SCENESETTER FOR JUNE 14 VISIT OF GENERAL SCHWARTZ TO TURKEY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 003352

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2026
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PARM, TU, IZ, IR, AJ, AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JUNE 14 VISIT OF GENERAL SCHWARTZ
TO TURKEY

Classified By: Ambassador Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) We look forward to your visit. Turkey is a strong
ally in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),facilitating the
distribution of critical supplies and fuel to the coalition
in Iraq and supporting the NATO Training Mission (NTM-I)
there; publicly calling on Iran to comply with its IAEA
commitments; and pressuring Syria and Hamas to renounce their
support for terrorism. Later this year Turkey will take over
command of ISAF-Central (with France and Italy) and open its
first Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan.
But there are challenges. Bilateral defense industry
cooperation is on the decline. An enhanced Turkish security
presence along the Iraqi border to combat an increase in PKK
terrorist activity has raised concerns that Turkey might act
unilaterally across the border into Iraq, which we have
discouraged.

2. (S/NF) Turkey is a key player in a number of issues that
come under your command, chiefly connected to OIF and the
GWOT:

--58% of all supplies flowing into Iraq by air use the
multi-directional cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base.

--25% of sustainment fuel for the coalition flows over the
Turkey-Iraq border crossing at Habur Gate, as do many other
key supplies for our troops downrange.

--We are now in informal discussion with the GOT to use
Turkish roads and ports to retrograde excess equipment and
material from Iraq. Retrograding equipment via Turkey would
provide an additional LOC to CENTCOM, relieve congestion at
Kuwait, and ensure a more secure route. You should urge the
Turkish General Staff (TGS) to continue to work with us on
this issue.

--Turkey has signaled its interest in working with us on
repairing Nasosnaya Air Base in Azerbaijan; you should seek
senior Turkish military confirmation and sell them on the
concept.

--The Turkish military had allowed us to use Incirlik as a
refueling stop for Operation FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE detainee
movement operations since 2002, but revoked this permission
in February of this year. We understand OSD and JCS have
been discussing whether to approach Turkey to seek to reverse
this decision. We recommend that you do not raise this issue
with TGS pending clarification from Washington on what
approach State/OSD/JCS/NSC wish to take. END SUMMARY.

Bilateral Relationship Improving
--------------

3. (S) During her April 25 visit to Ankara, Secretary Rice
and FM Gul announced our intention to set up a formal and
regular senior-level strategic dialogue consultative
mechanism. The goal was to signal progress toward restoring
confidence and strengthening our ability to work together in
ways helpful to our goals in the region and in Turkey itself.
We are now negotiating the final touches of our "Strategic
Partnership" document, which should be made public soon. We
have restored bilateral dialogue through many senior level
visits over the past ten months. We have shifted our
dialogue on Iraq from one dominated by Turkish whining about
the PKK and Kirkk to one of constructive collaboration
politically and logistically in support of our efforts there.

A PARTNER IN GWOT
--------------


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Iraq
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4. (SBU) Turkey's agreement to allow the use of its territory
as a logistical hub has been a crucial asset in our Iraq
operations. Two-thirds of gasoline and diesel fuel shipments
(3 million gallons per day) for the Iraqi people and 25% of
sustainment fuel for the coalition crosses into Iraq through
the Ground Line of Communication at Habur Border Gate. Since
Turkey approved the use of Incirlik Air Base as a cargo hub
to support coalition operations in Iraq in May 2005, over 152
million pounds of equipment has been shipped to US troops.
58% of all equipment provided to our troops in Iraq by air
pass through Incirlik. Six C-17 aircraft now deliver from
Incirlik the amount of supplies it took 9-10 planes to
deliver from Germany. Additionally four KC-135 tanker
aircraft based there since 2003 have run 2800 refueling
sorties, delivering 192 million pounds of fuel in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Turkey has four personnel assigned to NTM-I in Iraq and,
under this rubric, has trained 57 Iraqi military officers in
Turkey. Iraqis have pledged to send officers to at least
seven additional courses this year.

Retrograde
--------------

5. (SBU) On behalf of CENTCOM, we are informally coordinating
with TGS and the MFA with respect to gaining Government of
Turkey approval to use Turkish roadways and sea ports to
retrograde excess equipment and material from Iraq.
Retrograding equipment via Turkey provides an additional LOC
to CENTCOM, relieves congestion at Kuwait, and is a more
secure route. On May 26, TGS informed us that TGS and MFA
are supportive of the retrograde concept. They requested
that formal notification be made via diplomatic channels
since the Government of Turkey is the approval authority.
Additionally, they stated that our request to be exempt from
customs fees, taxes and surcharges would require further
discussion with Customs officials. The formal notification
should occur soon. You should express your appreciation for
TGS's initial support and ask for their continued support
once the formal request is presented.

Afghanistan: Good New Story
--------------

6. (SBU) Turkey has twice successfully led the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, most
recently from February to August 2005. Later this year, it
will take over joint command of ISAF-Central in Kabul for a
two-year period, and will open its first PRT in the
neighboring province of Wardak. PM Erdogan visited
Afghanistan in spring 2005 and subsequently increased
Turkey's pledged assistance ten-fold to $100M. This will be
allocated in $16M increments for five years to build schools,
hospitals, medical clinics and drinking water wells
throughout the country. Four hospitals have already been
constructed. The GOT provides counter-narcotics training in
Turkey to Afghan security forces and will initiate such
training in Afghanistan this year under the auspices of the
Wardak PRT. President Karzai demonstrated his gratitude for
Turkey's assistance by participating in a March
counter-terrorism conference at Turkey's NATO Center of
Excellence for the Defense Against Terrorism.

PKK
---

7. (S/NF) The PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party, which seeks to
carve off the primarily Kurdish portion of eastern Turkey by
force of arms) has intensified its terrorist campaign in
Turkey: over 150 Turkish security forces have died so far in
2006, a dozen in the past two weeks alone. This violence has

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increased pressure on the GOT to take decisive measures to
cope with the problem, including attacking PKK strongholds in
northern Iraq, which the organization uses as a command,
control, and logistics base to infiltrate Turkey and carry
out attacks. Turkey wants the new government in Iraq to take
immediate, concrete steps to limit PKK freedom of action in
the country. The PKK's isolated location, the long list of
priorities facing the GOI, and the attitudes of Kurdish
authorities in northern Iraq make this complicated.

8. (C) Secretary Rice told GOT leaders April 25 that the U.S.
will reinvigorate trilateral (U.S.-Turkey-Iraq) discussions
on the issue. While recognizing that the insurgency prevents
coalition troops from engaging the PKK in Iraq, the GOT
remains frustrated at its inability, and U.S. unwillingness,
to stop attacks by people coming from the other side of its
border.

9. (S) If you are confronted with this issue, you can point
to significant efforts the USG is undertaking to ameliorate
the PKK threat:

--Sharing of sensitive intelligence on PKK activities within
Turkey, which have led to successful Turkish COIN operations.

--MNF-I surveillance flights over PKK camps in northern Iraq,
which have also had a salutary effect interms of psyops.

--An intelligence fusion cell which meets weekly in Ankara to
pass information to the Turkish military on PKK activities.

--A new initiative to work with Turkey on building law
enforcement cases against PKK operatives in Europe.

OTHER KEY ISSUES
--------------

Iran
--------------

10. (S) Secretary Rice personally informed Foreign Minister
Gul May 31 of the U.S. initiative to join with the EU-3 in
negotiations with Iran's representatives once Iran fully and
verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing
activities. Deputy National Security Adviser Crouch followed
up with discussions in Ankara June 4. Official and public
reaction to this initiative has been uniformly positive. The
GOT has publicly supported this move and called upon the
Iranians to respond positively. Turkish officials have taken
a tougher line on Iran since the U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA,
Greg Schulte, provided in-depth briefings and consulted with
Turkey in February. Gul has told visiting Congressional
delegations that Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations are the
single most important problem facing Europe and the Middle
East, and he has emphasized the need for a united and
decisive international approach. Ankara has called on Tehran
to cooperate with the IAEA, adopt full transparency on its
nuclear programs, and resume negotiations with the EU-3, most
recently in Erdogan - Ahmadinejad encounters in Baku and Bali
and during an early May visit by Iranian National Security
Adviser Larijani.

An Opening on Nasosnaya?
--------------

11. (C) As part of a continuing effort in the Caucasus, the
U.S. and allies continue to promote collective assistance to
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. A recent proposal -- the
upgrade of Nasosnaya Airfield located outside of Baku -- has
not taken hold with our Turkish counterparts (at least not in
Ankara). Over the past 2-3 years, the idea of upgrading the
airfield has been briefed in several venues (the Caucasus
Working Group and the South Caucasus Clearing House).
Additionally, the idea of a joint venture among allies to

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perform the upgrade has been informally sent to the TGS J5 on
several occasions. While the military has not responded to
our entreaties in Ankara, the Turkish DATT in Baku (a
one-star general) recently told us that Turkey is
enthusiastic about working with us on Nasosnaya. A push at
the senior levels within TGS might help break this proposal
loose. Any interest you can promote during your visit would
be beneficial.


Defense Industry Cooperation Declining
--------------

12. (SBU) Defense industry cooperation, once the strongest
aspect of our military-to-military relationship, is in
decline. No U.S. firm has won a direct commercial sale since
Boeing was awarded a contract for an Airborne Early Warning
and Control (AEW&C) aircraft in 2002. In 2004, three tenders
(UAVs, Main Battle Tanks, and attack helicopters) were
canceled. Two U.S. firms, Boeing and Bell, were interested
in a second attack helicopter tender, but declined to
participate due to onerous liability and technology transfer
requirements. (Several non-US firms did submit bids.)
Sikorsky may choose not to participate in a tender for 54
utility helicopters for the Turkish Armed Forces and Forestry
Service for the same reason, and Raytheon may bow out of
contention for an aircraft trainer tender. Both in Ankara
and in Washington, U.S. firms and the USG have raised the
technology transfer and liability concerns with Turkey's
Ministry of Defense and Defense Industry Undersecretariat
(SSM). Despite both Turkish military and government
insistence that it wants US competition in these tenders, SSM
has resisted making the necessary changes to the tenders to
ensure it.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON