TURKEY/KOSOVO: LITTLE CONCERN ABOUT KOSOVO FINAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005475

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL TU YS
SUBJECT: TURKEY/KOSOVO: LITTLE CONCERN ABOUT KOSOVO FINAL
STATUS

REF: A. STATE 135734


B. ANKARA 1651

C. STATE 59894

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary. We detect little real concern in Turkey over
Kosovo final status, with Turkish officials prepared for an
independence outcome. MFA Eastern European Department Head
Hasan Asan concurred with USG views regarding Kosovo final
status negotiations, sharing the concerns expressed by a
number of regional states regarding the potential for
radicalization of Serbian politics, but nonetheless
supporting steady forward progress toward a final settlement.
Despite the Balkans' Ottoman heritage and Turkey's past
interest in Balkan conflicts, Kosovo talks draw little public
discussion here as most attention is focused on Iraq, Iran,
and the Middle East. Russian statements citing Kosovo as a
precedent for South Caucasus conflicts worry Turkish
officials somewhat. End Summary.


2. (C) A variety of Turkish officials have told us that
Turkey will accept any decision on Kosovo's final status to
which all parties agree, but fully expect an independence
outcome. MFA Eastern European Department Head Hasan Asan
told us GOT views concur with those of the U.S. with regard
to Kosovo across the board. He reiterated the stand conveyed
last spring by MFA Deputy Under Secretary Ahmet Uzumcu to EUR
A/S Fried (ref b) that he saw no catastrophic outcome
resulting from Kosovo independence. GOT officials have
added, however, that NATO should maintain a strong presence
in Kosovo after a final status decision, and express
misgivings about a possible transition to an EU-led force.


3. (C) Asan appreciated U.S. acknowledgment of concerns
regarding political stability in Serbia, noting the strong
potential for radicalization of Serbian politics, especially
in the aftermath of Serbia "losing" Montenegro and the strong
hold Kosovo has on the Serb national psyche. Nonetheless,
Asan agreed that this should not delay a final status
decision. In his view, Serbia will require a delicate
approach that includes appropriate EU and NATO incentives and
gestures, with a close eye on reactions in Voivoidina and
Presevo. Asan opined that Turkey's powerful military
establishment would be comfortable with independence for
Kosovo. He described Turkey's current diplomatic relations
with Serbia as "correct," with no recent high-level visits.


4. (C) Turkish National Security Council Secretary General
Yigit Alpogan told House International Relations Committee
staffer Alan Makovsky earlier this summer that Turkey is well
aware that the U.S. seeks a final status decision this year.
He said the international community should take care that an
independent Kosovo rest on solid foundations -- with strong
emphasis on meeting standards, achieving decentralization,
and guaranteeing human and minority rights -- to avoid
further problems in the region.


5. (C) Ankara-based Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies
(ASAM) Kosovo watcher (and ethnic Kosovar Turk) Erhan
Turbedar described to us how the official GOT attitude
towards Kosovo had changed since the Balkan crises of the
1990s. At that time, Turkey focused its attention on
Belgrade, limiting its contacts with ethnic Turks in Kosovo.
Dealing with a virulent Kurdish insurgency in the southeast,
the GOT feared that support for ethnic Turkish rights in
Kosovo could have a boomerang effect and encouraged Kosovo's
Turks to deal directly with Belgrade. Kosovar Albanian
leader Ibrahim Rugova asked the GOT to recognize Kosovo's
independence during a meeting with then-Turkish President
Ozal in 1990. With the Kurdish insurgency in mind, Ozal
refused. The result, according to Turbedar, was increasing
friction between Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Turks as the
Kosovar Albanians pursued their parallel structures and
eventually an insurgency.


6. (C) The GOT's attitude changed after NATO's 1999 entry
into Kosovo, Turbedar explained. Since then, Turkey's Balkan
policy has been closely aligned with that of the U.S. and EU.
He noted that FM Gul stopped first in Pristina before making
an official visit to Belgrade in October 2005. He
characterized the ethnic Turk minority in Kosovo as well

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integrated with the majority Albanians. Political parties
representing the Turk minority seek the restoration of
linguistic rights embodied in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia's 1974 constitution, but Turbedar characterized
their efforts as uncoordinated and amateurish.


7. (C) Turbedar said that, since many Turkish politicians
have Balkan roots, there remains a residual concern for and
interest in the area. Turkish politicians are sensitive to
the fact that several million Turks of Albanian descent are
in Turkey -- a sizable voting bloc. The Albanian ambassador
here speculated that the pro-Islam Justice and Development
Party (AKP) government is warm to Kosovar independence in
large measure to gain the support of traditionally secular
Turks of Albanian descent in upcoming elections.


8. (C) That political sensitivity aside, Middle East
Technical University Balkans Studies professor Mustafa Turkes
acknowledged a lack of Turkish public interest or debate
concerning Kosovo. He saw little official GOT concern, or
any particular strategy, for dealing with Kosovo independence
and its possible effect on the Turk minority there, and
expected Turkish policy to be largely reactive. He was less
sanguine about the Turk minority's prospects in an
independent Kosovo and suspected they would increasingly fall
prey to ethnic Albanian pressure. While acknowledging
independence as the likely outcome, he wondered whether
statehood would solve Kosovo's inherent problems and lead to
long-term stability for the region. He opined that the
political influence of Balkan-origin ethnic groups in Turkey
had been strong under the Ecevit government pre-2002 but had
less impact over the AKP government currently in power.


9. (C) Comment. Despite concern for Serbia's stability and
residual interest in the welfare of ethnic Turks in Kosovo,
the GOT does not appear to see an independence outcome for
Kosovo as worrisome, but rather inevitable, manageable, and
possibly politically useful. Turkish officials have told us
they are concerned by Russian arguments that Kosovo
independence will set a precedent for Caucasus and other
conflicts. Despite an uptick in Kurdish violence in Turkey
and enduring Turkish fears of an independent Kurdistan
emerging from northern Iraq, we see little inclination here
to compare the Kosovo and Kurdish situations. When pressed,
Turks are just as likely to quip that Kosovar independence
might be a useful precedent for northern Cyprus should
comprehensive settlement negotiations there suffer a
catastrophic failure. End Comment.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON