TURKEY TO CONSIDER PARTICIPATION IN UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004364

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS MARR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY TO CONSIDER PARTICIPATION IN UN
PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN LEBANON

REF: ANKARA 4357

Classified By: Charge Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA Undersecretary Tuygan advised State
Counselor Zelikow of Turkey's willingness to consider
participation in a peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Lebanon
following the negotiation of a ceasefire. Zelikow outlined
four different organizational options, including NATO, EU,
ad-hoc multilateral or a UN mission. Tuygan characterized a
UN PKO as the best political option for Turkey, but supported
a NATO role, particularly in the opening phase. Turkey's
participation will be dependent on the size, mandate, and
partnership countries, and, in exchange for a troop
contribution, Turkey would expect some voice in the
operational planning. Zelikow urged the GOT to publicly
announce its intention to participate in the PKO under the
right circumstances. Tuygan emphasized the need for progress
in combating the PKK terrorist organization in Turkey to
justify to the Turkish public any GOT decision to send troops
to fight terrorism abroad. END SUMMARY.

HELPING THE LEBANESE HELP THEMSELVES
--------------


2. (C) Counselor Philip Zelikow emphasized to MFA
Undersecretary (Deputy equivalent) Ali Tuygan and
representatives from the MFA International Organizations,
NATO and Middle East Departments and an officer from the
Turkish General Staff, the US interest in Turkey's
participation in a PKO in Lebanon given its western
orientation and unique history in the region. Emphasizing
that Lebanon must take responsibility for its territory,
Zelikow listed the PKO goals identified during the Rome
conference:

- facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief
- help implement a political agreement
- support the Lebanese armed forces to restore sovereignty
- build and train Lebanese security force capabilities

Tuygan observed that Zelikow did not list implementation of
UNSCR 1559 among the PKO goals and said this must be done by
the Lebanese themselves. Zelikow agreed, but underscored
that the PKO would assist the Lebanese forces.

UN BLUE HELMETS WITH NATO SUPPORT
--------------


3. (C) Zelikow outlined four alternative PKO options,
emphasizing that the US has not yet chosen a particular
course of action and looks to Turkey and other potential
participants to help make that determination. The options
are:

- NATO Force: Initial force could be the NATO Rapid Response
Force. This option, however, has little support outside of
the US, Zelikow said.

- EU Force using Berlin Plus: This force would be slower to
stand up than NATO, and possibly less effective. It could
use some NATO elements, but not enough to be effective.
Perhaps the US Navy could play an off-shore support role in
logistics, communications and command and control. (Note:
Zelikow emphasized that the US has not yet approved this
idea. End Note.)

- Multinational Force: Such a force could be constructed with
or without a lead nation and/or regional organizational
responsibility. No one country would be expected to assume
the majority of the burden. France is considering a possible
lead in such a force but does not want a high-profile role.

- UN Blue Helmet Force: Lebanese PM Seniora expressed support
for this option, according to Zelikow. Despite the
historical difficulties faced by UN forces, the distinction
between UN and other forces has begun to blur. However,
given the disappointing UNIFIL experience and the current
state of disarray of the Lebanese government and military,
the force must be able to take care of itself. A UN PKO
would require a strong mandate as a Chapter VII mission, with
robust rules of engagement.


4. (C) Tuygan thanked Zelikow for opening the PKO discussion
with Turkey, noting that it was the first time Turkey had
been approached about such an operation. FM Gul supports
deployment of a multinational force in Lebanon following a
ceasefire based on a solid commitment by all parties, he
said. Turkey is prepared to consider participating depending
on the mandate, modalities, decision-making mechanism and the
level of international support and participation. Turkey
would expect to have a role in the decision-making process if
it contributes troops. Zelikow agreed that there should be a
relationship between troop contributions and decision-making.
Regarding an EU-lead, Tuygan cautioned that because Turkey
is not a member it will not be given a meaningful voice in
the operation.


5. (C) A UN-led mission would be best received by the Turkish
public, Tuygan stated, but agreed that the force must be
credible and formidable. He noted past UN difficulties in
rapidly standing up missions, and gave Turkey's support for a
NATO role in both planning and security. Deputy U/S Uzumcu
opined that deployment should not take more than a week to
ten days to avoid further problems. Zelikow confirmed that
all options remain on the table. PM Global Strategy
Coordinator Smith pointed out that following the Brahimi
report on UN Reform, several hybrid operations have deployed
in Cote d'Ivoire and elsewhere. MFA Deputy U/S Akgunay
countered that the dual UN/NATO Balkan operation UNPROFOR did
not work well. IO DAS Anderson noted that past problems with
"dual key" missions like UNPROFOR will be addressed in future
missions, possibly to include Darfur, by sequencing NATO and
UN roles. NATO could control the early phase to rapidly
stand up the operation and establish infrastructure for the
UN. The US is open to options that avoid the "dual key"
problems, he added.

LEBANON CRITICAL TO REGIONAL STABILITY
--------------


6. (C) As a Muslim country, EU candidate and friend of
Israel, Turkey is concerned by the unresolved problems in the
Middle East and wants to contribute to the creation of a
stable environment in the region, Tuygan stated. Turkey
views Lebanon in the context of the Palestinian conflict,
Afghanistan and Iraq. Together, those situations weaken the
framework for lasting peace in the region and encourage
radicals, as demonstrated by the recent calls by al Zawahiri
to join the fighting in Lebanon. Turkey, said Tuygan, is
dismayed by Israel's response to the attacks and surprised at
its lack of success. The images on TV do not help the forces
fighting the radicals and Turkey wants to prevent the
extremists from gaining ground. For this reason, FM Gul
called for a ceasefire as soon as possible (Note: On July 30,
the MFA issued a statement calling for an immediate
ceasefire. End Note.) We may face a situation in which
Israel doesn't dismantle Hizbollah in Lebanon and is neither
a victor nor a total loser.


7. (C) Tuygan stressed the need for a commitment by both
sides to a ceasefire. Zelikow said the US looks to the
Lebanese government to establish the conditions for a
ceasefire, but welcomes input from others who have contacts
and/or influence with Hizballah leader Nasrallah and can
contribute ideas to constructively resolve the conflict. If
Hizballah makes specific, concrete demands, for example
regarding Sheba Farms, a solution might be found. It must
decide if it wants to be a force for peace or chaos.

THE PKK FACTOR
--------------


8. (C) Tuygan said an important element in Turkey's

participation in this PKO is the status of its fight against
the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) at home, which has
intensified during the summer months. Thousands of Turkish
troops are massed in the southeast. In one recent battle
alone, fifteen soldiers were killed. Turkey's potential
participation in the PKO is already in the press and there
will be discussion about the government's wisdom of sending
troops to fight terrorists elsewhere while the government is
engaged in a difficult battle against terrorists at home.
Tuygan underscored that any progress in the fight against the
PKK would be well-received by the Turkish public and will be
taken into account in the GOT's decision on the provision of
troops. He added that Turkey's recent experience with the
deployment of troops to Iraq was an unhappy one that must not
be repeated. (Note: Possible allusion to July 4, 2003
hooding and arrest of Turkish Special Forces in Suleymaniyah

by US troops. End Note.)


9. (C) Zelikow responded that the US takes the PKK very
seriously. The situation has been discussed at the highest
levels in the USG and we are moving vigorously to address the
problem. Regarding the public perception, Zelikow suggested
the GOT point out that the principle of fighting terrorism at
home and abroad is the same. Turkey is standing up for
governments that are trying to establish order in their
countries, and standing up for the same value - opposition to
terrorism. This, he pointed out, would reinforce Turkey's
message on the PKK.

NEXT STEPS
--------------


10. (C) Tuygan looked forward to further input on the
parameters of a PKO force. Zelikow noted that the UN might
host a meeting to discuss this but there should be additional
meetings of potential troop contributors. (Note: Per reftel,
we alerted Tuygan on July 29 of the proposed July 31 UN
meetings. End Note.) Zelikow urged the GOT to make public
its willingness to participate in a PKO under the right
circumstances. Tuygan agreed that this is possible, noting
that the government has already made some statements.

PARTICIPANTS
--------------


11. (U) Turkey:

Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Ali Tuygan
Special Advisor to the Undersecretary Murat Karagoz
Deputy Undersecretary for Multilateral Political Affairs
Rafet Akgunay
Deputy Undersecretary for Bilateral Political Affairs Ahmet
Uzumcu
Director General for Middle East Affairs Bozkurt Aran
Deputy Director General for NATO Affairs Serdar Kilic
Office Head for Middle East Affairs Sedat Unal
Turkish General Staff J-5 Strategy Division, Captain Hasan
Dogan

US:

Ambassador Ross Wilson
Counselor Philip Zelikow
IO DAS Gerald Anderson
PM Global Strategy Coordinator Mark Smith
Deputy Political-Military Counselor Maggie Nardi (notetaker)


Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

MCELDOWNEY