Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA5817
2006-10-05 13:17:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY AND GMF - SEEKING WIDER BLACK SEA WESTERN

Tags:  ECIN EPET MARR PREL NATO TU RS XH ZJ 
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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 1192
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 1419
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
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RUCBNLA/COMUSNAVEUR DET ONE LONDON UK//POLAD//
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RHMFIUU/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
RUEKDAI/DIA WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC//
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005817 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECIN EPET MARR PREL NATO TU RS XH ZJ
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND GMF - SEEKING WIDER BLACK SEA WESTERN
STRATEGY


ANKARA 00005817 001.3 OF 003


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005817

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECIN EPET MARR PREL NATO TU RS XH ZJ
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND GMF - SEEKING WIDER BLACK SEA WESTERN
STRATEGY


ANKARA 00005817 001.3 OF 003



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On September 10-11 in Ankara, The German
Marshall Fund (GMF) organized a workshop on "Developing a
Western Strategy towards the Wider Black Sea Region",
attended by EUR DAS Matt Bryza. Participants sought to
strike common ground and called for greater cooperation on
security, energy security, and democratization, noting that
Turkey must be a pillar. Some took note that the U.S. (in
particular EUCOM) had stepped back from seeking military
access to the Black Sea, but appeared unaware that this was
tied to an active information-sharing arrangement between
Turkey and NATO. Bryza and others cited the importance of
Azerbaijan and Turkey to advancing the southern gas corridor
to Europe to increase collective energy security by
diversifying energy supply and transit. This ended up as one
of the major topics of the workshop. End Summary.


2. (SBU) STRATEGIC OVERVIEW: Ron Asmus, GMF-Brussels
Executive Director and workshop chair, framed discussions by
using a draft paper aimed for the first chapter of a book
that is one desired outcome of the series of GMF workshops on
Black Sea strategy. Points he emphasized:

-The Black Sea region is an integral part of Europe, but EU
enlargement fatigue is an issue.
-Georgia and its integration into NATO should be supported
(NATO MAP).
-Frozen conflicts should be higher priority.
-The BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization)
should be more active and results-oriented.
-Energy security and diversity should be advanced.
-Security initiatives should be expanded and supported.
-Maritime issues should be separated from wider Black Sea
issues.

There were a lot of comments reflecting surprise about
Turkey's ambivalence and sensitivities on Black Sea, at least
in part driven by concerns about perceived U.S. designs on
military access and security. Moreover, many participants
claimed the situation in Iraq created a negative perception

about the U.S. role and credibility in the wider Black Sea.
There were concerns expressed about EU enlargement fatigue
and its effect on the region. In addition, there were
questions about the impact of the end of the Orange
Revolution in the Ukraine on Black Sea strategy.


3. (SBU) GOALS AND HOW TO DEAL WITH RUSSIA: In developing a
western strategy towards the wider Black Sea region, speakers
described Turkey as a pillar. A number of speakers,
including DAS Bryza, underscored the need to determine and
prioritize shared goals and strategy. Bryza emphasized that
we should pursue our goals and interests even when they are
in conflict with Russia and ensure that we compete more
effectively without antagonizing Russia needlessly. Asmus
and Bryza proposed that activities focus and balance in three
areas: security cooperation, democratization and governance,
and energy/trade.


4. (SBU) INSTITUTIONS AND SECURITY: Workshop participants
agreed on relevant Black Sea institutions. They identified
BSEC for energy and economy, lamenting that it was not more
effective as an institution. Participants noted that
security was the focus of a few institutions, like
BlackSeaFor (cooperating with Operation Endeavor) and Black
Sea Harmony. Bryza and others applauded the information
exchange implemented by the GOT in the maritime realm, as
described by Turkish Navy Rear Admiral Cem Gurdeniz. Bryza
said the U.S. supports Bulgaria and Romania participating in
Black SeaHarmony. He said the U.S. does not seek to hav
its military ships regularly enter the BlackSea.
Participants were struck at the apparentdegree that Turkey
sees the Montreux agreement controlling passage of vessels in
the Turkish Straits as sacrosanct. Bryza said the U.S. is
working to use its role as BSEC observer to make BSEC's
efforts more action and results oriented.

ANKARA 00005817 002.3 OF 003




5. (SBU) CAUCASUS: Participants observed the lack of
progress on frozen conflicts in the Caucasus, noting that
that there was always the risk of them "unfreezing".
Speakers called for continued support to Georgia's "Rose
Revolution, and noted the special challenge of Russian
historical and economic influence in the region. Bryza
stressed the importance of Turkey to the region in energy,
economic, and political relations. He described Turkey as an
ally and an important regional leader, in particular as a
secular democracy with a predominately Muslim population, but
with a unique experience - that cannot necessarily be applied
as a model. Bryza also noted the potential importance of
Azerbaijan, given its Shiite population, but observed that it
still had a way to go on democratization. Bryza extolled
Georgia as a big success, and explained that the U.S.
strongly supports moving it forward on NATO accession.


6. (SBU) ENERGY SECURITY AND RUSSIA: Launching a discussion
on energy security, Turkish MFA Energy Coordinator Mithat
Balkan presented a vision of multiple pipelines, which
included Blue Stream expansion south to Ceyhan for LNG
processing, so that it would not conflict with Caspian gas
transit to Europe. He pressed for more support from the
U.S., noting that there was no longer a special energy envoy
to the region and claiming that former President Clinton was
more supportive than President Bush. Balkan admitted that
the biggest problem was the limited commitment from the EU as
client for gas transit.


7. (SBU) MFA Deputy Director General for Energy Mithat Rende
asserted that Russia cannot be constructively engaged on
energy without having alternatives to transit on Russian
soil. Otherwise, the Kremlin will continue to use energy as
a foreign policy tool. For example, to make the Russians
"behave" on CPC expansion, alternatives like BTC expansion
and TCP for both oil and gas are needed. Rende worried about
the EU's ability to forge a joint energy policy, particularly
under an imminent German Presidency, given its ties to
Gazprom and the proposed Baltic pipeline.


8. (SBU) Presenting PowerPoint maps showing Russian
dominance of pipelines to Europe, Bryza advocated progress on
diversification via a southern gas corridor from the Caspian.
Bryza described the European gas market as broken, because
it is overly reliant on Russia, which would soon face
problems meeting its supply contracts - given lack of
investment in its fields. Therefore, Gazprom is busy seeking
to tie up Central Asian supply, which it in turn sells to
Europe at exorbitant margins, as well as seeking to buy into
downstream companies in Europe. Bryza (and other speakers)
lamented the EU's passive acceptance of its over reliance on
Russia, noting that if we were not successful in encouraging
Europe to reduce its over dependence on Russia, this would
weaken our ability to forge consensus on Caspian-sourced
projects. He lamented news that Hungary had struck a
significant independent deal on gas storage with Gazprom. He
exhorted the EU to be more active in promoting Caspian gas to
diversify its sources.


9. (SBU) Bryza asserted that the key next step will be to
get Azerbaijan to signal to investors and partners that it is
serious about developing Shah Deniz Phase II for export. He
said that current forecasts from BP/Statoil showed potential
for 50 BCM from Shah Deniz Phase II by 2015-16.


10. (SBU) COMMENT: The Black Sea workshop raised more
questions than answers. Given weak institutions and unwieldy
interests in the region, developing a new Euroatlantic
strategy for the wider Black Sea region is an immense
challenge. Developing such a "western" strategy is by
definition exclusive of Russia, which plays a dominating and
not always constructive role in the region, in particular in
the energy sector. The USG can continue to work with

ANKARA 00005817 003.3 OF 003


regional institutions on cooperative and selective
approaches, in particular with its relatively new observer
status in BSEC.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON