TURKEY-CYPRUS-EU - EUR DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005436

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2021
TAGS: PREL TU CY UN EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY-CYPRUS-EU - EUR DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH
TURKISH D/US APAKAN


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: In a 75-minute meeting with EUR DAS Matt
Bryza September 11, Turkish MFA D/US (U/S equivalent) and GOT
Cyprus pointman Ertugrul Apakan animatedly described the
latest state of play from Ankara's point of view. Apakan
stressed Turkey's preference for a comprehensive, UN-based
settlement, explained its discomfort with "mini-packages",
but stressed that the Turks are studying closely the recent
Finnish proposal and "aren't saying no." Apakan and Bryza
discussed the possibility of exploring legal challenges to
the European Court's 1995 decision against issuing EU
certificates of origin for Turkish Cypriot-produced goods as
a way to open up trade to northern Cyprus. According to
Apakan, Turkish Cypriot leader Talat is prepared to start
technical talks immediately, without a leaders' meeting as a
prerequisite. End summary.


2. (C) Apakan focused on Turkey's and Talat's preference for
a comprehensive settlement. Rumors we hear about Turkey
intervening with Talat to rein in the Turkish Cypriots "are
not true," he stated. Talat is well aware of GOT views but
is in charge of his own negotiations; Apakan said he talks
with the Turkish Cypriot leader only at critical junctures.
Right now, both Turkey and Talat want talks to start without
a prior meeting between Talat and Papadopoulos, which the GOT
views as key to preventing the derailment of Turkey's EU
membership ambitions. It is easier to work within the
context of an overall settlement, which allows for trade-offs
-- security for the TCs, for example, and property for the
GCs -- than with small packages. Apakan referenced the Annan
Plan and the way in which friends of the UNSYG had
contributed a balance of issues, all of which fit
symmetrically into the general matrix.


3. (C) Papadopoulos, Apakan stated, says the time is not ripe
to re-engage on comprehensive settlement issues; for Turkey
and the TCs, each and every time is ripe. There should be a
leaders' meetings to set a framework, and ensure that both
technical committee meetings and substantive working group
meetings follow a specific timeline. In July, the GOT had
encouraged both Gambari and Talat. In the interim, all that
had emerged were papers. Talat and Papadopoulos simply need
to announce a start and reiterate that the ultimate objective
is a comprehensive settlement. The process gains legitimacy
through gaining the imprimatur of the two leaders. Talat
remains Papadopoulos' appropriate counterpart.


4. (C) Apakan made it clear that Turkey has its eye on the EU
progress report which is slated to come out October 24 but
may slip. In that regard, they are looking hard at the
Finnish proposal, which contains some elements that would not
make the Turks happy. Apakan stressed, however, that Ankara
would not say no, would study it, view at it as a point of
departure, and would be willing to discuss the details. He
reiterated the importance of direct trade, opening Ercan
airport -- even for charter flights, which would help the
tourist industry -- and ending the isolation of the TCs. So
far they had seen nothing on paper; the ideas had been
delivered orally. He noted Ankara's difficulty in deviating
from its focus on a comprehensive settlement. The challenge
of mini-packages, he explained, is that they usually do not
provide enough room for maneuver for substitutions and
balances.


5. (C) Examining the run-up to the Republic of Cyprus' May
2004 EU accession, Apakan focused on legal obligations he
believed the GoC had undertaken. Under the Treaty of
Accession, the GOC had a responsibility to work toward a
comprehensive settlement once it became an EU member. This
was, he stated, also referred to in December 2002 EU Summit
conclusions. He cited Protocol 10 to the effect that the
entrance of the GC side into the EU would not damage the TC
side, and maintained the GCs had undertaken obligations not
to create discrimination against the TCs in terms of economic
development. The spirit of the statements was clear, Apakan
stated.


6. (C) Protocol 10 has been forgotten, Apakan lamented.
Protocol 3, which the UK Government concluded, states that
the Treaty of Establishment prevails: Greece, Turkey, the UK
and the two sides on the island gave birth to the RoC. As a
result, any settlement that replaces the 1960 "birth" should
emanate from those five parties. Bryza noted that in the
most recent UNSC UNFICYP renewal debate, the Greeks had
attempted to change the language from "sides" to
"communities". The USG would not agree to that because it
would undermine the Treaty of Guarantee, the second of three
founding treaties (the third is the Treaty of Alliance).
Bryza recounted how he told the Greek Ambassador to the

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United States that if Nicosia or Athens wished to renegotiate
or nullify the Treaty of Guarantee, they should say so and
pursue tis goal through direct negotiations.


7. (C) apadopoulos, Bryza noted, is an exacting contracts
lawyer. He agreed that the GC President's legalistic
arguments run counter to the spirit of the documents. Bryza
also focused on the 1995 decision to suspend the issuance of
certificates of origin. (Note: Cyprus DDG Bilman later told
us that, since the 2004 referendum, the EU accepts documents
issued by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. End
note.) Apakan added that the 1995 decision did not speak to
the embargo -- it focused solely on the stamp on the
certificate of origin and phyto-sanitary document. Nothing
in the RoC's EU accession should empower them to enhance
their power over the TCs, Apakan concluded. That was the
purpose of Protocol 10.


8. (C) Bryza explained that during his meeting with D/UNSYG
Gambari the previous week, Gambari had reiterated that the
main goal was a comprehensive settlement. That meshed with
USG policy. Gambari had requested that Talat be encouraged
to proceed with technical talks (or simultaneously with
substantive talks) even before a meeting between the island's
two leaders, because Gambari believed he could convince UNSYG
Annan to appoint a new DeSoto if/if technical talks are
ongoing. A USG goal, Bryza continued, was to get some
comprehensive process moving now to help give Turkey some
cover in October with the EU.


9. (C) Apakan responded that there was no need to encourage
Talat, who remains intent on moving ahead. The GCs say that
the technical talks must proceed concurrently with the
substantive working groups and that everything should be
studied indefinitely. According to Apakan, Papadopoulos'
list was organized not according to any UN principles, but
more in line with EU harmonization. To his knowledge, an
initial meeting between Talat and Papadopoulos was not a
precondition to starting other talks. Talat merely says that
it would be preferable, but not necessary, to have a leaders'
meeting first. Bryza said he would take that message back to
Gambari to try to bridge the communications gap.


10. (C) Bryza explained that he had been examining legal
angles, and believed there were arguments to be made in a
European court to the effect that no binding legal decision
states that shipping to Famagusta port is illegal. Apakan
interjected that all embargoes date from 1963-64 and
constituted a unilateral action by the GCs; there was no EU
or UN decision. UNSCRs 540 and 541 refer to the recognition
issue but not to an embargo. Apakan added that, as the GOT
had been assured repeatedly by a number of EU governments in
the attempt to get Turkey to open its ports and airports to
the GOC, lifting the embargo would not constitute
recognition. "We're not focused on getting the "TRNC"
recognition," Apakan stated, "We're seeking a settlement."


11. (C) Adding two additional points, Apakan professed
innocence with respect to Talat's presentation of the
winner's cup at the Istanbul Formula One race. Neither the
GOT nor Talat knew in advance, he claimed. It was not an
attempt to gain political benefit. On Lebanon and UNIFIL,
Apakan made the point that Turkey did not want to see the RoC
gain political or legal bonuses as a forward mounting base
for UNIFIL. Turkey understood UNFICYP would play a support
role, but wanted to ensure that this was not exploited.


12. (C) On the Finnish package, Bryza made clear the United
States was trying to assist the EU effort. Everyone knows
Famagusta-Varosha will re-surface, despite the Turkish side
having rejected the proposal in 2004. We recognize that for
Turkey, an eventual Varosha handover to the GCs must be part
of a final settlement. We would support the Finnish effort
not by offering alternative packages, but by trying to think
of a small number of additional elements that might plus the
package up sufficiently to make it acceptable to all sides.
We know Ercan is important to the TCs; property is important
to the GCs. One possibility would be to consider a form of
moratorium on development of certain properties in the north.
Apakan cautioned that the TCs would view a property
"moratorium" as an additional embargo, then noted that
perhaps something could be arranged with the new property
adjudication regime in the north: during the period when
cases are under Commission scrutiny, nothing can happen to
them. Bryza proposed exploring with the Finns later this
month the possibility of add-ons if their current package
proves too small and gets stuck, as Bryza suspects will be
the case. Apakan agreed. "We can't commit to a package,"
Apakan stated, "We don't have the authority, but we want and
need to be positive." He added that "in some ways, your

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mini-package relects the Turkish approach better than our
curent official position" but concluded that at this stage
of negotiations, Turkey would first focus on studying the
Finnish proposal.


13. (C) Apakan phoned us the following day to propose that,
if Bryza will be in New York during UNGA, that they continue
their discussions there.


14. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.

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WILSON