Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA391
2006-02-01 14:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY'S JANUARY 24 CYPRUS PROPOSAL UNLIKELY TO

Tags:  PREL TU CY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000391 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2015
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S JANUARY 24 CYPRUS PROPOSAL UNLIKELY TO
SOLVE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE


Classified by Ambassador Ross Wilson, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000391

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2015
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S JANUARY 24 CYPRUS PROPOSAL UNLIKELY TO
SOLVE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE


Classified by Ambassador Ross Wilson, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Ankara's EU diplomats view positively FM
Gul's January 24 proposal for mutual opening of Turkish and
northern Cypriot ports and airports but see little likelihood
the proposal will solve the issue of Turkey's Customs Union
obligations. The GOT is indicating it will not open its
ports and airports without some EU gesture for Turkish
Cypriots. We need to ensure that the discussion of these
EU-related issues continues -- preferably for a long time --
so that other items on the accession agenda and the UN's
mediation efforts can make progress. End Summary.

Domestic Reaction Positive
--------------


2. (U) Turkish domestic reaction to FM Gul's January 24
proposal calling for mutual opening of Turkish, Turkish
Cypriot and Greek Cypriot ports and airports was
overwhelmingly positive. Press commentary, reinforced by PM
Erdogan's remarks January 31, has emphasized Turkey's
positive approach on Cyprus, as contrasted with Greek Cypriot
intransigence. EU nay-sayer and main opposition Republican
People's Party (CHP) leader Baykal's criticism of the
proposal as a declaration of intent to make concessions got
little resonance.


3. (C) Reaction in Ankara to the Department Spokesman's
statement on the proposal was positive. Journalists from
mainstream Vatan and pro-government Islamist-oriented Yeni
Safak newspapers expressed surprise and pleasure to Embassy
IO at what they saw as a forward-leaning U.S. position.
Turkey's leading all-news TV channel NTV ran a headline
touting "Full U.S. Support for Turkey's Proposal." According
to MFA Northeastern Mediterranean DDG Bilman, FM Gul
"appreciated" the statement.

Proposal Reflects Turkish Domestic Politics
--------------


4. (C) Mutual opening of ports and airports, the heart of
the proposal, reflects several things. One is the GOT
position that equates the EU's outstanding pledge to ease
Turkish Cypriot isolation with Turkey's obligation to
implement the Customs Union by opening ports and airports.
Domestic political factors buttress this position: Turkey
sees opening ports and airports as a "concession" that,

without some EU gesture toward Turkish Cypriots, would result
in a firestorm of criticism of PM Erdogan's government,
including from within his own Justice and Development Party
(AKP). Obtaining a quid pro quo for the Turkish Cypriots,
the government believes, is essential to creating a situation
in which Turkey can meet its Customs Union obligations and,
more importantly, keep on track the barely initiated EU
accession negotiations started last October.

EU Diplomats See No Break in Impasse
--------------


5. (C) While EU diplomats in Ankara see the proposal as a
positive step, none expect it to resolve the issue of
Turkey's implementation of its Customs Union obligations. At
most, they think it may buy the GOT time, delaying a showdown
over implementation until late 2006 or early 2007.


6. (C) EU diplomats here, even the UK and others sympathetic
to Turkey, describe the crux of the matter: the EU views
Turkey's obligation as contractual and binding, while it
views the EU's commitment toward Turkish Cypriots as
political and subject to consensus. UK FS Straw nudged
closer to the Turkish position when, in January 25 remarks in
Istanbul, he said "These are separate tracks but they must
both work."


7. (C) None of our EU contacts predicts the proposal will
affect the impasse over trade and aid for Turkish Cypriots or
result in any other EU move toward Turkish Cypriots. They
emphasize the EU's natural tendency to side with affected
member states. One EU contact referred to a Cyprus impasse

ANKARA 00000391 002 OF 003


as still "the perfect pretext" for the EU's Turkey-skeptics
to block accession.


8. (C) The one hope EU diplomats here see is that flexible
and persistent Turkish diplomacy, coupled with heavy-handed
ROC intransigence, may eventually lead member states to
increase pressure on the ROC. The German Ambassador
suggested that FM Gul's initiative may change the psychology
in Europe; FS Straw's comments had reminded nations that
Turkey does not bear all the onus for the Cyprus stalemate.
Turkey's initiative may also lead governments to view Greek
Cypriot obstreperousness more critically. And some may
recognize, the German Ambassador indicated, that the EU
should resist Greek Cypriot efforts to enmesh the EU too
deeply in issues that should be dealt with by the UN in the
context of overall settlement negotiations.

GOT in No Mood For Further Cyprus Concessions
--------------


9. (C) Additional flexibility will, it appears, be difficult
for the GOT. PM Erdogan and his AKP government reject the
idea of further unilateral concessions on Cyprus. In a
January 26 meeting with Erdogan, UK FS Straw urged the PM to
consider more gestures, including troop withdrawals, to win
Turkey credit in the EU.


10. (C) According to UK PolChief Miller, Erdogan was
"unbending." Erdogan replied that Turkey is already "ten
steps ahead" of the Greek Cypriots and further concessions
would be perceived as weakness. Claiming the EU has not kept
promises to Turkey about Cyprus, Erdogan asked Straw
rhetorically if the EU would put in writing the benefits
Turkey would get in exchange for further concessions.
Erdogan pointedly noted that he had to contend with domestic
politics. When Straw urged Erdogan to bring the protocol
extending the Customs Union to new member states, including
the ROC, to Turkey's parliament for ratification, Erdogan
replied that the European Parliament had not yet ratified it.
Erdogan's public comments January 31 echoed these points.


11. (C) According to MFA Northeastern Mediterranean DDG
Bilman, FM Gul also rejected Straw's pitch for further
Turkish gestures in their January 26 meeting. According to
Bilman, Gul handed Straw a list of previous Turkish
initiatives on Cyprus and said Turkey was suffering from
concessions "fatigue." Erdogan advisor Omer Celik likewise
ruled out unilateral moves on Cyprus, including opening port
and airports, in our January 26 meeting with him.

Turkish Diplomatic Efforts Continue
--------------


12. (C) Immediately after Gul's January 24 rollout of the
proposal, Turkish diplomats demarched a number of foreign
capitals and urged support. Gul personally called at least a
couple of his EU colleagues. According to DDG Bilman, the
MFA focused on EU, P-5 and OIC countries.


13. (C) The MFA is preparing a demarche in response to the
Greek Cypriot January 25 aide memoire detailing the ROC's
"utter rejection" of the Turkish proposal. The MFA's current
goal is to prevent the EU from adopting a common position
rejecting the Turkish proposal.


14. (C) An EU statement of outright rejection is unlikely.
UK PolChief Miller and FirstSec Barnes predict that the UK,
having expressed support for the proposal, will not allow a
negative statement by the EU Presidency. They expect either
a bland statement noting the proposal or no statement at all.
Although Austria is a notorious Turkey-skeptic, Austrian DCM
Steiner rules out any Presidency statement absent consensus.
A German diplomat predicts the EU will be influenced by the
UN's reaction to the proposal.


15. (C) Bilman says Turkey will continue to push the
proposal "for some time" despite the ROC rejection. He
emphasizes the proposal is not "take it or leave it," noting
that part of the proposal envisions a high-level conference
to "finalize" it.

ANKARA 00000391 003 OF 003




16. (C) Comment: Turkey has rolled out Gul's initiative
well and gotten more positive commentary than seemed likely
six weeks ago in the wake of Orhan Pamuk's trial. It needs
to continue to be active and to promote its flexibility,
including on Cyprus and non-Cyprus issues. Our diplomacy
should aim to support Turkey's efforts, encourage the EU to
find ways to be responsive, and urge the EU to avoid imposing
a premature Cyprus litmus test that would usurp the UN's
proper role in mediating a settlement of the dispute. If the
discussion about fulfillment of Turkey's Cyprus-related
Customs Union obligations can be dragged out while the UN
re-starts its efforts and Turkey's broader accession process
has a chance to gain steam, it can only be helpful. For now,
the USG objective should be to help persuade the EU and the
UN to take the initiative as a basis for further discussion.
End Comment.
WILSON