSHA PACKAGE


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary. Turkish MFA Deputy U/S Apakan told
Ambassador that while Turkey will continue to work with the
Finns to find an acceptable Cyprus package that allows Turkey
to meet its legal obligations to the EU, including Varosha
will be next to impossible. The Turks would be more
comfortable with a smaller package that looks more
legalistically at its preexisting Customs Union obligations.
They realize time is short. The Turks would also like the
USG to push in New York to get the Gambari process off the
ground. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador met with MFA Deputy U/S Ertugrul Apakan
November 8 to underscore USG understanding that the EU mood
on Turkey is dark and frustration high after the proximity
talks that never happened. The Turks have a large mountain
to climb in the next five weeks. It will be crucial not to
aggravate already substantial doubt that some in the EU
harbor as to whether Turkey really wants to work this out.
Ambassador stressed that the GOT needs to do all it can to
reinforce Turkish interest in finding a solution.


3. (C) The USG is urging the Finns to re-engage, through
shuttle diplomacy or via inviting a series of senior people
for individual discussions. The Finns may be prepared to
invite experts to Helsinki as early as next week. When that
happens, Turkey should be ready with concrete proposals. The
Finns will also be looking to flesh out their initiative,
perhaps by putting it down in writing. Turkey can further
help itself by taking steps on other key issues, such as
Article 301, which the PM raised recently with NGOs. Other
possibilities could include taking action on Greek minority
issues, Halki, etc. Ambassador pointed to the recent Greek
parliament decision to fund construction of a mosque in
Athens. What Turkish officials say publicly on EU accession
and the Finnish effort would also be extremely important.


4. (C) Apakan responded that the GOT would continue its
"positive approach" to the EU and Cyprus. The official
response to the EU progress report would be low-key and

constructive. On Cyprus, they would maintain contact with
the Finns. FM Gul had spoken with Enlargement Commissioner
Olli Rehn and they were in contact on the diplomatic level.


5. (C) On process, Apakan said the GOT had advised the Finns
from the outset to hold four party talks. Turkey's reasons
were at least two-fold: Greece is a guarantor power and its
political assurances are needed on any Cyprus-related
agreement. Without them, the Turks cannot agree with Greek
Cypriot President Papadopoulos. And for implementation,
Greece must give its "open blessing". Apakan enumerated the
openings already offered to the Greek Cypriots (GCs): they
can come to Turkey without a visa and purchase one at the
airport. Word had been given quietly to Turkish customs to
allow GC goods to enter. They are coming in via Athens to
the tune of $7-8 million. Turkish Cypriot (TC) vessels. he
noted, cannot take their goods to Greece.


6. (C) Apakan said the Turks would speak privately to the
Finns on what he termed the "political geometry" of Cyprus,
his shorthand for stating how difficult it is for Ankara to
mix a final settlement issue - Varosha - with either
confidence building measures or Customs Union (CU) issues.
Under the Luxembourg presidency, the TCs and GCs had
discussed a basket of issues; then Varosha was inserted. The
package failed. Varosha does not fall under any Turkish
obligation to the EU; it appears in no EU document and, for
the GOT, it is too hard. Speaking confidentially to the US
and not to the EU, Apakan said that Turkey's obligation to
the EU is to fulfill the additional protocol. The purpose of
that document is to extend the CU to all new EU members,
including the ROC. In fact, the CU only applies to
industrial and specified processed agricultural goods, not to
services, and it says nothing about ports, airports or
airspace.


7. (C) To move in the right direction, Apakan continued,
shuttle diplomacy is needed. The Turkish position is to find
a way to work within the scope of the CU. For example, a
small package that pairs the opening of Turkish ports and the
lifting of the isolation of the TCs would be both meaningful
and digestible in Turkey. The GOT would be criticized at
home, but it would be politically defensible. With respect
to airports, since there is nothing in the CU on either
airspace or airports, how can Turkey open airports if no
consideration is given to opening Ercan? The smaller the
equation, the easier it will be to deal with, he stated.


8. (C) As a last resort, Apakan added, Turkey could consider
arbitration. He acknowledged that it might be riskier for

ANKARA 00006391 002 OF 002


Turkey than for others. This would be, however, for a later
stage. In the meantime, the Turks would talk to the Finns
and other EU partners.


9. (C) One other important element would be to get the
Gambari process moving. The letters have not reached Talat
and Papadopoulos because the GCs had asked that they be
delayed. Apakan asked for USG intervention to get this
moving; the parties would adjust accordingly.


10. (C) Ambassador responded that the point of the Finnish
package was to allow Turkey to meet its legal requirements to
the EU while ensuring that Cyprus does not pose an undue
barrier to Turkey's ongoing accession negotiations. The
trick is to find a formula that is politically doable both in
Ankara and in Nicosia; no small feat. The USG is concerned
and wants to be helpful. Turkey needs to be active and
energetic in working with the Finns and trying to find a
solution.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON