Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA2666
2006-05-11 14:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY/IRAN: PM ERDOGAN'S MESSAGE TO LARIJANI

Tags:  KNUC PARM PREL UN IR TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002666 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2026
TAGS: KNUC PARM PREL UN IR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY/IRAN: PM ERDOGAN'S MESSAGE TO LARIJANI

REF: A. ANKARA 2598 (NOTAL)

B. ANKARA 2640

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002666

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2026
TAGS: KNUC PARM PREL UN IR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY/IRAN: PM ERDOGAN'S MESSAGE TO LARIJANI

REF: A. ANKARA 2598 (NOTAL)

B. ANKARA 2640

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary. Prime Ministry advisor Ahmet Davutoglu told
Ambassador May 10 that PM Erdogan delivered a strong message
to Iranian National Security Secretary Ali Larijani during
the latter's May 8 visit to Ankara, warning Iran that it must
regain the international community's trust by behaving
transparently with regard to its nuclear program. Davutoglu
said there may have been a slight opening toward resumed
negotiations with the IAEA, but did not press the point. The
Turks rebuffed Iranian complaints that the IAEA is
politicized and assertions that China and Russia are on
Iran's side. Erdogan will likely see President Ahmadinejad
at the May 12-13 D-8 meeting in Bali. Ambassador urged
Turkey to continue sending clear messages to Tehran and
welcomed further U.S.-Turkey consultations. End Summary


2. (C) Davutoglu said FM Gul's meeting with Larijani was
one-on-one in order to express Turkey's concerns regarding
Iran's nuclear program more forcefully. In his subsequent
meeting with Larijani, PM Erdogan made clear Turkey opposes a
nuclear-armed Iran. He warned that Iran needed to change
negative international perceptions by cooperating fully and
openly with the IAEA. Larijani pointed to the conclusion of
the IAEA's latest report, suggesting that no evidence of a
nuclear weapons program had been found. In response, the
Turkish side directed his attention to the report's paragraph
citing gaps of knowledge concerning the Iranian nuclear
program. It urged Iran to close that knowledge gap and end
the speculation about its nuclear program. Davutoglu said
Erdogan told the Iranians that Turkey does not want another
crisis in the region, pointing to the effects of the conflict
in Iraq.


3. (C) Larijani reportedly complained that the IAEA is
politicized and not objective. Turkish officials reportedly
pushed back. They noted that El-Baradei had issued an
objective report on the absence of a nuclear weapons program
in Iraq, despite the convictions of some that one existed.
This and other things pointed to El-Baradei's integrity.

They urged the Iranians not to hide information from the IAEA.


4. (C) Larijani appeared confident China and Russia were on
Iran's side and would block a Chapter 7 UNSC resolution,
according to Davutoglu. Erdogan warned him against such
assumptions and told Larijani clearly that Turkey would
adhere to any UN Security Council resolution that is adopted.
Larijani tried to redirect the conversation to Iraq,
alleging U.S. contacts with the PKK there. Davutoglu said
the Turkish side cut off these excursions; Larijani later
repeated them in his public remarks.


5. (C) Davutoglu said there might have been a slight
softening of the Iranian attitude compared to previous
encounters. Larijani spoke less on Iran's right to pursue
nuclear technology. Several times he suggested that the
Iranians were "ready" to resume negotiations with the IAEA.
Davutoglu opined that Iran knows its limits, making it all
the more important to continue intensive diplomacy and
maintain "meaningful" diplomatic pressure on Tehran.


6. (C) Davutoglu said Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon would
be the worst scenario for Turkey. Besides the humanitarian
imperative of avoiding the spread of WMD, Iran's possession
of nuclear weapons would drastically change the regional
balance of power. Davutoglu noted Iran's expanding influence
in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian
territories, reaching all the way to China. Iran seeks to
paint its anti-PKK measures as supporting Turkey, while
spreading false information about U.S.-PKK contacts,
Davutoglu explained. Using such propaganda, Iran seeks to be
the anti-American and anti-Western voice of all Muslims,
Davutoglu warned, and a nuclear weapons capability is key to
these designs.


7. (C) Seeking to explain PM Erdogan's recent meeting with
Iranian President Ahmadinejad at the ECO summit in Baku and
noting the possibility of another Erdogan-Ahmadinejad

ANKARA 00002666 002 OF 002


conversation on the margins of the D-8 conference in Bali,
Davutoglu said that President Sezer would normally attend
such meetings but had cut back his travel schedule for health
reasons. As a result, PM Erdogan has had to fill in.
Davutoglu indicated that Erdogan's message would be the same
as that delivered to Larijani.


8. (C) Davutoglu asked Ambassador what the U.S. wanted
Turkey to do to be helpful on Iran. Davutoglu said he
understood we were not looking for Turkey to mediate, but
rather to influence Iran. To do that Turkey must engage
Iran, he stated. Turkey will be affected most by any
conflict with Iran, as a neighboring state and given Iran's
position astride Turkey's access to Central Asia. Turkey
wants to know what the next steps will be and wants to
consult with the U.S. as matters go forward. Ambassador
noted that Secretary Rice had not argued against a Larijani
visit when she was here in April, but focused on the message
he should get. We appreciated the fact that Turkish
officials gave him the right messages. Turkey's voice with
others in the international community can have impact.
Ambassador said it would not be a good idea for Ahmadinejad
to visit Turkey or for other high-level visits to take place.
At a minimum, there should be no surprises, and we should
consult before any major steps are taken. Turkey should
avoid being perceived as seeking a mediating role, thereby
undercutting the EU-3 and IAEA. Ambassador noted that the
Foreign Ministry planned to send a high-level group to
Washington to discuss Iran in the next weeks and stressed
that the U.S. welcomed the opportunity for further
consultations.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON