TURKISH PM ERDOGAN'S TRIP TO NORTHERN CYPRUS:

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004329

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY EU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PM ERDOGAN'S TRIP TO NORTHERN CYPRUS:
DOMESTIC SUCCESS; DID ANYONE ELSE HEAR?

REF: A. NICOSIA 1099

B. ANKARA 4133

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice Weiner, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Turkish PM Erdogan trekked to the "TRNC" July 19 with
a heavyweight delegation (six ministers and 20
parliamentarians) for a three-day visit to mark the 32nd
anniversary of the Turks' 1974 intervention. This first
visit of a Turkish PM to the island in eight years was
intended, per Turkish MFA Cyprus department head Huseyin
Muftuoglu, to send several messages:

--to Turkish Cypriots (TCs) to ensure them that whatever
happens, Turkey will stand by them;

--to Greek Cypriots (GCs),to let them know Turkey continues
to support a UN-brokered solution and will support TC efforts
in this regard; and

--to the EU, to emphasize that it should make good on its
promise to end TC isolation.


2. (C) Erdogan personally helped design the trip, Muftuoglu
stated, to reach out as effectively as possible to the most
aggrieved TCs. He signaled this by the length of the trip,
the seniority of the delegation and locations chosen to
visit. It was underscored by the PM's roadtrip (2-1/2 hours
by car each way) to Karpas, an impoverished area at the tip
of the "dagger", and by the ribbon cutting for a road from
Nicosia (Lefkosa) to Guzelyurt, which, under the Annan Plan,
would have reverted in part to the GCs. The PM further
emphasized Turkey's continued economic support by signing an
agreement for renewed economic assistance for 2007-2009 in
the amount of $360 million/year in aid.


3. (C) In his speeches, the Turkish PM underscored continued
support for a UN final settlement process. The watch words
continued to be bizonal, bicommunal and political equality.
In a television interview, Muftuoglu said, Erdogan agreed
that the earlier GC 2004 rejection of the Annan Plan meant
that it was legally null and void. The PM had added,
however, that any new solution would have to proceed from a
very similar basis.


4. (C) MP Murat Mercan, from Erdogan's governing Justice and
Development Party (AKP),traveled as part of the official
delegation, and offered us a similar assessment of the visit.
He reiterated that Turkey would not open its ports and
airports to the Greek Cypriots until TC isolation is eased.
Muftuoglu stressed that Erdogan truly believes the TCs have
been left out in the cold; he is equally sincere that once
isolation is lifted, Turkey would open ports and airports to
GCs simultaneously. The TC populace as a whole - even
Denktas supporters - believe Erdogan is on the right path, as
does public opinion in Turkey across the political spectrum.
EU support numbers in Turkey will go up, Muftuoglu concluded,
if the EU makes good on its trade promises to the TCs; for
Turks and TCs, it is a matter of trust. TCs believe they
were deceived.


5. (C) Comment: These are the messages Ankara hoped to
deliver at home and abroad. The question is whether - and
how - these messages were heard by the GOC and in Brussels.
Erdogan may have delivered his message in a conciliatory
manner, but he has effectively shored up domestic support and
locked arms with Talat, making it even more difficult for the
PM to ease back unless TC isolation eases.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON