Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA3
2006-01-03 07:17:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

FRAUD SUMMARY - TURKEY

Tags:  KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC TU 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000003 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP; DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC; POSTS TO FRAUD
PREVENTION MANAGERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC TU
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - TURKEY

REF: A) STATE 205073, B) ANKARA 673, C) ISTANBUL 158


A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS
---------------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000003

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP; DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC; POSTS TO FRAUD
PREVENTION MANAGERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC TU
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - TURKEY

REF: A) STATE 205073, B) ANKARA 673, C) ISTANBUL 158


A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS
--------------


1. Until recently Turkey could be considered a low-fraud
country from a consular perspective. In the past year,
however, Mission Turkey has seen an increase in the number
of fraudulent documents presented during interviews, and
also uncovered several alien smuggling rings. These more
recent experiences lead us now to evaluate Turkey as a
medium-fraud country. Embassy Ankara is a designated IV and
NIV processing post for Iranians and an IV post for Iraqis.
ConGen Istanbul is a designated post for Iranian NIV cases.
Fraud assessment in Turkey should separately view fraud
among applicants from Turkey, Iran, and Iraq.


2. The Turkish economy continued to strengthen in 2005. As
a result, Mission Turkey's posts are seeing more applicants
from all regions of the country. Areas that continue to
have high unemployment combined with historically high rates
of illegal migration to the United States such as Konya and
the Black Sea region are also sources of these fraudulent
documents and smuggling rings. The GOT produces reliable,
though technologically unsophisticated documents, which
officers can readily check in questionable circumstances.


3. Reports from Iran on the other hand, indicate that the
Iranian economy has shrunk 25% since the summer and youth
unemployment continues to be a severe problem. Original
documents and translations from Iran are of poor quality and
low reliability. The new Iranian passport has good security
features such as UV reaction, a biopage on the second page,
and a digital photo-image in the background. However,
applicants can change their name and DOB, making the
passport an imperfect identity verifier. Iranian applicants
also have special security considerations. Verifying
whether applicants have had government or military service
can be very difficult. Because the U.S. and Iran do not
have diplomatic relations, officers are unable to conduct
fraud investigations in Iran. Post heavily relies on
interviews to check relationships and qualifications.
Neither Ankara nor Istanbul has a native Farsi speaker among

its LES members.


4. Embassy Ankara began processing more Iraqi applicants
this fall when it became a designated IV processing post.
Prior to that, Ankara had been processing Visas 92 cases for
Iraqis in Turkey and some NIV cases. Officers are
familiarizing themselves with Iraqi documents, but face
problems similar to those when approaching Iranian
documents. Post has not detected fraud with Iraqi documents
yet but is proceeding with caution. Mission Turkey does not
have a native Arabic or Kurdish speaking LES or FSO at this
time.


B. NIV FRAUD
--------------


5. Over 70 percent of the Mission NIV processing takes
place at ConGen Istanbul. NIV fraud encountered typically
consists of fraudulent documents, such as fake bank and
employment letters and fake tax or company documents. A
significant percentage of fraud cases post has identified
involve students' falsifying or altering transcripts, mostly
in the context of the summer work and travel program. The
majority of such cases involve males between the ages of 18
and 45, though a fraud ring post detected this year also
involved several women between the ages of 20 and 30, and
their accompanying children. Many fraudulent B-1/B-2
applicants appear to be intending to work in the U.S. or
join family members living and/or working illegally in the
U.S.


6. Embassy Ankara continues to work with other embassies to
keep abreast of new trends and developments. The embassies
meet quarterly to exchange information and notable cases.
Among the trends jointly discovered were the increase in the
use of persons holding valid visas to shepherd male-fide
applicants to their appointments.


7. Fraud among Iranian NIV applicants is so prevalent that
officers do not rely on their documents. Officers must rely
on what is revealed during the interview. In early 2005,
officers at Embassy Ankara uncovered a fraud ring that was
using high-quality documents from reputable U.S. medical
institutions and well-coached applicants (ref B). Ankara
has initiated weekly emails between Iranian processing posts
to track trends in NIV interviews and to compare notes.


8. Student and Exchange Visitor Visas: Mission Turkey has
seen a number of voluntary departure cases in which aliens
used F-1 student visas (typically for ESL) to go to the U.S.
and work illegally. Most F-1 fraud cases are identified
when the applicant submits fake or altered transcripts to
hide failing grades.


9. Employment-Based Visas (H-1b, L-1, E-1, E-2): Istanbul
has confirmed at least three cases of H-1b fraud, in which
the beneficiary falsified employment/academic records, in
order to work for marble companies or restaurants. Ankara
has noticed several cases of possible fraud among Iranian H-
1b applicants. Post usually sees a spike in suspect L-1 or
E-1/E-2 applications once the H-1b cap has been reached each
year.


C. IV FRAUD
--------------


10. Embassy Ankara sees IV fraud mostly in fianc and
spousal petitions. This summer Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) cracked down on a Turkish marriage fraud
ring in California. The Turkish organizer was deported for
arranging over 50 fraudulent marriages. Officers frequently
return petitions on the basis of polygamy because applicants
fail to divorce their spouse in Turkey or Iran before
remarrying in the U.S.



11. Although ConGen Istanbul does not process IV
applications, it has a tangential role in some potentially
fraudulent marriages when couples execute the "Affidavit of
Eligibility to Marry." A significant portion of these
notarials involve young women marrying Iranian men, whom
they met on the internet and have seen for the first time
during their short stay in Istanbul.


D. DV FRAUD
--------------


12. Turkish DV fraud most often occurs with forged diplomas
and employment letters. Relationships of derivatives to the
primary applicant are not usually fraudulent. Calls to
schools and offices can easily reveal fraudulent documents.
Fraud in DV is low and has not increased since last year.


E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD
--------------


13. There have been few cases of ACS and passport fraud
identified in Istanbul. Although the proximity to Iran and
recently-added flight connections to Iraq increase the
potential for fraud cases, Mission Turkey sees relatively
few such applicants


14. ConGen Istanbul witnesses a low but steady number of
false claims to citizenship, largely from third country
nationals (usually Iranians). These cases are typically
obvious, given gaps in the person's story or documents, and
easily verified through contact with the DHS regional office
in Athens, or through PIERS/INK searches. Ankara and Adana
have not seen fraud related to ACS.


F. ADOPTION FRAUD
--------------


15. Embassy Ankara does not encounter much adoption fraud.
The legal process is so rigorous that it is difficult to
falsely adopt a child; however, applicants and agencies in
Iran sometimes try to cut corners in order to hasten the
process. The result has been adoptive mothers falsely
registered as the biological mothers of their children. In
one case, a petitioner had to return the child.


G. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD
-------------- --------------
--------------


16. Embassy Ankara has not been able to detect much fraud
in Visas 92 cases; however, the unreliability of Iranian
documents keeps the officers' attention focused on these
cases. ConGen Istanbul does not process Visa 92 cases,
but processes all the Visa 93 cases for Mission Turkey.
These cases are thoroughly vetted by the International
Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) prior to action at
post, and any suspicious cases that are passed to post from
ICMC are flagged as such.
22ConGen Istanbul processed 74 transportation letters for
lost/stolen I-551 cases in FY 2005. Although previous years
yielded several cases that proved to be fraudulent, none
were identified in FY-2005, thanks to a more thorough
interview and investigation process, coupled with
verification through DHS in Athens.

H. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
-------------- --------------
--------------


17. Host government authorities have assisted in recent
fraud investigations (particularly the fraud ring
investigation) by verifying some civil documents and
interviewing at least one applicant. However, their own
workload constraints, as well as a combination of sympathy
for applicants presenting fraudulent documents and
perception that a major prosecution would not lead to a
discernible payoff, kept them from investigating the 2005
fraud ring to a degree that would show tangible results and
arrests.


I. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
-------------- --------------


18. Fraudulent marriages on the IV side and falsely
obtained H-1b petitions on the NIV side continue to be
matters of concern. As there have been smuggling rings
broken up over the last 12 months in both of these areas,
officers review these cases with caution.


19. In FY-2005, the U.S. Coast Guard alerted Mission Turkey
that Turkish shipping companies accounted for a
disproportionate number of deserters from foreign vessels
the visiting U.S. ports. This, together with testimony from
several applicants and voluntary departure cases, confirms
what conoffs in Mission Turkey had observed for years --
that one common way young men (typically from the Black Sea
coast) to enter the U.S. illegally is by stowing away on or
deserting from ships doing business in U.S. waters.


20. ConGen Istanbul continues to be a transit point for
male-fide immigrants from the Far East and Central Asia.
Gozen Aviation Security, a private security firm that
screens all U.S.-bound flights in Istanbul, reports that
interceptions of U.S.-bound male-fide passengers has dropped
off in the last year or so.


J. STAFFING AND TRAINING
--------------


21. ConGen Istanbul's FPU consists of an officer and an
LES; for both of whom fraud prevention work is balanced
along with their main duties of handling overall NIV and ACS
work. Embassy Ankara has one officer and two LES, who also
work part time in support of fraud prevention efforts.
Other LES members at both posts' NIV units assist with
investigations and validation studies. Post's discovery in
FY-2005 of several fraud rings reinforces the need for
officers to redouble their efforts, both in terms of
devoting more time and resources to fraud prevention
activities, as well as to organizing and seeking further
training. The FPM in Ankara will attend PC-541 in January

2006. One of the Ankara's LES attended PC-542 in December

2004. In Ankara, the FPU would like to improve the database
of applicants to better crosscheck facts. Also the FPM
needs more contacts with local authorities to gain
assistance.


22. The current FPM in Istanbul attended PC-541 in October
2005, and also participated in the Balkan Fraud Roundtable
hosted by Embassy Athens in November 2005. The Istanbul LES
FPA attended PC-542 in December 2004. In anticipation of
the current FPM's departure from Istanbul next year, post
plans to have another Istanbul-based officer attend PC-541
in 2006. All incoming officers in the section receive a
fraud briefing as part of their orientation process, and all
five NIV adjudicating officers came to post immediately
following ConGen training, including basic fraud detection
techniques. The FPU will dedicate much of FY-2006 to
improving the fraud library at post, organizing validation
studies, and establishing more anti-fraud training modules
for FSOs and LES alike.

Wilson