DEEPENING ANTI-PKK COOPERATION WITH GERMANY

S E C R E T ANKARA 002539

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR OTI - RLEBENSON AND JSERAFINI
NSC FOR MERKEL
EUCOM FOR CHRIS BURDICK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2010
TAGS: KTFN PTER EFIN PGOV TU GE
SUBJECT: DEEPENING ANTI-PKK COOPERATION WITH GERMANY

REF: A. STATE 013857


B. TD-314/25971-06

C. BERLIN 988

D. BERLIN 889

E. ANKARA 2417

F. 05 ANKARA 7497

G. 05 STATE 186669

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Following the productive launch of
discussions with German authorities on combating illegal PKK
support activities in Germany, we may wish to consider
bringing Turkish services directly into the conversation with
German counterparts in the trilateral exercise foreseen by
ref A. Using the German analytical paper (ref B) as a
starting point, establishing a law enforcement/intelligence
working group would ensure maximum information-sharing and
lead development between Germans, Turks and Americans and
would help break down barriers between intelligence, law
enforcement and foreign ministry officials. It will also be
important to take maximum advantage of anti-money laundering
and terrorism finance tools. Germany could help strengthen
the spines of other European countries that take a more
tolerant approach to PKK criminality. End Summary.

--------------
Break Down Barriers with a Working Group
--------------


2. (S) As refs C and D clearly demonstrate, there has been
a positive initial reaction from German officials to our
approaches on PKK, and German officials -- unlike German
courts -- take a hard-nosed approach to PKK without illusions
that the PKK is merely a political movement. While we defer
to our colleagues in Embassy Berlin, our sense is that we
need to move smartly to take advantage of this good start in
ways that keep Turkey fully engaged and increase the
likelihood of reaching results that disrupt PKK networks.


3. (S) The German report on PKK activities shared with us
(ref B) could be a springboard for launching this effort.
Using this paper as a starting point, German, U.S. and
Turkish intelligence experts could identify gaps in our
collective knowledge of PKK activities in Germany. They
could then work with their respective agencies to prioritize
and target those information gaps for collection and action.
After a careful reconciliation of what the three countries
collectively know and do not know about PKK support
activities in Germany, we would then be in a better position
to determine next actions.

--------------
Maximum use of AML/CTF tools
--------------


4. (S) At the same time, as was suggested by French
authorities for France, there could be utility in further
discussion with German counterparts of the possible use of
anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing
(AML/CTF) tools to disrupt financing flowing to PKK
headquarters in northern Iraq. In ref C, the Interior
Ministry Counterterrorism DG told Embassy Berlin that Germany
had made good progress gathering information on the PKK,
particularly on the financing side. We recommend Washington
and Berlin consider checking into how well law enforcement
and intelligence information is flowing to agencies
responsible for financial crimes, and whether Germany is
using the EU Clearinghouse designation of PKK and KGK to
freeze assets of individuals and front organizations.
Likewise, PKK individuals and fronts may be vulnerable to
money-laundering charges.
-------------- --------------
Leveraging German Experience and No-nonsense Approach
-------------- --------------


5. (S) Germany's experience monitoring and combating the
PKK and its sober, unromantic view of the terrorist
organization is also an opportunity to leverage with other
European countries. Asking German officials to brief
European counterparts on their experience with PKK would
impart knowledge and also send a signal that all countries
need to take PKK more seriously. This might be particularly
fruitful in countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and
the Scandinavian countries, which were criticized by the
German Interior Ministry DG for their generous asylum and
free speech policies. PKK abuse of asylum and refugee status
might be a particularly fruitful area for Germany to share
its expertise with others, given Schindler's statements that
Germany no longer allows such status to be granted to PKK
figures, and given the large number of PKK operatives who
have obtained -- and abuse -- their asylum or refugee status
in western European countries.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON