AVOIDING A TURKEY-EU TRAIN WRECK: CONSULTING IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005333

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2021
TAGS: PREL TU EU CY US
SUBJECT: AVOIDING A TURKEY-EU TRAIN WRECK: CONSULTING IN
ANKARA

REF: A. ANKARA 5204 (EXDIS)

B. NICOSIA 1521

C. ANKARA 5268

lassified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 14 (b),(d)


1. (U) This is a joint message from Embassies Ankara, Athens
and Nicosia.


2. (C) Summary: We are seeing increasing signs that Turkey
may indeed be headed for a train wreck in its relations with
the EU late this fall. Derailment would endanger Turkey's EU
accession bid, which the US has supported for decades. It
could seriously undermine Western interests here by feeding
the perception that the West is rejecting Turkey. It would
undermine our regional interests regarding Iran, Iraq and the
Middle East, as well as in promoting peaceful development in
Southeast Europe. To help forestall this, we urge a vigorous
US effort this fall. One component of this could be a
mission to the region led by USEU Ambassador Gray. End
summary.


3. (C) PM Erdogan has drawn a line in the sand on Cyprus; the
Turks will not open ports and airports to Greek Cypriot trade
(i.e., ratify and fulfill their Ankara Protocol commitments)
until the EU makes good on what the Turks see as its promise
to ease Turkish Cypriot isolation. In addition, Turkey is in
pre-election mode, with both presidential and parliamentary
elections scheduled for 2007. There are rumors that PM
Erdogan may be tempted to scrap the whole EU effort.


4. (C) Turkish Parliament convenes a special session
September 19 to take up a new package of EU-related reforms.
It will include the Foundations Law, the Ombudsman Law, a
harmonization package (the earlier rewriting of the Turkish
Penal Code in its entirety means relevent sections of
pre-existing legislation must be harmonized with it -- a
painstaking endeavor needed for full implementation),and
likely a re-write of Penal Code provisions relating to
freedom of speech (ref c). This may go some distance toward
giving Turkey's few EU friends ammunition to prevent a
breakdown in negotiations. But it may not be sufficient.


5. (C) If the parties are left to their own devices, the
situation could evolve in a way deeply disadvantagous to
Western interests in Turkey. The Finns are quietly working a
package that we should support (refs a and b). Turkish
public opinion, though, has soured on the EU and the West
generally, because of what Turks perceive as promises broken
and because they are increasingly skeptical that the EU will
ever let them in. This is mirrored in polling data, such as
the German Marshall Fund's (GMF) just-released Transatlantic
Trends, which sees Turks as increasingly cool to
relationships with the US and the EU, which they no longer
see as working to their benefit. Similarly, the GMF report
noted that the percentage of Europeans who see eventual
Turkish membership as a positive has slipped.


6. (C) This is an opportune time for active US diplomacy to
keep Turkey's EU effort on track, reflecting the longstanding
priority we have given to the issue. It will take place at
the highest levels -- when the Secretary sees FM Gul on the
margins of UNGA and when the President meets PM Erdogan in
early October. These Turkish leaders have an obligation to
strongly and actively reaffirm their commitment to the EU,
the West and the US, and to defend those relationships
against critics here. We suggest that the Secretary also
consider using UNGA meetings with European allies to
challenge them to consider carefully the kind of Turkey-EU
relationship they want, and the serious consequences of a
breakdown of negotiations.


7. (C) We believe another form of direct diplomacy could reap
real dividends. One central problem concerns misperceptions:
GOT misperceptions about Brussels and individual EU members
and their intentions, matched, we suspect, by EU
misperceptions on just how far Turkey is prepared to go to
maintain its active candidacy. To help us rekindle a
constructive debate here on EU accession issues and to
reinforce the right kinds of approaches to Turkey's EU
accession that the Greek and Cypriot governments say they
support, we propose that USEU Ambassador Boyden Gray consider
visiting the region this fall. If Ambassador Gray were
accompanied by one or several EU member state counterparts,
the effort could be doubly useful.


8. (C) Talks in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus could be billed as
educational, but would offer an opportunity to make our key
points on Turkey's EU accession and public diplomacy to
counter negative attitudes here and potentially also with

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Europeans. Such a visit could be a vehicle for refocusing
European audiences on the strategic, political, and economic
benefits of EU expansion and Turkey's inclusion in that
process. It could provide a useful forum to demonstrate to
the Turks that EU member states are serious on Cyprus -- and
to listen to the concerns of Turks, Greeks and Cypriots. (We
would not, however, envision any EU ambassadorial delegation
trying to mediate on Cyprus issues.)


9. (SBU) A visit this fall would be optimal -- definitely
prior to the EU's December ministerial. The planned October
24 release of the EU's progress report on Turkey, which we
understand could slip, it also a key data point. Debate in
Europe and here will sharpen at that time.


10. (C) If Turkey-EU negotiations reach a de facto or de jure
suspension, they may never be revived, and we will all have
lost an enormous opportunity to influence this strategic ally
in ways beneficial to our long-term interests. We hope that
USEU Ambasasdor Gray might be prepared to help us out.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON