THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF TURKISH-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004647

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2021
TAGS: ECON ENRG PTER PGOV PINS IR TU
SUBJECT: THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF TURKISH-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP

REF: ANKARA 002045

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).


1. (C) Summary and Introduction: Turkey's relationship with
Iran is long, complex, and multifaceted. The two are
historical and regional rivals; mutual trust is a rare
commodity. Nonetheless, Turkey and Iran have enjoyed
improved political relations since the late 1990s --- when
Iran stopped supporting terrorism in Turkey --- and steadily
growing economic ties. Iran is an important bilateral and
multilateral partner for Turkey and a major supplier of
natural gas and crude oil. End Summary.

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An Uneasy Relationship
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2. (C) Throughout history, Turco-Iranian relations have been
difficult. The two countries are regional rivals who respect
but do not trust each other. Although the modern republics
of Turkey and Iran have never fought a war, there were no
fewer than ten wars between the Ottoman Empire and various
Persian dynasties over the past 500 years, the last being the
Ottoman-Persian War of 1821-23. In addition, the "Young
Turk" regime tried to destabilize Iranian Azerbaijan in 1908
and occupied Iranian territory during World War One.


3. (C) Turkish MFA and political party officials frequently
assert to us that Turkey and Iran have enjoyed a peaceful,
unchanging border for nearly 400 years --- an exaggeration.
A border agreement was negotiated in 1913, but never signed
due to the outbreak of the First World War. In the early
1930s, the parties negotiated a new border agreement and the
Turco-Iranian border was finally set in January 1932.


4. (C) Under the Shah, Turkish-Iranian relations enjoyed a
relatively positive period, but the 1979 Iranian Revolution
ushered in serious bilateral conflicts. Turkish officials,
particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, regularly accused
Iranian diplomats of interfering in internal Turkish affairs
and engaging in or supporting subversive activities,
including assassination and terrorism. Over these past two
decades, Turkish-Iranian relations have reached a crisis
stage several times, sometimes resulting in the expulsion (or
near expulsion) or recall of ambassadors and other diplomats.



5. (C) Iranian FM Manouchehr Motakki, who served as the
Iranian Ambassador to Turkey from 1985-89, was recalled to
Tehran as the Turkish MFA was preparing to expel him because
he had given public speeches condemning the Turkish headscarf
ban in universities --- despite repeated requests from the
MFA to desist from these activities --- and was allegedly
involved in the assassination and kidnapping of Iranian
dissidents living in Turkey. Iranian ambassador
Mohammad-Reza Baqeri and the Iranian consul-general in
Istanbul were expelled from Turkey in 1997-98 for subversive
activities. Among other acts that angered the Turkish
establishment, Baqeri, while standing under Palestinian
Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah posters, condemned cooperation
with the U.S. and Israel, and outlined Iran,s approach to
sharia during a February 1997 speech before a crowd in the
Ankara district of Sincan.


6. (C) Iran is also widely believed here to have played a
role in the assassination of Iranian dissidents and secular
Turkish intellectuals in the 1980s and 1990s because
terrorists captured by Turkish authorities later confessed to
receiving direct support, supervision, and training from
Tehran. The most prominent Turkish intellectual murdered
during this period was Ugur Mumcu, a secular investigative
journalist killed by a bomb attack in 1993. Another victim
was Muammar Aksoy, a liberal political scientist,
assassinated in 1990. In 1993, Aziz Nesin, a leading author
and essayist, was killed in an arson attack on a hotel and
Onat Kutlar, a movie critic and writer, was killed by a bomb
in 1994. Iranian involvement was also suspected, but never
proven, in the 1995 assassination attempt against the
then-head of the Ankara Jewish community. In addition, more
than 50 Iranian dissidents appear to have been kidnapped or
assassinated in Turkey by Iranian agents during this period,

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according to some reports.


7. (C) Turkey and Iran also have long vied for regional
influence. Turkey, a democratic country with a large Sunni
population, tried to export its system to Central Asia in the
1990s. Iran, an authoritarian Shiite theocracy, tried to
limit Turkey,s influence and export its own political
system. The two countries have also competed for influence
over the Palestinian community, Muslim communities in the
western Balkans, and the broader Middle East.

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Improved Relations in Recent Years
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8. (C) Overall, Turco-Iranian relations have been on the
up-swing since the late 1990s. In 1999, Turkey and Iran
signed a border security agreement and in recent months
Tehran has been cooperating --- to some degree --- with
Ankara against the PKK/Kongra-Gel. The past decade has seen
no new allegations of Iranian attempts at subversion or
assassination within Turkey. To judge from the tempo and
level of visits alone, the tone has improved. In 2003, 15
Turkish ministers traveled to Iran. President Sezer visited
Iran in February 2004 and PM Erdogan went in July 2004.
Iranian FM Mottaki came to Ankara in November 2005 and
Iranian Parliamentary Foreign Policy, National Security, and
Defense Affairs Committee Chair Aladdin Boroujerdi visited
Ankara in March 2006. A Turkish parliamentary delegation
also visited Iran in 2006.

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Borders, the PKK, and Bilateral Seurity Cooperation
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9. (C) Since the 1980s, when the terrorist PKK was
established, Iran has calibrated its approach to the PKK in
an effort to maximize its influence over Turkey. When
Turkish-Iranian relations were poor, Tehran provided material
support, safe havens, and training to PKK terrorists. In the
mid-late 1990s, for example, there were allegations that
around 1,200 PKK militants were residing at 50 PKK bases in
Iran. With the improvement of relations, Tehran has been
willing to cooperate with Ankara against the PKK, handing
over alleged PKK in handfuls, and going to far as to claim it
was helping root out the PKK from northern Iraq.


10. (C) In August 1999, Turkey and Iran signed a border
security agreement and agreed to exchange intelligence
information and coordinate anti-insurgency operations. As
part of the agreement, the two countries agreed to cooperate
against the PKK and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK),but Tehran
did not promise to immediately expel all PKK members from
Iranian soil.


11. (C) Ankara and Tehran hold high level security meetings
once every six months. They are conducted between the
ministries of interior, with both delegations headed by the
second highest ranking official in the ministry. In
addition, regional security officials and border security
officials along the Turco-Iranian border conduct local-level
meetings on an irregular basis to discuss areas for improved
cooperation and border enforcement.

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Border Gates and Transportation Links
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12. (C) Two roads and one railway connect Turkey and Iran.
The roads are more important than the rail crossing because
rail traffic must be unloaded and reloaded on either side of
Lake Van. The larger automobile border gate is Gurbualak in
Agri province; the smaller crossing is at Esendere in Hakkari
province, with the railroad crossing is at Kapikoy in Van
province.


13. (C) These transportation links are important to Turkey
because they connect Turkey not only to Iran, but also to
Central Asia, Pakistan, and beyond. We regularly hear that
70,000 trucks cross the Turco-Iranian border every year
headed for Central Asia. MFA Iran economic desk officer Ali
Bozcaliskan claims that the importance of the rail link is
increasing due to a recent decision by Japanese Tobacco to

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export Turkish tobacco along this line.

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Visa-Free Entry and Tourism
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14. (C) Iranians do not need a visa to travel to Turkey and
Iranian tourism in Turkey is booming. Antalya tourism
industry contacts tell us that more and more Iranians are
coming to Turkey's south for the sun and relaxed social
atmosphere. In 2005, 960,000 Iranian tourists came to
Turkey, a 50 percent increase over 2004, when 630,000
Iranians visited Turkey. Tourism dollars matter, too. Since
2004, the Iranian percentage of Turkey,s total tourism has
risen from around 3.5 percent to nearly 4.4 percent.

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Trade, Investment, and Energy
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15. (C) Turkish-Iranian economic relations are growing. In
2005, Turkey exported approximately $1 billion worth of goods
and services (mostly consumer goods and processed materials)
to Iran and imported over $3 billion worth of Iranian
products (mostly crude oil and natural gas). This trade
volume represents a four-fold increase since 1995 when the
two countries only traded goods and services worth a total of
$1 billion.


16. (C) The level of foreign direct investment between Turkey
and Iran, however, is small, according to official
statistics. In 2003, Turkish firms invested $200 million in
Iran, dropping to just $25 million in 2005. The decline was
largely due to a new law passed by the Iranian parliament in
September 2004 that required Iranians to own a majority share
of all businesses operating in Iran.


17. (C) The new Iranian investment law negatively affected
two large Turkish firms with major projects in Iran and
cooled Turkish interested in Iranian economic opportunities.
In 2003, TAV, an airport construction and operating concern
with contracts in Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, and Ukraine, won a
$200 million contract to build and operate for eleven years
the new airport in Tehran. In summer 2004, Turkcell, a major
Turkish cell phone operator, was awarded a 350 million Euro
contact to build and operate an Iranian GSM network for 15
years. The Iranian foreign investment law voided both of
these contracts and cost TAV about $20 million.


18. (C) Iran is a major supplier of natural gas and crude oil
to Turkey and, via Turkey,s energy transit corridor, to
Europe. Iran is Turkey,s largest supplier of crude oil and
its second largest supplier of natural gas. In 2005, Turkey
purchased 6 million tons of crude oil and 4.3 billion cubic
meters of gas from Iran. These imports represent roughly 24
percent of Turkey,s total crude oil and 16 percent of
Turkey,s total natural gas purchases.


19. (C) In 1996, Turkey and Iran signed a 25-year, $30
billion natural gas contract and a gas pipeline between the
two countries was completed in 2001. Despite this agreement,
Tehran cut gas exports to Turkey both this past winter
(2005-2006) and the previous winter for technical, and
potentially political, reasons (more gas is needed in Iran
during cold temperatures). In January 2006, gas shipments
were cut by about 70 percent, producing a shortfall in Turkey
of 15 to 20 percent on a daily basis. Turkey would have
grounds to cancel its gas supply contract based on these
cuts, but is unlikely to pursue this option. Meanwhile
Turkish officials have been attempting, so far without
success, to renegotiate what they believe to be very
high-priced "take or pay" contract.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
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WILSON