RUSSIA-TURKEY RELATIONS: KEEPING THE EAST-WEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002741

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT ON SECTION 02

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2021
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG EPET TU RU
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-TURKEY RELATIONS: KEEPING THE EAST-WEST
BALANCE

REF: ANKARA 1627

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Erdogan's Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government has worked to improve
relations with Moscow, a process fueled by booming trade
centered on energy, tourism, and construction. The GOT sees
engagement of Russia as part of a wider policy of seeking
good relations with all of its neighbors and regional powers.
Turkish officials hope to parlay improving ties into
Russian support on Cyprus and Armenia. Ankara also seeks to
engage Russia in Black Sea security, even at the expense of
increased NATO activity there. End Summary

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Increased Cooperation: Theories
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2. (C) Despite a history of bloody conflict in the Ottoman
period and Cold War animosity, Turkey-Russia relations have
improved significantly over the last several years. PM
Erdogan has developed a rapport with Russian President Putin
during four face-to-face meetings in 2005 alone. His
government views Russia less as a rival and more as a partner
with a "Eurasian" identity. In November 2001, the Turkish FM
Cem and Russian FM Ivanov signed a "Joint Action Plan for
Cooperation in Eurasia" entitled, "From Bilateral Cooperation
to Multidimensional Partnership." President Putin and
President Sezer signed the "Joint Declaration on the
Intensification of Friendship and Multidimensional
Partnership" during Putin's historic December 2004 visit.
Enhanced relations dovetail with influential Prime Ministry
advisor Ahmet Davutoglu's policy of "strategic depth," which
dictates Turkey should have good relations with all its
neighbors, even while pursuing EU membership.

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Increasd Cooperation: Economy and
Energy Issues are he Real Driver
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3. (C) Increasing energy dependency, growing trade ties and
tourism are driving relations forward. Some 65 of Turkey's
natural gas comes from Russia. The GOT is conflicted on how
to manage this reliance. Its officials sometimes speak of
reducing this dependence; but, they also meet regularly with
the GOR to seek agreement on a long list of potential energy
projects (Bosphorus bypass oil pipeline, natural gas storage,
natural gas distribution, natural gas processing, and more).
Turkish Botas and Russian GAZPROM continue to manage energy
partnerships, including new energy pipelines (the Blue Stream
project) and are examining the feasibility of transporting
incremental natural gas through Turkey, including to Israel.


4. (U) According to MFA and press figures, Turkish-Russian
bilateral trade in 2004 exceeded USD 11 billion, and in 2005,
USD 15 billion. Turkey seeks to increase this to USD 25
billion by 2007. Russian investment in the Turkish
construction sector exceeded USD 12 billion in 2004. The
number of Russian tourists, helped by eased visa
requirements, grew from 1.2 million in 2003 to 1.9 million in
2005, making them second in number only to Germans visiting
Turkey. Russian tourism fell somewhat after GOR warnings
about Avian Influenza early this year. Turkish officials
stress that growing economic interdependence has created a
framework for regular dialogue with Russia and contributes to
a more constructive discussion of bilateral and regional
political issues.

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Turkey's Equities: Black Sea
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5. (C) Turkish officials are conscious that Russia is one of
the more powerful economies represented in the Black Sea

Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization. While BSEC has not
been effective at facilitating cooperation among Turkey and
the Black Sea states, it provides a framework for cooperation
on maritime and port security, energy, and trade in the
region. Turkey welcomes Russia's contributions to BSEC and
looks for more. Turkish officials view the Montreux
Convention, which restored Turkish sovereignty over the
Bosphorus and Dardanelles in 1936, as a key to maintaining
their interests vis-a-vis Russia and the Bosphorus free from
legal wrangling. The GOT fears any reopening of Montreux
could (at least in theory) allow the Russians to seek some
measure of control over the Bosphorus -- a move that Turkey
will not accept.


6. (C) Turkish officials stress that Turkey has worked hard
since the 1990s to draw the other littorals -- especially
Russia -- into cooperative security structures in the Black
Sea. It convinced Moscow to participate in the Black Sea
Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR). Russia agreed to
join Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY (which provides data to
NATO's comparable Operation Active Endeavor in the
Mediterranean). A large-scale Turkish-Russian naval exercise
took place February 27 and 28, in which the missile cruiser
Moskva participated. The two countries' naval chiefs recently
met in Istanbul (reftel). Turkey sees Russia's willingness
to participate in OAE as a result of these Black Sea
initiatives. It also fears a more robust role for NATO in
the Black Sea could provoke Russia to cease its cooperation
in the maritime security arena.

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Cyprus, Central Asia and Caucasus
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7. (C) Russia has historically aligned itself with Greek
Cypriots and opposed Turkish interests on Cyprus issues in
the UNSC. It reportedly continues to block UNSC approval of
the Secretary General's 2004 report on his Cyprus Good
Offices Mission, a report favorable to Turkey and Turkish
Cypriots. In 2005, PM Erdogan pushed Putin for Russia to
take a less anti-Turkish Cyprus stance during at least two
face-to-face meetings. Putin reportedly responded
positively, and the Russian Ambassador here has spoken about
the Cyprus in a more conciliatory way, but nothing tangible
has occurred.


8. (C) Turkey and Russia compete for influence and trade in
Central Asia. Turkish economic involvement in the region has
grown, according to the Turkish MFA, to reflect a trade
volume of USD 8.7 billion since 1992. Turkey has granted USD
726 million in credits to the region since its independence
in efforts to make Central Asia an attractive area for
Turkish businesses; the MFA claims more than 1000 Turkish
firms currently operate in the region. Cast against a
renewed version of the "great game" in which the U.S., China,
and Iran are competing for influence over energy resources
and, in the case of the U.S., an increased security presence
to support the global war on terror, Turkish and Russian
policies in the area contribte to an increasingly complex
mix. While professing concern with corruption, human rights,
and political freedom, Turkey sees this as a region where it
can wield influence by focusing on economic issues, often in
direct competition with Russia.


9. (C) Turkish officials see Russia and Georgia working
together, although perhaps not deliberately, to thwart
Turkey's good faith efforts to help with the Abkhazia
conflict. In Turkey's view, Georgia has shown no interest in
Turkey's offers to host a conference on Abkhazia and
continues to harass Turkish shipping bringing humanitarian
supplies to Abkhaz ports. Turkey has viewed Georgian
President Saakashvili's criticism of Russia following the
early 2006 gas crisis with alarm. In a mid-March visit to
Tbilisi, Turkish President Sezer reportedly urged restraint
vis-a-vis Russia. Turkish officials are also concerned at
Georgia's eagerness for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP),

arguing that giving Georgia a MAP will prematurely commit
NATO to a formal relationship with Georgia while unduly
provoking Russia.


10. (C) On Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish officials
see Russia firmly in Armenia's camp but also believe that
Armenia, unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, does not
constitute a Russian strategic interest. Turkish officials
hope that, through broadly improved Turkey-Russia ties,
Russia can be convinced to permit a settlement to the N-K
conflict and encourage Armenia to take steps to improve
bilateral ties with Ankara.

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Official and Other Views
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11. (C) Turkish officials such as MFA Russia Department Head
Meltem Buyukkarakas and Energy Department First Secretary
Gulsun Erkul speak glowingly of improving Turkey-Russia
relations, noting that bilateral economic cooperation has
laid a foundation for constructive political dialogue and
created a framework for transparency between the two
countries. While acknowledging that Russia's power is
greatly diminished from the days of the USSR, they see Russia
exerting considerable influence on regional issues critical
to Turkish policy. They want Russia engaged in the Black
Sea. They are cautious regarding the Caucasus, hoping for
Russia's help with Armenia. They claim that Putin wants to
do the right thing vis--vis Cyprus but is blocked by his
bureaucracy.


12. (C) The conservative think tank TUSAM's vice president
Ali Kulebi and some journalists view Turkish-Russian ties in
the context of what they see as anti-Westernism. Others,
such as Istanbul-based journalist Ivor Torbakov, point to
growing anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe and AKP government
fears that Turkey will ultimately not be invited to join the
Western club, thereby pushing it closer to the other outsider
-- Russia. Some argue that Turkey and Russia share a
symbiotic foreign policy inclination that emphasizes status
quo and stability over support for human rights and
democratic change. German Marshall Fund country director Suat
Kiniklioglu wrote in a January 31 article that should
Turkey,s increasing sense of alienation from the West
continue, relations with Russia could develop into something
more consequential.


13. (C) Comment: Growth in Turkey-Russia ties, at least in
the fields of trade and energy, is real. The political
relationship may not quite keep pace, but the GOT will
continue to press. Movement by Moscow on either Cyprus or
toward an N-K settlement would be instrumental in pushing the
relationship to a new level. End comment.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON