Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA4199
2006-07-19 14:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKISH ISLAMIC ORDERS, THOUGH BANNED, MAINTAIN

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE KIRF TU 
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #4199/01 2001434
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191434Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7365
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDAI/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/TSR ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004199 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE KIRF TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH ISLAMIC ORDERS, THOUGH BANNED, MAINTAIN
INFLUENCE

Classified by DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004199

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE KIRF TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH ISLAMIC ORDERS, THOUGH BANNED, MAINTAIN
INFLUENCE

Classified by DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C/NF) Summary: Turkey is home to many brands of Islam.
In addition to the official Sunni overlay and the many Alevis
(heterodox Muslims),many Turks, including social and
political leaders, continue to associate with Islamic orders
known as "tarikats" and "cemaats." These have been
officially banned for decades as threats to the secular
state, but few focus on this. According to a scholar
specializing in Turkish Islam, the organization founded by
Islamic philosopher Fethullah Gulen has now emerged as the
most influential of these Islamic groups through its embrace
of globalization and technology. End Summary.

--------------
Islamic Orders Thrive Despite Ban
--------------


2. (U) On the surface, the vast majority of Turks form a
monolithic bloc of Sunni Muslims. In reality, however,
Turkish Muslims are divided into a complex array of groups,
which wield varying degrees of influence. Among these are
Islamic organizations known as "tarikats" and "cemaats," to
which many Turks belong. These organizations have been
officially banned since the mid-1920s as potential threats to
the secular order. However, as tarikats and cemaats maintain
a low profile, they are tolerated, to the point where many
prominent political and social figures are known to associate
with them.


3. (C/NF) We discussed tarikats and cemaats with Tayfun Atay,
an Ankara University anthropology professor who is an expert
on Islam in Anatolia. Tarikats, he explained, are mystical
Sufi organizations that date back to the 11th century. They
have very strict rules and principles. The largest tarikat
in Turkey is the Naksibendi tarikat. The Naksibendis have
had a profound influence in Turkey. Atay said PM Erdogan,
among many others, has been influenced by the Naksibendi
philosophy, though he is not a member. Other contacts,

however, maintain that Erdogan is a Naksibendi member.


4. (U) Cemaats are a more recent phenomenon, emerging in the
19th century. Cemaats place far less emphasis on ceremony
than tarikats, and lack the sheikh-disciple relationship that
is central to tarikats. Said-I Nursi was a Naksibendi who
broke away from the group and founded the Nur community, the
first cemaat. Nursi believed that tarikats had outlived
their usefulness, and sought to save Islam by creating a new
kind of organization. He emphasized education, and wrote a
book called "Risale-I Nur," which is considered a guide by
his followers.

--------------
Gulenists Are Most Influential Group
--------------


5. (C/NF) According to Atay, the Gulenist cemaat, founded by
Islamic philosopher Fetullah Gulen, has now eclipsed the
Naksibendis as the most influential religious order in
Turkey. Gulen was a Nurcu who, in the mid-1980s, broke away
to form his own movement. Gulenists operate schools and
media outlets around the world. They are noted for their
keen interest in Western science and technology -- Gulen
schools emphasize the hard sciences. According to Atay,
Gulenists have embraced globalization and technology,
allowing them to appeal to young people, while the
Naksibendis have resisted change, and have become weaker and
more passive.


6. (C/NF) The Gulenist organization is believed by many Turks
to control the Turkish National Police (TNP). Faruk Demir, a
national security analyst with ties to Islamist and secular
circles, told us that while perhaps only 20 percent of TNP
officers are members of the Gulenist organization, the TNP
leadership is dominated by Gulenists. Nihat Ali Ozcan, a
retired military officer and counterterrorism analyst, told
us in a separate conversation that it is impossible to
estimate the percentage of Gulenists within the TNP, but

ANKARA 00004199 002 OF 003


agreed that Gulenists control the organization.


7. (C/NF) Atay does not believe there is a direct link
between the Gulenists and the ruling Islam-oriented Justice
and Development Party (AKP). Some AKP members are Gulenists,
including some MPs. The two organizations share certain
views, and most Gulenists voted for AKP. But AKP does not
have an organized Gulenist wing and none of the senior
leaders in AKP hails from the Gulenist camp. The Gulenists,
per Atay, have a long-term goal of using their schools to
prepare followers to attain high positions in Turkey's
leading institutions; AKP's goals are more immediate and more
focused on electoral politics.

--------------
A More Self-Confident Muslim Generation
--------------


8. (C/NF) Atay said PM Erdogan has been influenced by
modernization and economic liberalization in Turkey. This
has caused him to diverge from his Islamist roots as a
spiritual follower of the Naksibendi movement and a political
follower of Islamist leader Necmettin Erbakan, whose brief
tenure as PM ended with the 1997 "post modern coup." Demir
made a similar point to us when he asserted that Erdogan
holds conflicting Islamist, traditional conservative, and
liberal/reformist thoughts in his personal outlook. Erbakan
drew support from pious, poor rural Turks -- many of whom
had migrated to the cities -- who felt threatened by
modernization and sought refuge in Islam. However, in the
1980s and 90s, thanks largely to the influence of former PM
and President Turgut Ozal, a pious middle and upper class
developed. Humble farmers and shopkeepers became
entrepreneurs, and even "Anatolian Tigers." These
successful, pious Muslims form an important part of Erdogan
and AKP,s support base, although the overwhelming majority
of AKP,s voters are not wealthy. Although schooled in the
Naksibendi movement, Erdogan is more open to modernization
and less suspicious of the West than traditional Naksibendis.

--------------
Scholar Says Islamism No Threat to State
--------------


9. (C/NF) Atay, a Western-oriented Turk who speaks fluent
English, is convinced that Turkey's Islamic orders do not
pose a threat to the secular (anti-religious) state. On this
point he diverges from many of our secular interlocutors, who
continue to view Turkish Islamists as a threat. Atay
believes Turkish Islamists today have modest goals. In the
past, they may have dreamed of turning Turkey into a Sharia
state, but now realize it is "too late to really Islamicize
Turkey." They have seen how the younger generation in
neighboring Iran has turned against the Islamic revolution,
and know that today's young Turks do not want to go down that
path. All they want, he said, is to remove state
restrictions on Islamic practices, such as the official ban
on headscarves at universities and among civil servants.


10. (C/NF) This sentiment that a Sharia state is impossible
in Turkey has been echoed by many of our contacts. Sadi
Kunduroglu, a self proclaimed "agnostic" and foreign policy
advisor close to AKP, told us that Turks would never accept a
Sharia state or military rule. Kunduroglu believes that
Turks respect both Islam and the Turkish military, but do not
want to be ruled by either, preferring democracy. Sencer
Ayata, a professor of sociology at Middle East Technical
University, told us he believes Turkey,s Islamists made a
"quick and universal" break in their rhetoric in the
immediate aftermath of the 1997 "post modern coup," during
which the military forced out the then-PM Erbakan's pro-Islam
Turkish government. Ayata claims that after the coup, many
Turkish Islamist leaders stopped touting anti-Americanism and
began to endorse democratization, human rights, and other
Western concepts. He believes that this change represented
an ideological conversion on the part of Turkish Islamists
due, in part, to the political realities in Turkey.


ANKARA 00004199 003 OF 003


--------------
AKP: A Broader Electoral Coalition
--------------


11. (C/NF) AKP,s electoral success reflects these broader
modernizing and moderating trends among Turkish Islamists.
Earlier Turkish parties with Islamist roots garnered only
about 10-20 percent of the vote, because their appeal was
largely limited to Turkey,s Islamist minority. AKP,
however, won 34 percent of the vote by claiming it was a
moderate "conservative democratic" party and reaching out to
both Islamist-oriented voters and Turkey,s larger group of
traditionally conservative and pious, but not Islamist,
voters. Demir told us that 25 percent of AKP,s electoral
support comes from Islamist-oriented voters and that the
remaining 75 percent comes largely from traditional
(non-Islamist) conservative voters. Ibrahim Uslu, an
academic and pollster, made a similar argument, telling us
that around 60 percent of AKP,s supporters were traditional
(non-Islamist) conservatives, around 15 percent were
Islamist-oriented voters, with the rest mostly swing protest
voters upset with corruption in the other parties.

--------------
Comment: "Threat" Of Islamism Hotly Debated
--------------


12. (C/NF) Many of AKP's domestic and foreign critics would
dispute the argument that Islamism in Turkey poses no threat
to secularism. They argue that the supposed evolution of PM
Erdogan and other AKP leaders from Islamists to "conservative
democrats" is nothing more than a political ploy.
Nevertheless, our contacts' views on Turkey's religious
orders provide a rare glimpse into a cryptic aspect of
Turkish society that is normally hidden from outside
observers: Islam in Turkey is multi-faceted, with those who
embrace globalization, technology, and democratic politics
apparently in the forefront.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON