SCENESETTER FOR PKK TRILATERAL MEETINGS: THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004355

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2026
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS TU IZ IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PKK TRILATERAL MEETINGS: THE
TURKISH WISH-LIST

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2628

B. BAGHDAD 2655

Classified By: Ambassador Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (S/NF) Recent pledges by Presidents Bush and Talabani have
assured the Turks that we and Iraq take the PKK seriously,
and may have averted -- temporarily -- a Turkish cross-border
operation. Should the Iraqis follow through on their
commitments, this will begin to satisfy long-standing Turkish
demands. A successful senior-level trilateral meeting will
consolidate these gains, publicly demonstrate U.S. and Iraqi
will to act decisively, and substantively improve Turkey's
relationship with Iraq and the U.S. End summary.

Cross-Border Operation Averted, For Now
--------------


2. (S/NF) Turks, both in government and out, appear reassured
by senior U.S. and Iraqi commitments to take immediate steps
to inhibit the PKK's freedom of action in Iraq. A Turkish
cross-border operation (CBO) is still on the table, but it
appears that Turkey is waiting to see if these commitments
bear fruit (and may also be waiting for the outcome of the
Supreme Military Council's selection of the new CHOD in early
August). Some senior civilian and military officials of the
GOT (including PM Erdogan) are proceeding with scheduled
summer leave. We have bought some time, but another serious
incident of PKK violence will raise the specter of unilateral
Turkish action again.

Trust But Verify
--------------


3. (S/NF) We will need to evaluate whether Talabani has been
able to deliver on the steps he has outlined for us and the
Turkish Embassy in Baghdad (reftels). A key player is
Barzani, who has generally taken a negative stance toward
Turkey (and Turkey toward him),even as Turkish companies
invest heavily in KDP-controlled areas. If indeed the GOI
and KRG take decisive action and sustain the effort, the GOT
will gratefully accept this demonstration of U.S. and Iraqi
will. More important, suc a demonstration will
significantly reduce public pressure for a CBO, ensuring that
Iraq's sovereignty is respected, and its stability not
threatened from the north.


4. (S/NF) Even with these steps PKK violence in Turkey will
not magically disappear. In addition to their northern Iraq
strongholds, PKK terrorists are already in Turkey and
planning attacks. Even if the PKK leadership called for a
cessation of terrorism, we suspect violence would continue
for some time. Indeed, the PKK may seek to derail the
trilateral process by stepping up attacks in Turkey. We must
prevail upon the GOT to educate the Turkish press and people
on this point.

Status of Long-Standing Turkish Requests
--------------


5. (S/NF) GOT demands for U.S./Iraqi action against the PKK
in Iraq have changed over time. In the early phases of OIF,
Turkey fully expected Coalition Forces to destroy the PKK's
presence there once and for all (despite Turkey denying us
the northern option in March 2003). When it became clear
that the insurgency was a significant threat to Iraq
everywhere except in the north -- where the PKK operates and
also where the KDP and PUK ensure stability -- Turkish
officials eventually understood that concerted kinetic
coalition action was not likely. They have continued to
press for other action, however, not only to degrade the
PKK's capabilities but also to demonstrate America's will to
stand by its NATO Ally. Informed Turks know the U.S. cannot
defeat the PKK, but they do expect us to help. They also
understand that, if the PKK is successfully blunted in
northern Iraq, Turkey will be forced to focus on fixing the
underlying problems at home that still give life to this
insurgency (we will discuss this septel).

6. (S/NF) During September 2005 talks with EUCOM CDR Gen
Jones and then-CENTCOM D/CDR Gen. Smith, CHOD GEN Ozkok
identified a series of steps the GOT would want the U.S.
and/or the Iraqis to take. While we have asked the GOT for
an update urgently for these talks, we believe this list
remains more or less definitive. We comment on the status of
each step:

-- Pressure the Kurds, especially the KDP, to cut off their
contact with, encouragement and support of the PKK and to
struggle against the terrorists. (COMMENT: We defer to
Baghdad on the issue of whether the Iraqi Kurds actively
support the PKK, but we surmise they tolerate their presence,
profit from it in a business sense, and do not prevent their
infiltration into Turkey. Recent Embassy Baghdad reporting
indicates that President Talabani intends to clamp down on
this and that KRG President Barzani has agreed.)

-- Take steps to stop the PKK's political activities that
inflame public opinion in Turkey (e.g., close front offices,
prevent their fronts from participating in the Iraqi
political process). (COMMENT: Per Baghdad reporting,
Talabani has pledged to do this and PM Maliki has agreed.)

-- Apprehend and hand over PKK leaders. (COMMENT: Per Baghdad
reporting, Talabani is considering this. This would be
difficult and require risky peshmerga action, and we
understand this would be politically very difficult for the
KRG. ISF and/or CF assistance may be necessary.)

-- Cut the PKK freedom of movement and logistics lines.
(COMMENT: Recent Baghdad reporting suggests that Talabani
will consider this if PKK attacks in Turkey continue.)

-- Preent criminal activity that funds the PKK. (COMMENT:
We do not know if Iraqi Kurdish officials benefit from PKK
smuggling activities (we understand that the PKK's smuggling
networks may actually compete with the KDP's). We understand
the PKK derives significant income from smuggling and other
criminal activities in Iraq, Turkey, and Europe.)

-- Close Makhmour refugee camp. (COMMENT: We understand from
Baghdad reporting that Talabani does not wish to pursue this
now. While Makhmour has been the focus of considerable USG
and UNHCR attention, it is at the end of the day less
important to Turkey than cutting off PKK infiltration,
arresting leaders, or closing offices.)

-- Get the word out to the U.S. media that the PKK does not
represent Kurds, but is a terrorist organization that uses
IEDs that kill indiscriminately ("are a crime against
humanity"). (COMMENT: U.S. leaders have consistently
condemned the PKK. We assess that "PKK romanticism" is more
of a problem in Europe than in the U.S.)

-- Provide real-time intelligence. (COMMENT: We provide
significant, real-time, actionable intelligence on PKK
activities in Turkey to the GOT, as well as regular exchanges
on PKK activities in Europe and in Iraq.)

-- Facilitate coordination between border units on both sides
of the border (but the Iraqi side should not be only Kurdish
units). (COMMENT: Task Force-Band of Brothers LNO to Turkish
Special Forces in Northern Iraq has successfully begun
coordination between IBP units and Turkish SF, but this is a
nascent effort. We assume IBP units that serve on the
Turkish border will be Kurdish, but that does not preclude
cooperation.)

-- Consider training Iraqi Border Patrol personnel in Turkey.
(COMMENT: We should coordinate and encourage this.)

What Can the Trilats Achieve?
--------------

7. (S/NF) Two previous trilateral meetings on the PKK (held
in January and August 2005, at the Deputy Assistant Secretary
level) have produced scant results. In her April 2006 visit
to Turkey, Secretary Rice pledged to redouble U.S. efforts on
the PKK and to hold another trilateral meeting after the
formation of the Iraqi Government. Very recent events have
given this process renewed momentum.


8. (S/NF) The trilats present an excellent opportunity for
the three governments to come together at a senior level to
consolidate recent gains, publicly demonstrate the resolve of
the U.S. and Iraq to take further decisive measures, and use
the momentum not only to deal with the PKK issue but to
solidify Turkey-Iraq (and Turkey-KRG) ties. If Turkish
officials really believe the GOI and KRG are serious about
this issue (and they remain skeptical),we will then need to
steer the conversation to a more robust Iraq-Turkey
discussion on follow-up. Such follow-up could include, for
example, final agreement on the modalities of extradition.


9. (S/NF) Turkey still has grave concerns about many issues
in Iraq (the threat of dissolution, Kirkuk),but real
progress on the PKK issue will provide the GOT more public
space to maneuver and make more concrete contributions to the
futre of a new Iraq. It should also silence the
saber-rattling.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON