Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA4405
2006-08-01 14:50:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY SYMPATHETIC BUT NEEDS EVIDENCE TO REQUIRE

Tags:  PREL PARM MARR ETTC SA SY IR TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0025
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #4405 2131450
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011450Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7585
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0821
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0697
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1535
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0845
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 0194
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0599
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0066
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 0070
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA// PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
S E C R E T ANKARA 004405 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2031
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR ETTC SA SY IR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY SYMPATHETIC BUT NEEDS EVIDENCE TO REQUIRE
SYRIAN AND IRANIAN PASSENGER PLANE LANDINGS

REF: A. STATE 124945

B. ANKARA 4279

Classified By: Charge Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T ANKARA 004405

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2031
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR ETTC SA SY IR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY SYMPATHETIC BUT NEEDS EVIDENCE TO REQUIRE
SYRIAN AND IRANIAN PASSENGER PLANE LANDINGS

REF: A. STATE 124945

B. ANKARA 4279

Classified By: Charge Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para. 6.


2. (S) SUMMARY: MFA Aviation Department Head Olcay welcomed
information on possible Syrian and Iranian use of passenger
flights to transfer weapons. He raised the possible abuse of
VIP flights from Syria and Iran, noting that one such flight
had overflown Turkish airspace without the VIP it was slated
to carry. Olcay emphasized, however, that the coerced
landing and search of passenger flights was a highly
sensitive political issue and Turkey could not take action
absent specific information. Post requests Washington
assistance to identify further information that can be shared
with Turkey about the potential flights or the actions taken
by other countries to thwart the abuse of passenger flights.
END SUMMARY.


3. (S) Per ref a, on Aug. 1 we notified Aviation Department
Head Hamit Olcay of possible Syrian and Iranian use of
passenger aircraft for weapons transfers. Olcay appreciated
the new information but reiterated ref b points that it would
be politically sensitive for Turkey to request the landing
and search of passenger flights under Article V of the
Chicago Convention without specific evidence. Syria and Iran
are criticizing Turkey for its decision to request the
landing and inspection of cargo flights, he said. PM Erdogan
will attend the emergency OIC meeting on Lebanon in Malaysia
on Aug. 2 and expects to receive complaints from the Syrian
and Iranian delegations about the detention of humanitarian
flights. Pars Airlines has made three overflight requests
and has complied with the landing and search requirement each
time. According to Olcay, only tents and other humanitarian
goods were found. However, since Turkey invoked Article V,
it has received no further official Syrian or Iranian cargo
overflight requests.


4. (S) Olcay raised the possibility that Syria and Iran might
also abuse VIP flights. On July 30 Turkey received an
overflight request for a Syrian VIP. Given the Lebanon
situation, Olcay said, the MFA is doing a thorough review of
all overflight requests and pressed Syria for the name of the
VIP. Syria complied, providing the name of a Deputy Foreign
Minister, and Turkey granted overflight clearance. Turkey
later learned that the named VIP was not on the plane. "They
are playing a cat and mouse game" said Olcay, but underscored
that the political ramifications for Turkey would be
significant if the GOT requested a VIP plane to land. Turkey
would need specific, credible evidence before taking this
step.


5. (S) Separately, Arms Control and Disarmament Acting Head
of Department Serhan Yigit, whose office is peripherally
engaged on this issue, raised the possibility that putting
Syria and Iran on notice that a check of passenger flights is
being considered might deter their use of those flights.
COMMENT: MFA Aviation has the lead on this issue and it is
unclear if the Arms Control Department will have any
influence on GOT actions. END COMMENT.


6. (S) ACTION REQUEST: Post would appreciate any further
information that can be shared with Turkey regarding either
the potential flights or the actions being taken by other
countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia) to thwart the abuse of
passenger flights. If the GOT is convinced that other
countries have cut off alternative avenues of transport,
leaving Turkey as the primary route, it may be more willing
to act.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

MCELDOWNEY