TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY SPLIT - THE PM'S CIRCLE TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004688

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2021
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY SPLIT - THE PM'S CIRCLE TO
THE FORE


Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

1.(C) The long-standing split between the professional MFA
diplomats and the tight circle of advisers around PM Erdogan
has widened noticeably in recent weeks. This gap has existed
under Erdogan,s Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government, largely because of the close links that both PM
Erdogan and FM Gul have with PM adviser Davutoglu, who has
been willing to undertake numerous initiatives. Until
recently, however, such strains have usually been more
effectively papered over. This internal debate now affects
every step the GOT takes on the international stage.

2.(C) The Turkish diplomatic corps is highly educated and
well attuned to what will sell in the U.S. or Europe; less so
on the domestic political front. PM Erdogan,s core of AKP
advisers, including Davutoglu and the AKP vice chairs,
understand what will play well with their constituencies.
Their sense of how policy will play outside of Ankara is
handicapped, however, by their Turkey- and Islam-centric
vision of how they want the world to operate.


3. (C/NF) Decoupling MFA from the PM,s advisers can produce
a greater willingness to take chances. At the same time, it
can also create greater room for misunderstandings or
wrongfooted efforts. In the run-up to the February 2006
Hamas visit to Ankara, for example, MFA was kept in the dark.
The AKPers who dealt with the visit did so in a haphazard
and uncoordinated manner. MFA, uninformed, was unable to
preview it with us. The backlash from the U.S. in particular
truly took AKP aback. It took weeks -) even months -)
before limited understanding dawned on the depth of the
displeasure the Hamas venture had spawned, and why. It did
not (and still does not) fit within their frame of reference.



4. (C/NF) Most startling, perhaps, to AKP were those in the
U.S. and elsewhere who, in the aftermath of the Hamas visit,
asked how AKP would feel if we met with PKK leaders. For
Erdogan,s circle, it is not analogous: for them, terrorism
equals the PKK. It is difficult for PM Erdogan to believe
that his philanthropist Islamic friend Al Kadi could be
involved in terrorist financing, just as it is alien to their
frame of reference to view specific Islamic groups as
terrorists. Hamas and Hizballah are the result of western
policies gone awry, a response from desperate people )- not
truly terrorists. Allow them to talk reason to these people,
exert Turkish influence, and the Hamases of the world will
change. This has been evident in other Turkish efforts
throughout the region as well -- with Iran (FM Mottaki,s
visit here; Erdogan,s talks with Ahmedinejad on the margins
of international conferences); with Syria (the Turks believe
they were instrumental in getting Syria,s Asad to agree to
pull troops out of Lebanon, and to certain aspects of the
Hariri investigation); with the current conflict in Lebanon
and the Gaza strip.

5.(C/NF) A more recent example of the PM circle-MFA
disconnect involved Davutoglu,s trip to Damascus the first
week of July, where he met not only with Asad but Misha,al
as well. The MFA was cut out and furious (their Ambassador
to Damascus reportedly cooled his heels outside while
Davutoglu met with Asad).

6.(C) As the Israel-Lebanon crisis intensified, so has this
tendency within Erdogan,s small circle. AKP sees own its
back to the public opinion wall. Instead of exercising
leadership, Erdogan -- in populist pre-election mode -- has
followed. He is playing to AKP,s constituency; to those
within the party who have never been positively inclined
toward Israel; and to the greater regional Sunni audience
that he is trying to court. Two early results, aimed at
these audiences, were (1) the PM,s participation in the
August 3 extraordinary OIC executive council meetin in Kuala
Lumpur, where he again met with Irnian president Ahmedinejad
and uttered strong anti-Israeli statements; and (2) FM Gul,s
August 3 op-ed piece in the Washington Post, which aired GOT
ire in an unhelpful way and blindsided the professional
Turkish diplomats in Washington.

7.(C/NF) Complicit or not (we believe the former),Gul has
had his name sullied by a number of these efforts. He will
have to decide whether to give the MFA renewed weight -)

Foreign Ministry officials could be key in bridging certain
delicate issues, particularly Cyprus, with both the
government and the military, for example -) or go with the
PM,s circle.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON