MONTREUX CONVENTION: MILITARY LIMITS ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002904

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2026
TAGS: KTIA MOPS EWWT XH ZJ TU
SUBJECT: MONTREUX CONVENTION: MILITARY LIMITS ON THE
TURKISH STRAITS

REF: A. ANKARA 1958

B. STATE 79658

Classified By: Political Military Counselor Timothy A. Betts for reason
s 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Montreux Convention (MC) obligates
Turkey to keep the Dardanelles and the Bosporus open to
commercial shipping and to limit naval passage into and out
of the Black Sea. In addition, non-littoral navies face
limits on both tonnage and duration of stay in the Black Sea.
Civilian owned but military commanded vessels are subject to
these restrictions as well. Although the MC limits Turkey's
ability to control fast-growing commercial traffic through
the Straits and the environmental hazards this entails for
the 17 million residents of Istanbul, the historical
importance of the MC to Turkey, Turkish fears of
relinquishing a share of control over the Straits, and
Ankara's desire to maintain naval leadership in the Black Sea
mean Turkey will not support an effort to renegotiate the
Convention. Despite the restrictions, US Navy vessels can
and do pass through the Straits and call on Black Sea ports.
Transparency and inclusion of Turkey in US activities in the
region should build Turkish support for USN, and eve NATO's,
engagement in the Black Sea. End summary.


2. (U) The 1936 Montreux Convention transferred to Turkey
control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus that the
International Commission had exercised since its creation in
1923 by an agreement negotiated in conjunction with the
Treaty of Lausanne. This, in effect, restored Turkish
sovereignty over the Straits and completed the creation of
modern Turkey. The importance of the MC and the Treaty of
Lausanne as founding documents of the Republic is taught in
Turkish elementary schools. It was not signed by the US, but
by the UK, Australia, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania,
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, the USSR and Turkey.


3. (U) The MC enshrines the principle of freedom of transit
through the straits for commercial shipping, limited only for
reasons of safety of navigation and public health. Over the
past decade, Turkey has successfully imposed safety-based
limits on passage of large tankers, but in so doing faced
strong opposition and criticism from Russia. The risks
presented by tankers are multiplied by an explosion in the
number of unregulated smaller vessels in the Straits, which
present risks to other shipping (including large tankers) as
well as to residents on shore. As Black Sea and Central
Asian oil and gas exports grow, the GOT would like to impose
further limitations on traffic through the Straits in favor
of "bypass" pipelines, but its legal ability to do so under
the MC is ambiguous. Naval vessels, however, are subject to
several explicit restrictions regarding passage through the
Straits and presence in the Black Sea:


TRANSIT

-- All naval vessels must be notified to the GOT in advance
(at least eight days in advance for littoral powers; 15 days
for non-littorals who must also specify destination and the
date of their planned return passage);

-- All naval vessels must transit the straits during daylight
hours;

-- Non-littoral countries' submarines may not transit; and,

-- An individual nation's daily passage of "war ships"
(including auxiliaries except oilers) may not exceed the
lesser of 15,000 tons or nine vessels, although littoral
states' ships of greater than 15,000 tons may pass with a
two-destroyer escort.



PRESENCE IN THE BLACK SEA

-- The total tonnage of non-littoral naval vessels (except
oilers) in the Black Sea at any one time is 45,000 tons;

-- The total tonnage that any one non-littoral navy may have
in the Black Sea at one time is 30,000 tons; and,

-- Non-littoral naval vessels may remain in the Black Sea no
longer than 21 days and must then transit south through the
Dardanelles.


None of the restrictions apply to foreign naval vessels
visiting ports in the Straits (e.g., Istanbul) provided they
leave the way they came, thereby avoiding a complete passage
through the Straits.


4. (C) The MC obliges Turkey to enforce these limits. During
the Cold War, the restrictions prevented the Soviet Navy from
surging into the Mediterranean. However, they also impact
the US Navy's operations. In June, for the USS Apache to
complete its planned mission of over 21 days, it will need to
exit the Black Sea, passing through the Dardanelles and then
go through the Straits again. Similarly, another USN ship
recently had its passage through the Straits delayed because
its presence in the Black Sea would have exceeded the 45,000
ton aggregate limit on non-littoral naval vessels; it passed
several days later after a German naval vessel exited the
Black Sea. MFA officials are transparent with us when these
situations arise, and offer workarounds or alternatives
within the limit of the Convention. However, the MC requires
that Turkey notify the other signatories of the movement of
non-littoral navies through the Straits and into the Black
Sea. If it appears that Turkey is breaking the rules, it
would have to answer to the other signatories; Russia in
particular uses these notifications to monitor USN traffic.


5. (C) Over the past several months we have explored
informally with MFA whether there is flexibility in the
application of these limits, particularly concerning civilian
owned vessels chartered to the USN. This month we were told
that GOT legal experts view long-term leased ships under the
command of the Maritime Sealift Command as auxiliaries under
the MC and, therefore, subject to restrictions. However,
short-term, time-chartered vessels not normally employed on
fleet duties, hired to move military cargo are not considered
auxiliaries and are therefore not subject to the tonnage and
duration of stay restrictions of the MC, even when military
personnel are on board provided they have no formal authority
over the ship's master. This interpretation was how military
hardware could be shipped through the Straits from Romania to
Iraq prior to the Iraq War. Pointing to this precedent, an
MFA official told us that he was confident a ship hired to
carry humanitarian relief equipment and supplies next year as
part of EUCOM's SEA BREEZE 07 exercise would normally be
approved.


6. (C) The Turkish military's extreme sense of sovereignty
and profession pride forbids foreign forces from exercising
visible force protection measures, according to our MFA
contact. This combination of pride and nationalism
manifested itself during a March visit to Marmaris of the USS
Theodore Roosevelt. When the TR wanted to fly a helicopter
as it was coming into port as a force protection measure, the
Turkish General Staff balked; flying it for other purposes
was less of a problem. Similarly, although the cargo ships
carrying war materiel for the Iraq War carried US armed
forces personnel assigned to protect the cargo, they were
kept out of sight during the passage through the Straits at
the GOT's request. Future passages of like vessels would

have to do the same. MFA tells us, however, a request for
Turkish military or coast guard escorts for the passage would
be granted.


7. (C) Comment: Although the restrictions on non-littoral
naval passage through the Turkish Straits and presence in the
Black Sea constrain possible USN operations in the region,
the importance of the MC to Turks' definition of their
country predisposes Ankara to oppose any revision. Besides
the emotional reaction and the arguments for changes in the
Convention that would permit greater regulation of commercial
traffic, the GOT would fear Russia and/or others would try to
exert more control over management of the waterway or dilute
Turkey's authority to regulate traffic. We defer to Embassy
Moscow, but imagine Russia would welcome an opportunity to
wrestle some control over the Straits from our NATO Ally.


8. (C) Comment (cont.): Turkish defense and enforcement of
the Montreux Convention should not be mistaken as GOT
opposition to US engagement in the Black Sea region. Turkey
has welcomed US and NATO involvement in the littorals,
strongly backing PfP participation and the membership of
Romania and Bulgaria. Turkey's concerns about the Black Sea
are narrowly focused on naval activities. Turkey sees itself
as the naval leader in the region and believes NATO
operations in the Black Sea might provoke the Russians to
withdraw from Black Sea maritime security cooperation. It
therefore takes a cautious view on NATO (and US) naval
activities in the region. After discussions here in April
(ref a) and between Turkish Navy and the Pentagon earlier
that previewed ref b points on the Black Sea, Ankara now
appears less concerned by USN and even limited NATO naval
engagement there, as evidenced by completing TUN-USN
exercises in the eastern Black Sea earlier this year,
accepting the visit of the USS Porter to the Black Sea port
of Samsun last month, and scheduling Turkish Navy
participation in the Romania-hosted NATO exercise BREEZE next
month. Remaining transparent and including Turkey where
appropriate in our Black Sea activities should further put
Ankara at ease and build Turkish support for our own
engagement in the region. End comment.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON