ACCUSATIONS OF GOT MEDDLING IN JUDICIARY RING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002596

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE TU
SUBJECT: ACCUSATIONS OF GOT MEDDLING IN JUDICIARY RING
HOLLOW


Classified by DCM Nancy McEldowney; reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (U) Summary: Judicial officials and opposition politicians
often accuse Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP) of stocking the judiciary with judges and prosecutors
who share the party's Islam-oriented views. Most contacts,
however, say the accusations are alarmist. They note that
applicants must clear a number of hurdles to enter the
judiciary, and that it takes at least 15 years for a jurist
to qualify for a high-level position. They also say AKP is
no more biased in its judicial appointments than previous
governments. At the same time, they acknowledge that the
judiciary is not fully independent and requires reform, a
point echoed in several EU reports on Turkey. End Summary.

--------------
PM: How Can You Blame AKP?
--------------


2. (U) The presidents of both the Constitutional Court and
the High Court of Appeals made public comments in April
indicating, without detail, that AKP has been politicizing
the judiciary. Such statements have become common among
AKP's critics. PM Erdogan issued a sharp rebuttal in an
April 16 interview with the daily Hurriyet. The PM averred
that it is not plausible to imagine that AKP has been molding
the judiciary in its own image during its short tenure in
power since the November 2002 elections. Noting the strict
requirements for entering the profession, and the long years
needed to advance, Erdogan pointed out that the vast majority
of judges and prosecutors were appointed by previous
governments. "We came to power only three years ago," he
said. "If there is politicization in the judiciary, then it
involves judges and prosecutors recruited by our
predecessors. How can you blame AKP for this?"

--------------
Strict Requirements Limit Political Influence
--------------


3. (U) We discussed the issue with a wide range of contacts
holding a variety of views on AKP. Most agreed that Erdogan
has a strong argument. According to the Ministry of Justice
(MOJ),508 of Turkey's 9,012 judges and prosecutors have been
appointed since AKP rose to power. To become a judge or
prosecutor, an applicant must earn a law degree, pass three
exams, and complete a two-year apprenticeship. Jurists begin
their careers in rural, less developed "Category Five" cities
and gradually move up to large "Category One" cities. It
takes at least 15 years to rise to Category One, and strict
regulations require that appointees to top positions -- such
as chief public prosecutors and judges on high courts -- be
at the Category One level.


4. (U) The Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors
controls assignments and promotions within the judiciary.
Five of seven Council members are appointed by the President
(currently a staunch secularist) from among a list of high
court judges. The Justice Minister and his Undersecretary
also serve on the Council; the Justice Minister is Council
president.


5. (C) Aykut Kilic, MOJ director general for International
Law and Foreign Relations, averred to us that the strict
requirements of the judicial system protect it from excessive
political interference. He noted that the first, written
exam for prospective jurists is controlled by an independent
government agency. The second, oral exam is run by the MOJ,
providing the first opportunity to screen candidates with
political/religious bias. Kilic said he assumes the AKP
government, like previous governments, favors like-minded
applicants to the extent possible. But he said the space for
political influence is limited, given that MOJ officials
administering the oral exam can only choose among the small
number of jurists who have cleared the previous career
hurdles.


6. (C) In 2005, the GOT adopted legislation that would have

ANKARA 00002596 002 OF 003


allowed the MOJ to recruit practicing attorneys as judges and
prosecutors through an expedited process. GOT officials said
the move was designed to meet the urgent need of filling
4,000 vacant positions. AKP critics, however, asserted it
was an attempt to recruit Islam-oriented jurists. President
Sezer vetoed the legislation, and the GOT subsequently
dropped it. Sami Selcuk, a former president of the High
Court of Appeals who ran for parliament as a Motherland Party
candidate, told us the AKP initiative was no different from
similar efforts by previous governments desperate to fill
chronic staffing gaps in the judiciary.


7. (C) Vahit Bicak, attorney and former AKP-appointed head of
the GOT's Human Rights Presidency, told us AKP is no more
biased than previous Turkish governments when it comes to the
judiciary. He noted that Mehmet Mogultay, who served as
Justice Minister in the 1990s as an MP of the left-of-center
Social Democratic People's Party, was accused by opposition
parties of favoring leftist jurists. To this, Mogultay
famously retorted: "What do you expect me to do, appoint
judges from the (ultra-nationalist) Nationalist Movement
Party?" Bicak said the accusations against AKP reflect the
frustrations of AKP's critics over the lack of an effective
political alternative.

--------------
Judiciary Lacks Independence
--------------


8. (C) Ayse Arikan, former head of the MOJ General
Directorate for EU Affairs, has a different view. Arikan
resigned from the ministry recently, largely out of
frustration with what she views as AKP interference with the
judiciary and MOJ bureaucracy. She told us that the Turkish
judiciary is far less independent in practice than it
appears. While it is true that the Justice Minister and his
Undersecretary wield only two of seven votes on the Supreme
Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, she said, the MOJ
dominates Council decisions through its control of the body's
funding. The Council meets in MOJ facilities and has no
separate budget. The MOJ provides Council members with
official vehicles (which Arikan said are often used for
personal needs) and pays the bills when Council members
participate in international conferences or visit regional
courts in Turkey. Arikan said Council members technically
can vote down an appointee proposed by the Justice Minister,
but they would pay a heavy price, as the Minister could
respond by cutting off their perquisites.


9. (C) Bicak told us he agrees that the Council lacks
independence, though he doesn't share Arikan's views on the
extent of MOJ influence. In addition to the points raised by
Arikan, Bicak noted that the MOJ maintains full authority
over the group of inspectors that drafts performance
evaluations for judges an prosecutors. The Council relies
on these evaluations when it reviews candidates for
promotion, or disciplinary sanction. The Council was more
independent before the 1980 military coup -- it had its own
budget and supervised the inspectors, for example. The
military-drafted, post-coup Constitution established the
current system. The EU has issued a number of reports
maintaining that MOJ influence over the Council undermines
judicial independence, and calling for reform.


10. (C) Arikan, who joined MOJ in 1989, averred that AKP has
demonstrated less respect for the concept of judicial
independence than previous governments. She recalled once
learning that a new employee had been assigned, without her
knowledge, to work for her at the EU Affairs department. He
was a qualified jurist, but spoke poor English (though his
Arabic was strong) and had no background in EU matters. She
said many positions in the ministry have similarly been
filled with unqualified AKP favorites. Moreover, she said,
the MOJ personnel department systematically has been seeking
out jurists who attended imam hatip (Islamic preacher) high
schools and submitting their names for appointments in both
the judiciary and MOJ bureaucracy.


ANKARA 00002596 003 OF 003



11. (C) According to Bicak, however, even if what Arikan says
is true, these practices could not have changed the
orientation of the judiciary. Given the rigid bureaucratic
controls on career advancement, a government would have to be
in power for more than 20 years before it could really make
an imprint on the judiciary, he said.

--------------
Comment: AKP Not the Only Outside Influence
--------------


12. (C) The charge that AKP is dramatically overhauling the
judiciary rings hollow, given the rigid hierarchy of the
Turkish system. That is not to say, however, that the
judiciary is completely independent. In addition to the
above-noted structural arrangements allowing the MOJ to
influence the Supreme Council of Judges and Public
Prosecutors, the judiciary is also subject to other powerful
outside influences. This was clear, for example, in March
when a prosecutor in Van Province lost his job, and his
license to practice, after naming Land Forces Commander
Buyukanit in an indictment. Moreover, the Turkish General
Staff regularly issues letters to prosecutors advising them
to open cases against individuals who make statements that
military officials believe violate the law, and prosecutors
often follow through on these requests. Change is needed in
the Turkish judiciary - to decrease the influence of the MOJ
and the military and ensure more predictability and rule of
law; least of all in the appointments system.



Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON