Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA5738
2006-10-02 15:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

PKK DECLARES CEASEFIRE: NOW WHAT?

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV TU IZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005738 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2021
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: PKK DECLARES CEASEFIRE: NOW WHAT?


Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005738

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2021
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: PKK DECLARES CEASEFIRE: NOW WHAT?


Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The PKK leadership in Iraq declared a ceasefire as of
Oct. 1, following Ocalan's Sept. 27 call from his Turkish
jail cell. PM Erdogan took a measured stand, repeating the
GOT position (and ours, as outlined by Gen. Ralston in his
Sept. 27 press conference) that as a terrorist organization
-- as opposed to a nation-state -- the PKK's only real option
is to lay down its arms. However, Erdogan also implied that
if the PKK indeed halts attacks the military will not
initiate violence. Thoughtful opinion makers here are still
calling for concrete steps against the PKK in Iraq, but also
view the ceasefire as an opportunity to move forward on the
Kurdish issue at home. The two are linked, but sequential
progress in slowing down PKK terrorism will create the
necessary political space for domestic reform. End summary.

It's Official
--------------


2. (C) Through his lawyers, jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan
called for a unilateral ceasefire on September 27. The PKK
leadership in northern Iraq quickly followed suit on
September 30, ordering that the ceasefire commence Oct. 1.
We have seen no confirmed reports of PKK-initiated violence
as of Oct. 1. A small bomb exploded in the southeastern port
city of Mersin, but it is not confirmed that the PKK was
responsible. Turkish leaders and officials responded much as
expected: The PKK is a terrorist organization, not a state,
and the term "ceasefire" applies to nations at war. For
Turkey, the only acceptable step by the PKK is to lay down
its arms and permanently renounce violence. Furthermore, as
the press heavily reported this weekend, the PKK has declared
ceasefires before, only to use the lull to regroup and renew
violent attacks in Turkey. The most recent example was the
2000-2003 ceasefire. By 2000 the Turkish military had
significantly degraded the PKK's capability, and Ocalan had
been captured the year before. But by 2003 the PKK -- using
its safehaven in northern Iraq -- had rearmed and recruited

new terrorists for its war on Turkey.


3. (SBU) PM Erdogan himself took a measured line toward the
announcement, telling the press on his plane bound for an
Oct. 2 meeting with President Bush in Washington that the PKK
must lay down its arms. However, he added that Turkey is
waiting to see if indeed the PKK does cease attacks, adding
"if the terrorist organization keeps its word, there is no
reason why security forces would carry out operations." At
the same time, Erdogan emphasized that he would tell the
President that the U.S. must work to implement steps against
the PKK in Iraq. The new CHOD, GEN Buyukanit, accused the
PKK in an Oct. 2 speech of having manipulated ceasefires in
the past to bargain with past governments. While he vowed to
fight on against terrorism, he stopped short of calling for
draconian measures.

A Chance to Move Forward?
--------------


4. (SBU) While many editorials limited themselves to denying
that the ceasefire has any real meaning, some more thoughtful
(and connected) columnists went beyond this. Mehmet Ali
Birand wrote that the PKK's move is part of a longer chess
game that the GOT must play wisely, adding that a ceasefire
will mean fewer deaths in Turkey and could/could lead to a
solution without dividing the country. Two Washington-based
correspondents noted that U.S. officials are already raising
the need for Turkey to consider amnesty (or "reintegration")
for PKK terrorists, but only after real action is taken to
deal with the PKK's safehaven in Iraq.


5. (C) The Turkish press also reported on Iraqi President
Talabani's October 1 comment to the Greek press that the PKK
is finished and has no future. Talabani reportedly said that
the PKK had caused problems between Iraq and Turkey, but that

ANKARA 00005738 002 OF 002


"from now on, there will be no such problem." He added,
however (according to press),that the solution to the PKK
problem rested with Turkey, not Iraq, and that Turkey must
induce terrorists to return home with an amnesty. Given
Turkish anger over Talabani's recent accusation that Turkey
is interfering in Iraq's internal affairs -- and his implied
threat to use the PKK against Turkey -- we do not expect
Turks to see Talabani's words as a olive branch.

Comment: Keep the Pressure On Both Sides
--------------


6. (C) A PKK ceasefire -- even if the organization follows
through -- does not solve the problem. Indeed, with winter
approaching the pace of PKK activity in the southeast is due
to decrease anyway. This in turn would ease the pressure for
Turkey to undertake a cross-border operation into northern
Iraq to attack PKK camps there. And as President Talabani
himself has implied (by placing the burden for a solution
solely on Turkey's shoulders),a ceasefire could be used by
the GOI to renege on commitments it has made to combat the
PKK.


7. (C) The key for Turkey will remain the concrete steps the
GOI takes in Iraq. By declaring a ceasefire, the PKK is in
part seeking to buy time and live to fight another day. A
ceasefire is not the same as the real solution: laying down
arms and renouncing violence, which would pave the way for
long overdue political and social reforms in Turkey.


8. (C) If the PKK keeps its word (always a dangerous
assumption),casualties in Turkey will decrease. This may
give us the breathing room necessary to undertake a quiet,
sustained dialogue with Turkey on steps that it must
eventually take if it ever wants true peace in the southeast.
We are heartened that some prominent opinion-makers are
already giving this some attention. But, without a real push
to deal with the PKK in Iraq first, there is little chance of
addressing the fundamental problems of Turkey's Kurdish
population.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

MCELDOWNEY