TURKISH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SUPPORTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004978

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV USUN LE TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SUPPORTS
PARTICIPATION IN UNIFIL; STILL NEEDS PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL

REF: A. ANKARA 4893


B. ANKARA 4878

C. ANKARA 4875

D. ANKARA 4953

Classified by Ambassador Ross Wilson for Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)


1. (C) Summary: The Turkish Council of Ministers announced
its support of Turkish participation in UNIFIL on August 28;
it plans to seek parliamentary approval within the next week
or two. A united front by PM Erdogan, FM Gul and Speaker
Arinc, along with the ruling Justice and Development Party's
(AKP) parliamentary majority, make approval likely, though
strong opposition and events out of their control -- such as
continued PKK-related bombings at tourist sites -- could
derail AKP's careful planning. Turkey's president has come
out against a deployment and opposition leaders are vocally
resisting troop participation. The Turkish General Staff
(TGS),which has remained publicly neutral, has stated that
the military is prepared to deploy wherever the government
directs. The vote does not now look nearly as momentous as
the March 2003 vote on the Iraq war, but its results might
provide insights into the durability of Erdogan's leadership
ahead of the May 2007 presidential election. End Summary.

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Cabinet Announces Support
but Needs Parliamentary Approval
--------------


2. (C) Prime Minister Erdogan's Council of Ministers publicly
announced its support for Turkish participation in UNIFIL
following an August 28 meeting. Senior government officials
are meeting August 29 to discuss when to convene parliament,
according to Government Spokesman and Minister of Justice
Cemil Cicek. Cicek said the government may convene an
extraordinary session of parliament for a vote as early as
next week; AKP whips have told the press they already have
the number of signatures needed to convene a special session.
A parliamentary vote is required under the constitution.


3. (C) Cicek made clear that the government's decision is to
participate in the peacekeeping force "within the framework
of UNSCR 1701." The government has begun the process to make
Turkey's airports and airspace available in support of
UNIFIL, based on an earlier cabinet decision, according to
Cicek.


4. (C) It was "out of the question for Turkey to remain a
mere spectator," Cicek stated, adding that some may exploit
the issue for domestic political purposes. Consistent with
earlier government statements, he stressed Turkish troops
would only go to protect the peace and "not to disarm
Hezbollah." While Cicek did not mention deployment details,
PM Erdogan advisor Ahmet Davutoglu told Ambassador on August
26 that the GOT is looking at sending 500 to 1000 troops; MFA
spokesman Namik Tan referred on August 28 to "several
hundred". Davutoglu added that deployment at the outset of
Ramadan (which starts September 24) is unlikely; troops would
likely arrive in Lebanon after October 1.

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AKP Laying the Groundwork
--------------


5. (C) PM Erdogan has been out front on this issue for
weeks, publicly making a case for Turkish participation. FM
Gul has also been laying the groundwork for deployment,
including a well-publicized regional tour to Beirut, Tel Aviv
and Damascus to gauge the views of regional actors. Each
visit included a high-level Turkish military officer to
discuss logistics (Refs A and B). The GOT also plans to use
SYG Annan's September 6 visit to good effect. We understand
that Annan may give a speech at parliament, and the GOT may
choose to time a vote to coincide with that or take place
soon thereafter. The PM also appears to have parliamentary

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speaker Bulent Arinc on board. Arinc responded to a negative
spin by President Sezer, stating that voting on a troop
deployment was the prerogative of parliament, not the
President.


6. (C) PM Erdogan advisor Davutoglu told Ambassador August 26
that AKP is thinking carefully about how to use the press to
measure public reaction and calibrate next steps. He and PM
Advisor Egemen Bagis tell us that AKP is in touch with
columnists and opinion makers to help make the case. We have
heard reports of a leadership-initiated gag order on ruling
party deputies, and that unfortunately, the chairman of
parliament's foreign affairs committee, Mehmet Dulger, as
well as habitual AKP dissenters, have spoken out publicly
against a deployment. Party leaders may well tell dissenters
to absent themselves on the day of the vote.


7. (C) AKP would prefer not to impose party discipline,
Bagis told us. Almost all AKP deputies owe PM Erdogan their
seats. If Erdogan is in parliament for the vote, Bagis
emphasized, "No one can look him in the eye and vote against
him." Bagis and Davutoglu distinguished this vote from the
March 1, 2003 vote on Iraq, noting that the UNIFIL vote will
be for a peacekeeping mission (vice war) involving Turkish
troops (vice American ones) under PM Erdogan's tested
government (vice Gul). The GOT had learned its lessons well,
he added. It now knows how to maneuver vis-a-vis the
opposition Republican People's party (CHP),a skill its
then-fledgling MPs had not yet developed in March 2003.

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But Parliamentary Approval Not Guaranteed
--------------


8. (C) AKP cannot afford to declare victory too early.
President Sezer, in response to a press question on the
margins of the August 25 Turkish Land Forces Change of
Command ceremony, stated that he opposes Turkish
participation in UNIFIL. Turkey's priority should be to
"solve its own problems," not protect the interests of other
countries or solved security problems abroad. Nobody has
backed Turkey on the PKK issue, Sezer stated; why should
Turkey extend support to others?


9. (C) Other secular leaders have been voicing opposition
since the cease-fire took hold. The main opposition party,
CHP, which was instrumental in derailing the March 1 vote,
has publicly opposed a deployment barring an additional UN
resolution that clarifies the mission. Following the Council
of Ministers decision, CHP Vice Chairman Onur Oymen (a former
Turkish Ambassador to NATO) declared that it would be
"extremely wrong to send troops to a minefield." Other
parties, including the nationalist MHP and center-right
Motherland Party (ANAP),echoed these statements.

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Military Will Follow Civilian Lead
--------------


10. (C) GEN Yasar Buyukanit, who assumed command as Chief of
the General Staff on August 28, stated on August 25 that the
military would "do as it was told" with regard to sending
troops to participate in a robust UNIFIL, according to the
press. In discussions with Embassy officials and in other
public pronouncements, the Turkish military leadership has
been somewhat more circumspect, saying only that Turkey's
participation would be reviewed in light of the expanded
UNIFIL mandate and the cease-fire conditions. Some observers
have commented that the military wants to be able to point at
the government as having made the decision to deploy should
post-deployment circumstances on the ground in Lebanon lead
to negative public reaction. Following several interagency
meetings -- including the August 21 National Security Council
meeting -- to discuss Lebanon, MFA officials have suggested
that the General Staff supports participation in UNIFIL but
is concerned about placing troops in a position where they
may have to shoot -- or could be shot by -- other Muslims.

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Recent Bombings Complicate the Situation
--------------


11. (C) Another possible complicating factor that could lead
some to follow President Sezer's lead is home-grown
terrorism. A series of seven bombings from August 24 to 28
killed at least three and injured more than 40 in Istanbul,
Adana and the tourist centers of Antalya and Marmaris. The
PKK-affiliated Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (ref D) finally
claimed responsibility late August 28. This uptick in
PKK-related violence will strengthen those who argue Turkey
should take care of its own problems first. Absent
sufficient initiative on combating the PKK and speed in
bringing the proposed deployment to a vote, these arguments
may gain traction in parliament. Alternatively, a PKK
cease-fire or significant action by the U.S. or Iraq against
the PKK could serve to dilute the isolationist and
nationalist appeal.

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Comment: This is Not March 1
--------------


12. (C) The government, Erdogan leading the charge, has come
out four-square in favor of a UNIFIL deployment. AKP has not
gone in blindly, despite serious misgivings of many in
government and military alike on placing troops where they
risk having to shoot at (or disarm) fellow Muslims. Foreign
Affairs Committee chair Dulger voiced what many were
reluctant to -- that Turkey would be stepping into an
unknown, with equally unknown consequences. He represents
the status quo attitude of traditional Turkish governments.
Erdogan has chosen instead to pursue his activist ambition
that Turkey play a more robust role in the region. With
leadership comes risks, and Erdogan is putting his leadership
on the line, both within his diverse party and
internationally. The PM may rightly believe that he and his
whips can control enough of his party, but he has no control
over outside actors such as the PKK/TAK or a vocal
opposition. The outcome will serve a a barometer of the PM's
power and internal party loyalty as Turkey enters a dual
election year.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON