Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA6230
2006-11-01 15:26:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKISH MILITARY STRESSES IRAQ AND PKK TO VISITING

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR MPOS PTER IZ TU 
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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
S E C R E T ANKARA 006230 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MPOS PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MILITARY STRESSES IRAQ AND PKK TO VISITING
ARMY COS GEN SCHOOMAKER


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T ANKARA 006230

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MPOS PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MILITARY STRESSES IRAQ AND PKK TO VISITING
ARMY COS GEN SCHOOMAKER


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: Iraq and the PKK dominated US Army Chief of
Staff Schoomaker,s meetings in Ankara October 27 with his
host Turkish Land Forces Commander Gen. Basbug and with TGS
CHOD Gen. Buyukanit. The Turks expressed anxiety about
developments in Iraq and possible trends in US policy;
complained again about KRG representation in the
US-Turkey-Iraq trilateral process on the PKK; and called
Kirkuk potential &dynamite8 that could undermine efforts to
form a unified, successful Iraq. On Afghanistan, Gen.
Buyukanit said Turkey can provide additional forces for ISAF,
but any deployment to fight terrorists in the south of the
country would require parliamentary approval; he did not
repeat earlier arguments that Turkey,s peacekeeping
commitments abroad and PKK requirements at home preclude any
additional forces. End Summary.


2. (S) On Iraq/the PKK, the Turks emphasized the following
points.

-- Iraq,s political unity and territorial integrity are
vital to Turkish interests and for the region. Recent
developments worry Turkey. Division along sectarian lines
will not solve Iraq,s problems and might make them worse.
Gen. Basbug complained that Turkey,s advice on Iraq going
back to 2002-2003 had been disregarded, including for example
on the importance of proportional representation for all the
key communities in Iraqi political and security institutions.
Nevertheless, Gen. Basbug said, Turkey does not want to see
any change in US policy on Iraq (division of the country,
premature withdrawal, etc.).

-- The PKK presence in northern Iraq remains a serious
problem and source of frustration for this country. Turkey
supports Gen. Ralston,s initiative and understands he is
very serious about it. But the effort must succeed for the
sake of Turkey,s terrorism problem and for the sake of
US-Turkish relations; without this, relations will continue
to deteriorate, and the damage won't be easily repaired. The

PKK problem cannot be resolved in one day, but taking real
steps cannot take too much time, either. Gen. Buyukanit said
that he wants to come to the US in mid-February (per his
invitation from CJCS Gen. Pace) with some results in hand on
the PKK. This will enable him to speak more effectively in
the US and in Turkey on behalf of US-Turkish relations.

-- Recent US emphasis on military force against the PKK as a
&last resort8 had a very negative impact in Turkey. The
military option need not be and understandably will not be a
large-scale US ground operation against the PKK, but a range
of other actions could be considered -- e.g., seizing a PKK
leader, a single air strike, etc. These would have
significant and very helpful impact.

-- Gens. Buyukanit and Basbug reiterated their objections to
Kurdistan Regional Government representation in
US-Turkey-Iraq trilateral talks on the PKK. Buyukanit said
the Turkish government had received a formal note from the
Baghdad authorities designating a KRG representative to the
process (presumably Karim Sinjari). The effect was to turn a
tripartite process into a quadripartite one. This was
unacceptable, and Turkey has rejected it.

-- Gen. Basbug restated Turkish concerns regarding Kirkuk,
calling it &dynamite8 that could aggravate sectarian and
other problems within Iraq. He urged postponement of the
2007 referendum and an overall approach to Kirkuk that would
reflect broader consensus among all of Iraq,s various
communities.


3. (S) On Afghanistan, Gen. Buyukanit reviewed SACEUR,s
requests for additional forces to fight in the south and
Turkey,s argument that the mandate of ISAF, in which it
continues to participate, does not include fighting
terrorists. He said Turkey can provide additional forces for
ISAF, but extending Turkish fores to fight terrorists would
require parliamentary approval here. He added, however, that
the situation in Afghanistan is not good and emphasized that
NATO must be successful there. Gen. Buyukanit did not repeat
arguments he has made previously, including publicly, that
the fight against the PKK and other peacekeeping commitments
make it impossible to increase Turkey,s Afghanistan
commitment, and he clearly said that this is not the

military,s position. In a separate discussion October 28 in
Istanbul, Turkish Army 3rd Corps Commander and former
commander of ISAF Lt. Gen. Erdagi argued to Gen. Schoomaker
that NATO HRF commanders should not be stay-behinds if
substantial elements of their headquarters are deployed with
ISAF. Erdagi did not address the issue of additional Turkish
forces for ISAF.


4. (S) Gen. Schoomaker said that no one in the US has any
doubt about Turkey,s concerns regarding the PKK. He had
spoken with Gen. Ralston and believes he is approaching his
mission in a practical, serious way. Gen. Schoomaker
affirmed the US commitment to a unified Iraq; said there is
no discussion in official circles about dividing the country;
and stressed that we see Iraq also in a broader regional
context that must be looked at strategically. He cautioned
against over-interpreting electoral season statements and
assessments by US political figures on Iraq issues and noted
how long it took to fashion the US constitution and political
order. Gen. Schoomaker tried three times to turn the
conversation to possibilities for Army-to-Army cooperation.
Gen. Basbug twice turned the conversation back to the PKK,
but later indicated some interest in learning lessons from
the US Army,s experience in Iraq. Subsequently at dinner on
October 27, Gen. Basbug approached Gen. Schoomaker one-on-one
with a much more positive message of serious interest in a
range of Army-to-Army activities including education,
training and staff talks.


5. (S) In response to the Turkish generals, specific points
about the PKK, Ambassador stressed the importance of the
Ralston initiative. Gen. Ralston,s step-by-step approach is
producing results, including the closure of PKK offices and a
GOI statement that the PKK is a terrorist organization --
significant, if imperfect policy changes. We understand that
more is needed, and it is essential to support the work of
Gens. Ralston and Baser, which holds the promise of changing
a negative in our relations into a positive. Regarding the
tripartite process, Ambassador said that Gen. Ralston
believes he has one counterpart designated by the Iraqi
government, al-Waili. Whom the Iraqi government includes
within its delegation/group working to support al-Waili on
the PKK is its business. As Gen. Ralston noted on his first
visit to Ankara, he believes that some connection with
Barzani and the KRG will be important for producing results,
but this connection should be through the authorities in
Baghdad and definitely not one that turns the effort into a
four-party process that includes the KRG in a formal way. In
any case, Gen. Ralston wants to work for the time being on a
US-Turkey and US-Iraq basis, and no formal trilateral is
imminent.


6. (C) Comment: The Turkish generals, points to Gen.
Schoomaker, especially regarding Iraq and the PKK, foreshadow
the approach that TGS DCHOD Gen. Saygun and Gen. Buyukanit
himself will take during their respective counterpart visits
to the US in mid-November and mid-February. On the overall
Iraq problem, the Turks are increasingly uneasy about
developments there and rhetoric in the US that could bear
negatively our long-term commitent. Saygun and Buyukanit
will be seeking a clearer sense of US plans in Iraq and the
role that we would like for Turkey to play.


7. (U) Gen. Schoomaker cleared this message.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON