ON A KNIFE'S EDGE: TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006037

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU EU CY
SUBJECT: ON A KNIFE'S EDGE: TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION PROCESS

REF: ANKARA 5976

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: The next two months are critical for Turkey's
EU accession. The obstacles remain formidable. Should the
EU and Turkey fail to arrive at a modus vivendi over Cypru,
the result could well be a de facto suspension of
negotiations. With the Turks in a nationalist, "it's us
against the world" mood and pre-election mode, that could
easily shift to rupture. This would be bad for Turkey,
Europe, the region, an eventual Cyprus settlement, and
U.S.-Turkish relations. Over the next eight weeks, USG high
level interlocutors will need to talk often and openly, both
in Turkey and in Europe to help prevent this rupture and to
preserve our own bona fides here. End summary.


2. (C) Turks have been in denial for months over the Cyprus
train wreck scenario, believing matters will be papered over
eventually as has happened at previous crisis points. This
one is different:

--The slow pace of political reforms in Turkey and freedom of
expression prosecutions appear to leave many unsure of how
serious the GOT is about pursuing its European vocation.

--Many here, from the man on the street to bureaucrats in
government who have long pushed for Turkey's EU membership,
seem convinced failure is inevitable. No matter which
legislative boulder they push up the hill, no matter how
comprehensive their adoption of the Acquis, they believe in
the end Europe will say no.

--The GOT upped the ante when PM Erdogan traveled to northern
Cyprus, declared Turkey would not abandon it or open its
ports and airports to the Greek Cypriots until the EU made
good on what the Turks see as its promise to lift the
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots (in reward for their April
2004 "yes" vote on the Annan Plan).

--Nationalist sentiment is running high. This results from
the PKK terrorism issue, the European parliament report on
Turkey, action by the French National Assembly to criminalize
denial of the 1915 Armenian "genocide," and the approach of
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007. Few issues
jangle nationalist nerves more than Cyprus.

--The military probably still formally supports EU accession
as the present day manifestation of Ataturk's
European/Western ambitions. But some fear also that EU dicta
to put the military under civilian control could lead to the
unraveling of Ataturk's secular society, especially at the
hands of PM Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government.


3. (C) In addition, this EU-Turkey round goes forward without
recently departed British Ambassador to Turkey Sir Peter
Westmacott. At each previous crisis point, the UK and
especially Westmacott were instrumental, in real time, in
drawing out the crux of the problem and finding a compromise.
The new UK ambassador will lack Westmacott's contacts and
experience in Turkey, and no other EU ambassador can play a
comparable role.


4. (C) Enter the Finns. They have done an admirable job of
listening and identifying a loose package of Cyprus-related
elements that could allow this process to continue to bump
forward. Despite the obvious benefits for Turkey, Ankara has
embraced the initiative with alacrity and distaste. With
skill and luck, though, the Finns may be able, at least
temporarily, to satisfy both Turkish demands (easing TC
isolation) and EU demands (that Turkey open ports/airports to
the ROC),while kicking other Cyprus issues down the road a
few years. It is significant that the Finns have implicitly
linked the two, a leap many in the EU appeared reluctant to
make. The issues remain thorny. If the Turks say "yes,
maybe" but are not seen as being sufficiently flexible or
aggressive in negotiating the details, it will count against
them. Even if the Turks work effectively and the Greek
Cypriots balk, it is not clear that will suffice to prevent
negotiations from stalling on more than a few acquis
chapters. This is a risk we need to persuade the Turks to
take, no matter how hard the sell.


5. (C) A rupture would serve no one's interest. It would
isolate Turkey from Europe and exacerbate growing nationalism
here. It could remove virtually any prospect of a
comprehensive Cyprus settlement anytime soon, as well as any
incentive to do something constructive on Armenia. It could
undermine Turkey's cooperation with us and the Europeans on
Iran -- cooperation that will be critical in future years.

ANKARA 00006037 002 OF 002


It could hurt us on Iraq. Bluntly put, it risks seriously

changing the Turkey equation for the Europeans and the West
generally, which means us.


6. (C) Our role -- behind the scenes, persistently, and at
high levels -- is to persuade and cajole the parties (Ankara,
Brussels and key European capitals) to support and work with
the Finnish package. In the absence of a fully capable UK
ambassador, the Germans will be key. They will want to
minimize problems for their EU presidency next year. We will
also need to nudge UN U/SYG Gambari to move forward with his
efforts to foster a process that could lead to renewed UN
settlement talks. And when the right time comes -- when all
parties have engaged but the December EU summit deadline is
looming -- we need to be prepared to offer up additional
practical suggestions that will help give all parties enough
to make the Finnish package work. We have consistently,
through many administrations, supported Turkey's EU vocation.
In the wake of PM Erdogan's October 2 meeting with President
Bush, where the President pledged our support, we need to
work hard to keep this on the rails.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON