Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA5699
2006-09-29 13:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKS NEED MORE CONVINCING ON SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR

Tags:  ENRG PINR AJ TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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O 291301Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9094
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 1413
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 3065
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5485
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 005699 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DAS BRYZA, S/P FOR STEVE HELLMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2011
TAGS: ENRG PINR AJ TU
SUBJECT: TURKS NEED MORE CONVINCING ON SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR

REF: A. ANKARA 5611


B. ROME 02699

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 005699

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DAS BRYZA, S/P FOR STEVE HELLMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2011
TAGS: ENRG PINR AJ TU
SUBJECT: TURKS NEED MORE CONVINCING ON SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR

REF: A. ANKARA 5611


B. ROME 02699

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. As we work to convince Turkish officials
to connect with Azerbaijani counterparts to develop a
framework for the transit agreement needed to create a
natural gas "southern corridor," to Europe, Post continues to
hear skepticism and reservations about some of the
fundamental premises of the concept. NIO Amb. Kauzlarich's
October 8-12 meetings in Ankara will be another chance to
address with senior energy officials the big picture concerns
and misperceptions that may be impeding Turkish action. This
could be followed up by a technical political/economic
briefing by USG energy experts. The mooted IEA-hosted
meeting that would bring together all the parties is another
opportunity. End Summary.


2. (C) Energy Ministry Under Secretary Sami Demirbilek
summed up his questions in a September 28 meeting. Foreign
Ministry officials are less blunt, but we hear the same types
of questions in our meetings with them.

-- Not enough gas: Most consistently, Turkish officials say
they are not convinced that Azerbaijan has sufficient current
or prospective gas reserves to meet its own needs and to
export. The Turks tell us they hear different things from
us, from companies like BP and Statoil, and from the
Azerbaijanis about the potential of Shah Deniz phases I and
II. Thus, they continue to prioritize trans-Caspian sources
(as MFA DDG Rende did in a recent lunch we hosted with EU
diplomats - ref a). This dilutes the emphasis on working
with Azerbaijan.

-- Not a meaningful counterweight to Gazprom: More
fundamentally, Turkish officials say that even if the most
expansive claims about Azeri reserves are true, this would
only be enough to slightly dent Gazprom's control of gas
supply to Europe. Demirbilek argues that if one supplier
(Russia) controls 95% instead of 100% of the supply, the
marginal supplier does not affect the commercial or political
balance, particularly when the large supplier has almost
unlimited potential to feed the market while the marginal
supplier's potential is capped.

-- Not politically feasible. Recalling the years of
political spadework that it took to create BTC, Turkish
officials tell us they wonder if the political will exists to
create another major multi-country project. Demirbilek asked
for example, if potential suppliers would not just conclude
that the effort to get their gas to Europe was just too hard.


3. (C) These are the same basic doubts we have been hearing
since we began talking to the Turks about Azeri gas for
Europe earlier in the year. They do not seem to have been
compelled by the logic of the idea in the interim. Turkey
has a long-standing strategic and foreign policy objective of
developing its role as a gas and energy hub and creating
alternatives to Russian and Iranian gas, as Ministers Gul and
Guler have told us repeatedly. A more concerted effort to
lay out the big picture as well as basic facts and figures
about Azeri gas and our assessments of the political
practicality of the initiative could help make obvious to
them that working with the Azerbaijanis on a transit
arrangement now is the only way forward. Arming Ambassador
Kauzlarich to answer the questions above in meetings with
Guler and MFA officials would be an immediate first step that
could be followed by more in depth economic/political
briefings by USG energy experts.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

MCELDOWNEY