Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA5802
2006-10-05 10:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

SE TURKEY LEADERS WANT POSITIVE RESPONSE TO PKK

Tags:  PTER PGOV PREL TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 051038Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9215
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH// PRIORITY
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RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005802 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2021
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: SE TURKEY LEADERS WANT POSITIVE RESPONSE TO PKK
CEASE-FIRE


Classified By: ADANA PRINCIPAL OFFICER ERIC GREEN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),
(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005802

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2021
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: SE TURKEY LEADERS WANT POSITIVE RESPONSE TO PKK
CEASE-FIRE


Classified By: ADANA PRINCIPAL OFFICER ERIC GREEN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),
(D)


1. (U) This is a Consulate Adana Cable.

Summary
--------------


2. (C) Kurdish and regional GOT leaders in SE Turkey are
hopeful
the PKK cease-fire will de-escalate the violence, but
worried that Ankara will not capitalize on the opportunity,
which they believe offers an opening for serious, long-
range political engagement with Turkey's Kurds. Local
leaders were especially concerned that the security forces
could
veto any possible moves by the civilian government to
relax restrictions on Kurdish cultural rights or produce an
amnesty package. While Diyarbakir Provincial Governor Ala
and city mayor Baydemir both favor seeking a long-term
compromise to the Kurdish issue, other local leaders (from
both sides) remain attached to older policies of
confrontation and denial. End summary.

PKK Cease-fire: What Next?
--------------


3. (C) On September 26-29, Adana PO and Ankara PolCouns
visited
Diyarbakir, Batman and Bingol to meet with municipal and
GOT officials as well as representatives of NGOs. Although
the PKK had not yet announced its cease-fire while we were
in the region, all our interlocutors were confident it
would happen and tailored their comments accordingly. Our
sources attributed the PKK move to pressure from the
grassroots, who deal with the fallout from higher levels of
tension created by the current terrorist campaign. They also
link
it to the dynamics of Northern Iraq, where the Kurdish-run
administration is stating it will not tolerate PKK activity
there. Seymus Diken, a Diyarbakir writer and advisor to
Mayor Baydemir, said that Iraqi President Talabani addressing
the
UNGA -- in Kurdish -- was a huge emotional marker for
Turkey's
Kurds and that it weakened the PKK, which had previously
dismissed Talabani as a "feudal" chief.


4. (C) Mayor Osman Baydemir, who was involved in the
roll-out of
the DTP announcement urging the PKK to call a cease-fire,
said it is essential that the GOT respond with initiatives,

such as a new amnesty law, lowering the election threshold
or increasing broadcasting rights, to demonstrate that
there is progress on the Kurdish issue. "We need a
roadmap," he said, so each side can plan its actions and
work toward a common goal of defusing the conflict.
Baydemir acknowledged that it would be very difficult for
the government to cede on these issues during the run-up to
next year's election.


5. (C) Similarly, Governor Efkan Ala believed that after a
cease-
fire declaration the GOT should step up its efforts to deal
with the Kurdish problem. He volunteered that indirect
negotiations with the PKK might be possible, using parties
in Northern Iraq, for example, as intermediaries. (Ala did
not mention the DTP as able to play this role.) Ala also
suggested that the U.S. could also participate in pushing
for a long-term political solution to the Kurdish question.
He said the U.S. could work through the MFA and noted that
FM Gul is "sensible" on these issues.

But the Security Services are Obstacles
--------------


6. (C) Ala lamented that as long as violence continues, it
will
be difficult to accelerate the pace of change on issues such
as broadcasting. He also complained that civilian
officials are often undercut by the security forces in

ANKARA 00005802 002 OF 003


handling the Kurdish issue. Baydemir was blunt on this
subject, saying that the key now is to influence the
security forces, not the politicians. Baydemir and others
worried that the recent outspoken comments by senior
military leaders signaled an intention to resist any
political initiatives.

Amnesty is Key Issue
--------------


7. (C) Several human-rights activists and bar association
officials, who are not DTP members but are in touch with
the grass-roots, identified amnesty as a critical issue,
since allowing the thousands of PKK fighters to return home
would have a huge effect on public opinion. Under current
rules, PKK militants are permitted to surrender to the
authorities but are then under intense pressure to provide
information useful for counter-insurgency operations. As a
result, those who turn themselves in are regarded with
suspicion once they try to return to society.

Moderation is not a Universal Sentiment
--------------


8. (C) Many of our interlocutors -- notably the NGO and
political community in Diyarbakir -- displayed a high level
of political maturity in relating the Kurdish issue to the
broader context of Turkey's national politics. They
recognized
that nationalists in western Turkey are using the on-going
terrorist campaign to weaken the government, which will
make progress on the Kurdish issue even harder. In the SE
itself, leaders remain who are also attached to policies of
confrontation and/or denial. The DTP mayor of Batman,
Huseyin
Kalkan, praised the PKK as "freedom fighters" who are "solely
responsible" for any progress that the Kurdish cause has
achieved in recent years. Asked about fighters coming
home, he said that if his son was in the mountains, he
would not welcome him home unless the PKK released him from
duty. Meanwhile, in Bingol, the AK Party mayor Haci
Ketenalp (himself a Kurd),sounding like an echo of ten
years ago, claimed that there is "no Kurdish issue" in
Turkey. While these officials are not making policy, their
positions suggest they represent ever present strains of
opinion
that would be obstacles to compromise.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Leaders with common sense from civil society and
regional
government recognize that the current alignment of forces
is pushing the PKK to stand down, at least temporarily.
They also believe that the national government needs to
respond
positively to the cease-fire in order to maintain momentum in
moving
the conflict from violence into the realm of peaceful
politics.
An offer to reintegrate rank-and-file PKK fighters (perhaps
those whose only crime is membership) back into society
would be, they believe, the best way to develop such
momentum,
as it would affect thousands of families wanting their
relatives
to return safely while further eroding the PKK's ability to
fight and recruit. Apart from the politically difficult
amnesty issue, the GOT could also move the process forward
by following up on PM Erdogan's ground-breaking
acknowledgement of Turkey's Kurdish problem 13 months ago
with another high-profile gesture to lend official
recognition to Kurdish identity by, for example, relaxing
broadcasting restrictions or making a run at lowering the
election threshold to give Kurdish parties a better chance of
competing nationally.


Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

ANKARA 00005802 003 OF 003



WILSON